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iINTRODUCTION
The subject of this thesis is sovereign debt and the restructuring of sovereign debt, which is 
analysed in a historical prospective, going through the cycle of restructurings that hit developing 
countries in the 1980ies and 1990ies, moving to very recent cases, which affected not yet emerging 
economies but European countries.
Debt restructurings are a recurrent theme in the history of countries and was recently back on the 
spotlight due to the financial crisis that required the debt of certain European countries to be 
restructured, challenging the idea that sovereign debt restructuring is an issue concerning 
developing countries only.
The financial issue of the unsustainability of the debt is also put into a social context, to highlight 
the consequences on the population, which ultimately pays the price for the default of its own 
country. The international community realised and recently promoted the idea that the concept of 
sustainable development is intertwined with a sustainable debt profile of each state, given that 
the funds required to service an unsustainable debt service are ultimately diverted from social 
uses and to the extent multilateral financial aid is destined to repay the external indebtedness of 
the country, no social development can be expected.
The focus of the thesis is on the techniques used in past and recent sovereign crisis to deal with 
the restructuring of the debt and the changed panorama in which restructurings take place, 
comparing the Latin American restructurings of the 1980ies against more recent cases, such as 
Greece. 
It is, first of all, worth noting that experience plays an important role: the more the financial 
communities and the practitioners themselves are used to deal with this kind of situations, the 
fastest and more organised the process of restructuring becomes, due to the fact that both the 
investors and the sovereign countries (and respective advisors) know what they will be dealing 
with and what the possible outcomes are. 
During the Mexican crisis, in the 1980ies, a considerable amount of time was spent in order to 
find viable financial structures to implement the restructuring and to coordinate the parties 
involved. On the other hand, the Greek restructuring was extremely fast and efficient in terms of 
choosing and implementing the technical structure required to complete the reprofiling of the 
indebtedness, proving that the experience matured in the past decades created a valuable know 
how which is now a key element for successful debt restructurings.
There is no fix pattern in sovereign debt restructuring, as each country has its own peculiarity in 
terms of structure of the debt and creditors and historical background, however, each process 
uses a set of instruments which are combined and tailored to the specific cases, such as 
ii
“haircuts”, rescheduling of the debt, exchange of “old” debt with new debt, equity swaps, which 
are all analysed in chapter three and four of this thesis.
A key element in distinguishing sovereign restructurings is the moment in time when the 
negotiations with its creditors begin: in some cases, governments prefer to engage with the 
creditors at an early stage of the financial crisis, when service of the debt is still kept current, but it 
is known that payment of such debt is not sustainable in the long term. This kind of approach is 
often referred to as “pre-emptive” restructuring, and they generally tend to be concluded within a 
short timeframe and with widespread cooperation and recovery of access to the international 
financial markets shortly after.
In some other cases, on the other hand, governments do not approach their creditors prior to the 
default, but they do announce to the market that they are not in a position to service their debt 
and therefore a restructuring process is required (so-called “post-default restructurings”) and 
payment of the debt is not restored until a settlement is reached. In this second scenario, it has 
been observed that the sovereigns may obtained a larger debt relief, given that the act of 
defaulting results into a shift of bargaining power, due to the fact that there are no other options 
and the creditors are more or less “forced” to accept the proposal put forward by the relevant 
government in order for the service of the debt to be restored.
It has been observed that the choice of the countries to opt for pre-emptive restructurings is 
usually linked to the willingness to avoid reputational losses on the market and preserving the 
image of creditworthiness amongst the other players in the sovereign debt context.1
It is also worth noting, on the other hand, that the decision of certain governments to default is 
usually linked to domestic political, institutional and social factors: for instance Argentina 
defaulted following the fall of an elected government and the decision to default was also 
connected to the political need to settle social unrest which was spreading throughout the country 
and sending to the population a message that there had been a change in the course of economic 
policies to be implemented. 
The complexity of sovereign restructurings is linked to the multiple elements that need to be 
factored in when taking decisions: pure financial issues are intertwined with social domestic 
unrest, international politics and relationships with public and private creditors (naming merely a 
few of them), turning the negotiations into measured assessments of compromises and 
assessments of pros and cons.
In the past 60 years, we assisted to more than 600 cases in 95 countries, of which 450 involved 
public creditors (in particular bilateral loans between governments) and 186 with private sector 
creditors. Historically debt restructurings involving the private sector would consist of bank loans 
rescheduling, however the implementation of the Brady plan in the late 1990ies (see chapter 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 J.	Diaz-Cassou,	A.	Eroe-Dominguez	and	J.	Vasquez-Zamore,	Recent	Episodes	of	Sovereign	Debt	Restructurings:	
a	case	study	approach,	Documentos	Ocasionales	n.	0804,	Banco	de	Espana,	available	at:	www.dbe.es.
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three) resulted into a switch from bank loans to bonds so that recent cases of debt restructurings 
consisted in exchange of existing bonds with newly issued bonds with different economics, 
marking a new era of sovereign debt restructurings, with features which closely follow corporate 
restructurings.
The aim of most of the researches on this subject is the study of a model which can ensure a high 
level of predictability in terms of outcome of the restructuring process. The comparison is usually 
made with corporate restructuring procedures, whereby corporations facing financial issues can 
choose between the statutory procedures that each jurisdiction offers in order to achieve the best 
outcome with minimal losses and the required level of protection offered by national courts.
In the international context, there are neither statutory procedures nor international courts that 
can overview such procedures, hence the quest for a framework which can grant the same 
features that national procedure can offer, namely: (i) protection from enforcement procedures 
during the negotiation of the restructurings; (ii) rescue financing which receives super priority 
status, in order to provide new finance to alleviate liquidity issues in defaulted countries; (iii) 
cram-down procedures to protect debtors from hold out creditors taking advantage of the 
weakness of the defaulted borrower to obtain highly remunerative pays out at the expenses of the 
population  and of multilateral creditors granting debt relief and loans at concessional terms.
In the following chapters the two main proposals to deal with the lack of an established 
mechanism to deal with sovereign debt restructurings will be analysed. Certain members of the 
International Monetary Fund advocated the first proposal, in particular the First Deputy 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Anne Krueger, which suggested a 
statutory approach, the so called Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), to be 
adopted by the market participants by means of an amendment to the Articles of Agreement of 
the IMF itself. The SDRM however met several critiques and remains a theoretical approach 
which did not convinced the market players.
The second proposal involves contractual techniques rather than statutory changes and advocates 
the introduction of Collective Action Clauses in the instruments regulating the terms of sovereign 
bonds, in order to set out the process to be followed between creditors and debtors in the context 
of a restructuring in terms of negotiations and voting provisions, dealing in particular with the 
issue of hold out creditors and lack of cram-down procedures.2
                                                                                                                                                 
2 On	the	comparison	between	SDRM	and	market	based	approach	see	J.	Sedlak,	Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring:	
statutory	reform	or	contractual	solution?,	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review,	2004,	pp.	1483-1515	and	
D.	K.	Tarullo,	Neither	order	nor	chaos:	 the	 legal	 structure	of	 sovereign	debt	workouts,	Emory	Law	 Journal,	
2004,	pp.	657- 689.
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Furthermore, to better understand the context of debt restructuring, the second chapter sets out 
an overview of the kind of debt that developing (and non developing) countries may find on the 
market and the main characteristics of each type of debt. As it will be further explained in the 
following chapters, the kind of debt will also influence the kind of restructuring that will be 
required (although, as mentioned, the predictability of sovereign debt restructuring is quite 
limited, due to the multiplicity of economical, political and social issues involved).
Although there are no full answers yet, the aim of this thesis is to highlight the progresses which 
have been made in the contractual sovereign debt restructuring techniques, whose development 
was favoured by the mutated financial context, whereby bonds debt replaced the vast majority of 
bank loans debt, establishing the beginning of a new era in  the sovereign debt restructuring.
1CHAPTER ONE
SUSTAINABLE 
DEBTS
1) THE UNITED NATIONS SUMMIT ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCE –
MONTERREY 2002
The concept of sustainable development was proclaimed as one of essential objective of 
the international community in 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED or Earth Summit). Sustainable development 
includes ecologically sustainable human development, which involves economic 
development as well. The acknowledgment of the interconnection between poverty and 
environmental degradation pushed the international community to seek to address these 
problems together, adding the adjective “sustainable” to “development”. The idea 
underlying this new approach was to protect and restore the environment and promote 
peace and security, economic and social development at the same time.
The outcome of the UNCED was an ambitious action plan called “Agenda 21”3, that 
includes a comprehensive international program for the twenty first century and a 
declaration of principles, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development4, 
whereby the right to a healthy environment and the right to development, for present 
and future generations of humankind was stated.
Agenda 21 makes reference to economical and financial aspects acknowledging that 
promoting a sustainable development pattern would have requested a considerable 
financial support to developing countries. 
Amongst the objectives to be reached by the plan of action of the international 
community, purely financial aspects are highlighted, namely:
 negotiation of commercial bank debt reduction for heavily indebted 
countries;
 negotiation mentioned above has to take due account of both the medium-
term debt reduction and new money requirements of the debtor country;
 engagement of multilateral institutions strengthening international debt 
strategy to continue to support debt-reduction packages related to 
                                                                                                                                     
3 See	http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/
4 the	 Rio	 Declaration	 is	 composed	 by	 twenty	 seven	 principles	 set	 out	 in	 order	 to	 guide	 the	
implementation	 of	 Agenda	 21.	 See	
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163
2commercial bank debt with a view to ensuring that the magnitude of such 
financing is consonant with the evolving debt strategy;
 creditor banks to participate in debt and debt-service reduction;
 policies to attract direct investment, avoid unsustainable levels of debt and 
foster the return of flight capital.
Following the Earth Summit, the concept of sustainable development has been included 
in several multilateral and regional treaties, including the constituent treaty of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) dated 19945, in the Treaty on the European Union dated 19926, 
and in other international instruments, as the 1992 Climate Change Convention7 and the 
1992 Biodiversity Convention8. Sustainable development was also discussed in 
judgments of the International Court of Justice9 and of the dispute settlement body of the 
WTO.10
A second important international acknowledgment to sustainable development was 
made in 2000, in the Millennium Declaration11of the General Assembly fixed the 
Millennium Development Goals which, make express reference to achieving sustainable 
environmental development.
                                                                                                                                     
5 The	treaty	recognises:	“	that	their	relations	in	the	field	of	trade	and	economic	endeavour	should	
be	conducted	with	a	view	to	raising	standards	of	living,	ensuring	full	employment	and	a	large	and	
steadily	growing	volume	of	real	 income	and	effective	demand,	and	expanding	the	production	of	
and	 trade	 in	goods	and	services,	while	allowing	 for	 the	optimal	use	of	 the	world’s	 resources	 in	
accordance	with	the	objectives	of	sustainable	development,	seeking	both	to	protect	and	preserve	
the	 environment	 and	 to	 enhance	 the	 means	 for	 doing	 so	 in	 a	 manner	 consistent	 with	 their	
respective	 needs	 and	 concerns	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 economic	 development”,	 Agreement	
Establishing	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organisation,	 Marrakesh,	 15	 April	 1994	 see	 at	
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.
6 Article	6	of	the	Treaty	on	the	European	Union	sets	the	objective	of	“economic	and	social	progress	
as	 well	 as	 a	 high	 level	 of	 employment	 and	 the	 achievement	 of balanced	 and	 sustainable	
development”,	 Treaty	 on	 European	 Union,	 Maastricht	 7	 February	 1992,	 see	 at	 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html.
7 See	full	text	at	http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
8 See	full	text	at	http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf.
9 The	 full	 recognition	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 sustainable	 development	 was	 given	 in	 the	 Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros	 Project	 Case:	 “new	norms	 and	 standards	 have	 been	 developed,	 set	 forth	 in	 a	 great	
number	 of	 instruments	 during	 the	 last	 two	 decades.	 Such	 new	 norms	 have	 to	 be	 taken	 into	
consideration,	and	such	standards	given	proper	weight,	not	only	when	States	contemplate	new	
activities,	 but	 also	 when	 continuing	 activities	 begun	 in	 the	 past.	 The	 need	 to	 reconcile	
development	with	protection	of	the	environment	is	aptly	expressed	in	the	concept	of	sustainable	
development”.	Gabcikovo-Nagymaros	Project	 Case	 (Hungary/Slovakia)	 Judgement,	 25	 September	
1997,	ICJ	Reports	1997,	p.	241.
10 The	decision	which	clearly	stated	the	relevance	of	the	principle	of	sustainable	development	is	in	
the	Shrimp-Turtles	case	in	1998,	whereby	the	Appellate	Body	states:	“	(…)	the	preamble	attached	
to	the	WTO	Agreement	shows	that	the	signatories	to	the	Agreement	were,	in	1994,	fully	aware	of	
the	importance	and	legitimacy	of	environmental	protection	as	a	goal	of	national	and	international	
policy.	The	preamble	of	the	WTO	Agreement	– which	informs	not	only	the	GATT	1994	but	also	the	
other	 covered	agreements- explicitly	 acknowledges	 ‘the	objective	of	 sustainable	development’”.	
United	States- Import	Prohibition	of	Certain	Shrimp	and	Shrimp	Products,	Report	of	the	Appellate	
Body,	Doc	WT/DS58/AB/R,	para	129.
11 Millenium	Declaration,	see	full	text	http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.
3The Millennium Development Goals take also into account the financial point of view, 
defining the eighth goal also as: “worldwide collaboration to promote development must 
be formalised with agreements on good governance, the development of an open, honest, 
predictable, rule based and non-discriminatory trade and financial system, a solution for 
the debt problem and the transfer of new technology”.12
Millennium Development Goals generally and in particular goal no. 8 are the starting 
point of a new focus on the issue of how to finance sustainable development and the 
issue of debt sustainability of developing countries. In order to find an answer to the 
issue of how to find the economical resources to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals, in 2002 a UN summit on development finance was held in Monterrey, also known 
as the Monterrey consensus on development finance13.
The Monterrey consensus represents the first international forum dedicated entirely to 
the issue of how to finance development. Its importance is also given by the fact that it 
was able to bring together all relevant stakeholders in an unprecedented inclusive way. 
All parties contributed to create a policy framework to guide their respective future effort 
to deal with the issue of financing development at national, regional, international and 
systemic levels.
The final report of the conference highlights six main actions to be carried out by the 
international community, namely: 
 the need to mobilise domestic finance resources for development;
 the need to mobilise international resources, either as foreign direct investments 
and other private flows; 
 international trade; 
 increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development; 
 debt sustainability; and 
 promoting coherence, governance and consistency of the international monetary, 
financial and trading systems.14
The first point addressed by the Monterrey Consensus relates to the importance of the 
domestic financial resources of a country. The elements that need to be improved in such 
context are several: starting from the macroeconomic policy of a country, good 
governance and market oriented policies, together with establishing a regulatory 
                                                                                                                                     
12 See	Un	fact	sheet	at	http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_FS_8_EN.pdf.
13 See	 final	 text	 of	 the	 Monterrey	 Consensus	 at	
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf
14 See	above,	final	text	of	the	Monterrey	Consensus.
4framework to encourage public and private initiatives and fight against corruption. Tax 
policies are mentioned as well both as need for prudent fiscal policies and fiscal 
sustainability. 
The second point focuses on how to attract international funds either by means of private 
initiative, foreign direct investment and other sources such as multilateral development 
banks (such means of providing finance to developing countries will be analysed in the 
following chapter).
The parties gathered in Monterrey urge banks and other financial institutions to take into 
account, in doing their business, social and environmental implications and welcome new 
initiatives, which can satisfy such requirements and meet developing countries needs.15
Furthermore, the parties specifically highlight one of issues which would often affect 
countries in financial crisis: the stability of financial flows and a not sufficiently 
developed and regulated financial market.16 Such issues will be further analysed in the 
context of the analysis of the causes of sovereign debt restructuring in the following 
chapters.
The third point deals with international trade and its key role for economic development. 
One of the initiatives supported in relation to international trade is the accession of 
developing countries to the WTO, in light of a general reduction of trade barriers. 17
Next point on the list is the need for “increasing international financial and technical 
cooperation for development”.18 As first observation, the importance of ODA is 
highlighted especially for those countries not able to attract foreign investments. A call 
for a general rise in the level of ODA granted by developed countries is made, fixing the 
                                                                                                                                     
15 See	para	22	of	 the	Monterrey	Consensus:	 “While	Governments	provide	 the	 framework	 for	 their	
operation,	businesses,	for	their	part,	are	expected	to	engage	as	reliable	and	consistent	partners	in	
the	 development	 process.	We	 urge	 businesses	 to	 take	 into	 account	 not	 only	 the	 economic	 and	
financial	 but	 also	 the	 developmental,	 social,	 gender	 and	 environmental	 implications	 of	 their	
undertakings.	 In	 that	 spirit,	 we	 invite	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions,	 in	 developing	
countries	 as	 well	 as	 developed	 countries,	 to	 foster	 innovative	 developmental	 financing	
approaches.	 We	 welcome	 all	 efforts	 to	 encourage	 good	 corporate	 citizenship	 and	 note	 the	
initiative	undertaken	in	the	United	Nations	to	promote	global	partnerships.”
16 See	 para	 25	 of	 the	 final	 text	 of	 the	Monterrey	 Consensus:	 “We	underscore the	 need	 to	 sustain	
sufficient	and	stable	private	financial	flows	to	developing	countries	and	countries	with	economies	
in	transition.	It	is	important	to	promote	measures	in	source	and	destination	countries	to	improve	
transparency	 and	 the	 information	 about financial	 flows.	 Measures	 that	 mitigate	 the	 impact	 of	
excessive	volatility	of	short-term	capital	flows	are	important	and	must	be	considered.	Given	each	
country’s	varying	degree	of	national	capacity,	managing	national	external	debt	pro- files,	paying	
careful	 attention	 to	 currency	 and	 liquidity	 risk,	 strengthening	 prudential	 regulations	 and	
supervision	of	all	financial	institutions,	including	highly	leveraged	institutions,	liberalizing	capital	
flows	 in	 an	 orderly	 and	 well	 sequenced	 process	 consistent	 with	 development	 objectives,	 and	
implementation,	 on	 a	 progressive	 and	 voluntary	 basis,	 of	 codes	 and	 standards	 agreed	
internationally,	are	also	important.	We	encourage	public/private	initiatives	that	enhance	the	ease	
of	 access,	 accuracy,	 timeliness	 and	 coverage	of information	on	 countries	 and	 financial	markets,	
which	strengthen	capacities	for	risk	assessment.	Multilateral	 financial	 institutions	could	provide	
further	assistance	for	all	those	purposes.”
17 See	final	text	of	the	Monterrey	Consensus	paragraphs	from	26	to	38.
18 See	point	D	of	the	final	text	of	the	Monterrey	Consensus.
5goals of reaching 0.7 of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries 
and 0.15 to 0.20 of GNP to least developed countries.19 A call is made to multilateral and 
bilateral financial and development institutions to move towards a more effective and 
more coordinated action to support economical growth of developing countries, 
including by reducing transactions costs by harmonizing their operational procedures, 
offering more flexible and tailored approaches and promoting the use of ODA as means 
to attract private funds, leveraging additional financing for development.20
As specific point, the relevance of debt sustainability is mentioned as well. It is 
acknowledged the connection between the sustainability of the external debt of countries 
and their actual capacity to develop and to reach the goals set out in the Millennium 
Development Goals. This link will be at the heart of this thesis, which aims at 
highlighting the relevance of the debt situation of a country and the relevance of finding 
solutions to financial crisis in a fast and efficient way in order to minimise the collateral 
effect on the country and allow it to progress on a sustainable development path.
The parties to the conference state the joint liability of debtors and creditors in preventing 
and sorting out issues of debt sustainability. Such position represents a relevant step 
forward in order to require a more ethical approach from lenders, whose behaviour 
would then be under scrutiny together with the debtor’s conduct. Such view is shared by 
some authors which condemn the violation by lenders (both private and public lenders) 
of ethical norms in the context of global finance.21 In particular reference is made to the 
fact that sophisticated lending institutions have taken advantage of their strength in order 
to get more convenient results at the expenses of developing countries, the breach of 
good faith principles by means of providing bad advice to such countries and a lack of 
cooperation in order to help most disadvantaged country. Some examples of such 
unethical approach will be highlighted in the context of the analysis of some sovereign 
debt restructuring processes in chapters three and four.
The shift in the approach to the debt crisis of developing countries in the international 
debate occurred at the end of the 90’ies. At the time of the financial crisis of Malaysia the 
IMF and World Bank rhetoric began to be more borrower sympathetic and started to 
address responsibilities for bad loans to both lenders and borrowers. In 1999 the U.S. 
Treasury Secretary at the time, Robert Rubin, commented on the Malaysia debt crisis: 
“markets by themselves do not necessarily create the conditions that enable markets to 
work most effectively […] it means […] acting to induce creditors and investors in 
industrial countries to weight risks more appropriately, so as to help avoid the excesses 
                                                                                                                                     
19 See	para	42	of	the	final	text	of	the	Monterrey	Consensus.
20 See	para	43	of	the	final	text	of	the	Monterrey	Consensus.
21 See	 C.	 Jochnick	 and	 F.A.	 Preston,	 Sovereign	 debt	 at	 the	 crossroads,	 Oxford	 Scholarship	 Online,	
2006.
6in flows – flows of credit, flows of portfolio investment – that have contributed 
significantly to the crises, and also to reduce the leverage that has contributed 
significantly to the crisis”.22
The need for a more central role played by ethical considerations in the financial field is 
key in order to give guidance to the several players in such complex field such as 
international finance in a globalised world.23
The relevance of external debt relief and other approaches which aim at reducing the 
burden of the most indebted countries is stressed and as further relevant point, the need 
for a structured and efficient mechanism to deal with financial crisis due to the over 
indebtedness of developing countries.24
As final point, the importance of an integrated approach to the issue of financing 
development, taking into account the deep interconnection between international 
monetary and financial system and the opportunity of development is discussed. A 
globalised world requires a globalised approach to issues so interconnected. 
The global financial crisis proved the analysis carried out by the parties to the Monterrey 
Conference to be right, showing how in a globalised world issues apparently belonging 
exclusively to certain countries affect other members of the financial international 
community requiring therefore an integrated and comprehensive answer.
                                                                                                                                     
22 As	cited	in	R.	P.	Buckley,	Lessons	from	the	Globalisation	of	the	Emerging	Debt	Markets,	in	Journal	of	
International	Business	Law,	2000,	p.	108.	To	compare	such	approach	with	the	previous	one,	held	
during the debt crisis in	the	80’ies,	in	1983	Donal	Regan,	Secretary	of	the	U.S.	Treasury	at	the	time,	
stated:	“I	don’t	think	we	should	just	 let	a	nation	off	the	hook	because	we	are	sympathetic	to	the	
fact	that	they	are	having	difficulty.	As	debtors,	I	think	they	should	be	made	to	pay	as	much	as	they	
can	bear	without	breaking	them.	You	can’t	just	let	your	heart	rule	your	head	in	these	situations”,	
as	cited	in	R.	P.	Buckley,	Lessons	from	the	Globalisation	of	the	Emerging	Debt	Markets,	in	Journal	of	
International	Business	Law, 2000,	p.	108.	
23 “[…]	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 governments	 of	 advanced	 industrial	 countries	 and	 the	 international	
institutions	 that	 they	 dominate	 have	 tried	 to	 manage	 globalization	 in	 ways	 that	 benefit	
themselves,	and	in	particular	special	interests	within	their boundaries.	Principles	of	social	justice	
(or	 even	 democratic	 processes)	 that	 have	 motivated	 political	 activity	 within	 countries	 have	
played	 little	 role	 in	 driving	 global	 economic	 policies	 or	 in	 shaping	 the	 global	 economic	
institutions.	In	a	sense,	economic	globalization	has	outpaced	political	globalization,	if	by	that	we	
mean	 the	 creation	 of	 polity	 in	 which	 shared	 values	 of	 democracy,	 social	 justice	 and	 social	
solidarity	play	out	on	a	global	scale.	Globalization	– the	closer	integration	of	the	countries	of the	
world- implies	 greater	 interdependence	 and	 therefore	 a	 need	 for	 greater	 collective	 action.	
Although	determining	the	principles	that	should	underlie	this	collective	action	is	no	easy	matter,	
this	much	 is	 clear:	 given	asymmetries	of	 information	and	 resulting	market	 failures,	 processes	 I	
which	each	nation	attempts	to	push	for	those	policies	that	are	narrowly	in	their	own	self	interest	
are	not	likely	to	produce	outcomes	that	are	in	the	general	interest.	Ethics	may	be	an	uncertain	and	
imprecise	compass,	but it	at	least	provides	some	guidance	in	a	world	in	which	the	only	beacon,	all	
too	 often,	 points	 in	 the	 wrong	 direction.”,	 C.	 Jochnick	 and	 F.A.	 Preston,	 Sovereign	 debt	 at	 the	
crossroads,	Oxford	Scholarship	Online,	2006,	p.	16.
24 See	para	51	of	the	final	text	of	the	Monterrey	Consensus:	“While	recognizing	that	a	flexible	mix	of	
instruments	 is	needed	 to	 respond	appropriately	 to	countries’	different	economic	circumstances	
and	capacities,	we	emphasize	the	importance	of	putting	in	place	a	set	of	clear	principles	for	 the	
management	 and	 resolution	 of	 financial	 crises	 that	 provide	 for	 fair	 burden-sharing	 between	
public	 and	 private	 sector	 and	 between	 debtors,	 creditors	 and	 investors.	 We	 encourage	 donor	
countries	to	take	steps	to	ensure	that	resources	provided	for	debt	relief	do	not	detract	from	ODA	
resources	intended	to	be	available	for	developing	countries.”
72) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MONTERREY CONSENSUS – DOHA 2008 
The importance of the Monterrey Consensus is further confirmed by the fact that it was 
followed by a second conference in 2008, in Doha, named “Follow-up International 
Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the 
Monterrey Consensus”, summoned in order to check the level of implementation and the 
results achieved in relation to the priorities set out in the Monterrey Consensus.
As further aim, upon review of the status quo, there is the selection of the new goals for 
the coming years. The conference produced, as per the Monterrey event, a final 
declaration, the “Doha Declaration of Financing for Development: outcome document of 
the follow-up international conference on financing for development to review the 
implementation of the Monterrey Consensus” (the Doha Declaration). 25
As general observation, the parties to the conference acknowledged that since 2002 an 
increase in the private and public financial flows towards developing countries had taken 
place, improving the situation of many countries. However, the global financial crisis 
forced the international community to face new challenges and required to work in a 
very different context in respect of 2002.26
The consequences of the change of the international context had an impact on the six 
points of the Monterrey Consensus.
In relation to private initiative, the Conference acknowledged that many developing 
countries benefitted of increasing private investments, however, the distribution of such 
flows between the developing countries was not even, requiring an international 
intervention to support those countries not able to attract private international capital 
flows (i.e. African countries, landlocked developing countries, countries emerging from 
conflict and recovering from natural disasters). The importance of bilateral treaties and 
tax treaties is stressed in order to facilitate foreign investments and the need to provide 
such countries with technical and financial assistance is further confirmed.
                                                                                                                                     
25 The	Conference	was	 held	 in	Doha	 from	29	November	 to	 2	December	 2008.	 See	 full	 text	 of	 the	
Doha	 declaration	 on	 Financing	 for	 Development	 at	
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/documents/Doha_Declaration_FFD.pdf.	
26 See	para	3	of	the	Doha	Declaration:	“We	recognize	that	the	international	context	has	changed	in	
profound	ways	since	we	met	in	Monterrey.	There	has	been	progress	in	some	areas,	but	inequality	
has	widened.	We	welcome	the	substantial	increase	in	public	and	private	flows	since	2002,	which	
has	 contributed	 to	 higher	 economic	 growth	 in	 most	 developing	 countries	 and	 a	 reduction	 in	
global	poverty	rates.	Yet	we	express	our	deep	concern	that	 the	 international	community	 is	now	
challenged	 by	 the	 severe	 impact	 on	 development	 of	 multiple,	 interrelated	 global	 crises	 and	
challenges,	 such	 as	 increased	 food	 insecurity,	 volatile	 energy	 and	 commodity	 prices,	 climate	
change	and	a	global	 financial	crisis,	as	well	as	 the	 lack	of	results	so	 far	 in	 the	multilateral	 trade	
negotiations	and	a	loss	of	confidence	in	the	international	economic	system.”
8A new acknowledgment is also introduced: since 2002 it was observed that the 
perception of a country’s current economic conditions influences greatly the capital flows 
from private investors. Hence the necessity of providing investors with high quality 
information from public sources such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund and private ones like investment advisors and credit-rating agencies. The role of 
these entities will be further analysed in the following chapters, in the context of their role 
in managing debt crisis of developing countries. Credit-rating agency, in particular, play 
a significant role in relation with bonds issued by countries, which represent the biggest 
source of private finance for many developing countries, as it will be described in chapter 
four.
A big achievement of the Monterrey Consensus is recognised in the rise in the levels of 
ODA, which recovered from its declining trends before the Monterrey Conference: ODA 
increased by 40 per cent between 2001 and 2007, thanks also to debt relief policies and 
humanitarian assistance.27 The focus is now set on the way in which aid is delivered to 
developing countries, stressing the importance of reducing transaction costs, improving 
mutual accountability and transparency, the so defined “aid architecture”. 
In relation to the issue of external debt, the idea of introducing a more “borrower 
friendly” approach is mentioned, expressing also worries in relation to the behaviour of 
the so called vulture funds, which are not ethically driven rather profit driven and in the 
recent sovereign debt restructuring proved to be a tough obstacle to the progress of 
profitable and constructive negotiations.28 Such issue will be analysed in detail in chapter 
four.
It is further stressed that the responsibility to maintain the external debt of developing 
countries sustainable is a shared responsibility of the debtor and of the creditors. 
Creditors should check the sustainability status of the debt in relation to changes in the 
debtor situation due, for instance, to natural disasters and create a framework whereby 
they can jointly operate and coordinate their actions taking into account the social and 
economic needs of the country.29 In this context the Debt Sustainability Framework30, 
                                                                                                                                     
27 See	para	42	of	the	Doha	Declaration.
28 “We	recognize	that	important	challenges	remain.	Debt	service	accounts	for	a	significant	portion	of	
the	 fiscal	 budget	 and	 is	 still	 unsustainable	 in	 a	 number	 of	 developing	 countries.	 The	 existing	
international	debt	 resolution	mechanisms	are	creditor-driven,	while	 taking	 into	account	debtor	
country	situations.	More	efforts	are	needed	through	international	debt	resolution	mechanisms	to	
guarantee	equivalent	treatment	of	all	creditors,	just	treatment	of	creditors	and	debtors,	and	legal	
predictability.	We	are	deeply	concerned	about	 increasing	vulture	 fund	 litigation.	 In	 this	respect,	
we	welcome	 recent	 steps	 taken	 to	prevent	 aggressive	 litigation	 against	HIPC-eligible	 countries,	
including	through	the	enhancement	of	debt	buy-back	mechanisms	and	the	provision	of	technical
assistance	 and	 legal	 support,	 as	 appropriate,	 by	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	 institutions	 and	 the	
multilateral	development	banks.	We	call	on	creditors	not	to	sell	claims	on	HIPC	to	creditors	that	
do	not	participate	adequately	in	the	debt	relief	efforts.”,	para	60	of	the	Doha	Declaration.
29 “[…]	Preserving	long-term	debt	sustainability	is	a	shared	responsibility	of	lenders	and	borrowers.	
To	this	end,	we	encourage	the	use	of	the	joint	IMF/World	Bank	Debt	Sustainability	Framework	by	
9introduced by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2005 and 
periodically reviewed, play a central role in helping developing countries in keeping their 
level of debt under control and in making appropriate decision in respect of what kind of 
financing matches their needs best. Debt burden indicators have been elaborated in order 
to detect at an early stage the risks related to excessive indebtedness. The Debt 
Sustainability Framework can help in directing investors as well since they provide rating 
of the debt situation of the country, both in relation to the debt-distress risk and the debt 
vulnerability risk, the latter relating to the kind of debt granted to the country, comparing 
long term financing to short term financing, for instance.31
In conclusion, the commitment of maintaining a comprehensive and diverse multi-
stakeholder follow–up process, including civil society and private sector, is undertaken 
together with the commitment of holding a new follow up meeting before 2013.
Summing up, the Monterrey and the Doha Conference highlight the most relevant 
obstacles in the financial field which developing countries have to deal with in order to 
progress towards the final goal of a permanent debt sustainability which will allow them 
to focus on social, environmental, gender and civil issue in order to achieve sustainable 
development. As it will be shown in the next pages, it is hard to find resources for such 
concerns when basically all the gross national revenues of a country are used to service 
its external debt. 
The change in the attitude of the international actors has also been registered in such 
forum: from a debtor’s problem to the concept of joint liability of debtor and creditors, 
from the idea of debt collection to debt rescheduling and finally to debt sustainability.
In next paragraph, a brief overview of the main challenges developing countries have to 
face in respect of external debt management will be presented.
                                                                                                                                     
creditors	 and	 debtors,	 as	 appropriate.	 Borrowers	 should	 strive	 to	 implement	 sound	
macroeconomic	 policies	 and	 public	 resource	management,	which	 are	 key	 elements	 in	 reducing	
national	 vulnerabilities.	 Particular	 attention	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 keeping	 the	 debt	 sustainability	
frameworks	 under	 review	 to	 enhance	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 monitoring	 and	 analysing	 debt	
sustainability	and	consider	fundamental	changes	in	debt	scenarios,	in	the	face	of	large	exogenous	
shocks,	 including	those	caused	by	natural	catastrophes,	severe	terms-of-trade	shocks	or	conflict	
[…]”	para	64	and	65	of	the	Doha	Declaration.
30 For	 a	 short	 description	 of	 the	 Debt	 Sustainability	 Framework,	 see	 the	 International	 Monetary	
Fund	fact	sheet	at:	https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/jdsf.htm.
31 See	an	example	of	the	debt	sustainability	analysis	carried	out	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund	
and	the	World	Bank	in	relation	to	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Sao	Tome	and	Principe,	dated	6	July	
2012	at	https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2012/dsacr12216.pdf.
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3) SUSTAINABILITY OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 
In this paragraph the main issues in relation to the quest for debt sustainability are briefly 
set out, namely: the need for technical skills, for more transparency and information to 
attract investors, financial regulation, debt sustainability analysis and the issue of an 
effective sovereign debt restructuring mechanism whereby bridge financing is available 
to the debtor and standstill is imposed to creditors in order to avoid opportunistic 
approaches by aggressive funds.
a. Technical skills
Most of the government of developing countries do not possess the same skills and 
information as representatives of foreign investment banks, or representatives of 
more sophisticated and economically mature countries. There is an asymmetry of 
information which puts the negotiating parties at the table in a position, respectively, 
of strength for the lenders and of extreme weakness for the inexperienced borrowers.
As it will be better explained in chapter three, one of the main reasons of the debt 
crisis which occurred in the ‘80ies was the eagerness of bankers to lend the huge 
amount of liquidity which the so called “petrodollars” had brought in the American 
and European markets. Many developing countries were “eased” into massive loans 
which they did not ask for in the first place but were offered by eager bankers which 
would receive bonuses on proportion to the size of the deal. 32
From such experiences it becomes clear the need for technical assistance and training 
in the finance field so that a rebalance of the negotiating position takes place and 
lenders are not in a place where they can take advantage of their more qualified 
experience and borrowers can get what they really need (for instance more long term 
credit rather than short term financing and in a reasonable and sustainable amount) 
from the finance point of view, creating the first step for a sustainability framework.
b. Transparency and information
Being able to offer a clear and complete picture of the financial and economic 
situation of the country is important for two order of reasons: (i) in order to attract 
foreign investors; (ii) to prevent irrational market panic.
                                                                                                                                     
32 See	R.	P.	Buckley,	International	Financial	System,	policy	and	regulation,	Kluwer	Law	International,	
2008,	on	this	point.
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It is crucial then to create a climate to encourage investment and to make it 
transparent and stable so that it can be judged as “investors-friendly”.
Information on the economic and financial situation should be always updated and 
easily accessible to the public. This point is particularly relevant for countries which 
choose as main source of debt the issuance of bonds, as it occurred after the debt 
crisis in the ‘80ies, when bank loans financing had dried up for emerging countries.33
This kind of financing is subject to “contagion” risk: as bonds investor are not always 
particularly expert of developing countries economies, the crisis of one country can 
easily be exported in other countries, creating the contagion. The perception that 
something is going wrong in the country will result into a capital flow out of the 
country, which may affect an economy otherwise sound. Hence the relevance of 
offering clear and qualified information on the economy to the public, in order to 
avoid irrational investors behaviours. In such respect the role played by rating 
agency will be further analysed as well, as their judgment is often key as it is a 
trusted source of information by investors.
However, transparency should not be a one-way obligation, as it has been observed 
by some authors: lending institutions as well should be under an obligation to 
disclose their exposures, especially overleveraged hedge funds34, in order to facilitate 
the work of policy makers and also in order to make easier to deal with the problems 
of the international financial markets.35
                                                                                                                                     
33 “The	debt	crisis	had	not	curbed	the	appetite	of	emerging	market	borrowers	for	external	financing;	
it	 had	 just	 changed	 the	 method	 (securities,	 not	 loans)	 and	 the	 place	 (bond	 markets,	 not	
commercial	banks)	in	which	that	appetite	would	be	sated”,	L.	C.	Buchheit,	A	lawyer’s	perspective	
on	 the	 new	 international	 financial	 architecture,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Business	 Law,	 1999,	 p.	
226.
34 On	this	point	S.	Griffith	Jones	comment:	“Concerning	portfolio	flows	to	emerging	markets,	there	is	
an	important	regulatory	gap,	because	at	present	there	is	no	international	regulatory	framework	
for	taking	account	of	market	or	credit	risks	on	flows	originating	in	institutional	investors	such	as	
mutual	funds	(and,	more	broadly,	on	flows	originating	in	non-bank	institutions).	This	important	
regulatory	gap	needs	 to	be	 filled,	both	 to	protect	 retail	 investors	 in	developed	countries	and	 to	
protect	 developing	 countries	 from	 the	 negative effects	 of	 excessively	 large	 and	 potentially	
reversible	portfolio	 flows.	 Institutional	 investors	 such	as	mutual	 funds	 can,	 in	 view	of	 the	very	
liquid	 nature	 of	 their	 investments,	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 contributing	 to	 currency	 crisis	 in	
developing	countries.”,	S.	Griffith	Jones,	Developing	countries	and	the	new	financial	architecture,	in	
Sovereign	debt,	origins,	 crises	and	restructuring,	V.K.	Aggarwal	and	B.	Granville	eds.,	The	Royal	
Institutes	 of	 International	 Affairs,	 2003,	 p.	 134.	 This	 point	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 following	 one,	
concerning	 financial	 regulation.	 It	 is	 worthy	 mentioning	 that	 the	 Financial	 Stability	 Board	 has	
taken	 into	 account	 this	 issue	 and	 created	 a	 specific	 working	 group	 on	 the	 highly	 leveraged	
institutions	 (HLIs)	 whose	 scope	 of	 work	 concerns:	 “These	 included	 strengthened	 risk	
management	 practices	 by	 HLI	 counterparties	 and	 HLIs,	 enhanced	 regulatory	 oversight	 of	 HLI	
credit	 providers,	 enhanced	 public	 disclosure	 by	 HLIs	 and	 counterparties,	 improvements	 to	
market	 infrastructure,	guidelines	on	good	practices	 for	 foreign	exchange	 trading,	and	enhanced	
market	 surveillance	 by	 national	 authorities.”	 See	 the	 first	 report	 of	 the	 working	 group	 at	
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0203b.pdf.	
35 See	 S.	 Griffith	 Jones,	Developing	 countries	 and	 the	 new	 financial	 architecture,	 in	 Sovereign	 debt,	
origins,	 crises	 and	 restructuring,	 V.K.	 Aggarwal	 and	 B.	 Granville	 eds.,	 The	 Royal	 Institutes	 of	
International	Affairs,	2003,	p.	129.
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c. Financial regulation
This point makes reference to the debate on the need to find a new financial 
architecture as the current structure has been proved not to be able to deal with the 
financial crisis which have widespread especially since the 80’ies.
Solutions to such issue look towards two directions: the first one concerns a reform of 
the international financial markets36, the second one focuses specifically on 
developing countries, trying to make the financial markets of such country more 
robust and less vulnerable to exploitation by unethical investors such vulture funds 
and to the irrational behaviour of the participants to the market.
An important step forward was the institution of the Financial Stability Forum, 
founded in 1999 and composed by the main international financial institutions, 
central banks, ministers of finances whose aim was to create a forum of discussion to 
deal with the risk of systemic instability of the international financial markets and 
how to achieve a more stable international financial architecture. It also had a role of 
control and supervision of the international financial institutions and promoted the 
cooperation of the member states in the field of financial regulation. In 2009, at the G-
20 meeting held in London, it was decided to replace the Financial Stability Forum37
with the International Financial Board.38 This international body tries to be the 
answer to the observation that in a global market, where the crisis of one country
negatively impact on actors in the international financial game across the globe, the 
lack of a single set of rules and the lack of one authority to supervision is the main 
source of instability and the reason why illegitimate conducts can be carried out as 
long as the real crisis explodes. Regulators of a country are left with the hope that 
regulators in other countries carry on their duty to supervision, however in a 
multijurisdictional field such as finance it often happens that the entity which should 
be regulated by multiple jurisdictions are regulated by none.
                                                                                                                                     
36 “The	two	challenges	for	a	new	international	financial	architecture	(IFA)	that	would	support,	not	
undermine,	development	are	thus	twofold:	to	prevent	and	better	manage	(if	they	occur)	currency	
and	 banking	 crisis,	 and	 to	 ensure	 that sufficient	 net	 private	 and	 public	 flows	 go	 to	 developing	
countries,	 including	 emerging	 and	 low-income	ones”,	 S.	Griffith	 Jones,	Developing	 countries	 and	
the	new	financial	architecture,	 in	Sovereign	debt,	origins,	crises	and	restructuring,	V.K.	Aggarwal	
and	B.	Granville	eds.,	The	Royal	Institutes	of	International	Affairs,	2003,	p.	126.
37 On	the	establishment	of	the	Financial	Stability	Forum	and	the	reasons	behind	it	see	J.	Liberi,	The	
Financial	 Stability	 Forum:	 a	 step	 forward	 in	 the	 right	 direction…not	 far enough,	 University	 of	
Pennsylvania	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law,	2003,	pp.	549	– 575.
38 The	 Financial	 Stability	 Board	 is	 located	 in	 Basel	 and	 is	 hosted	 by	 the	 Bank	 for	 International	
Settlements.	 See	 chart	 of	 the	 Financial	 Stability	 Board	 at	
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf.	 See	 list	 of	 its	 members	 at	
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/fsb_members.htm.	
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In order to deal with such issue, the International Financial Board prepared a set of 
principles, the Compendium of Standards39, which are the first attempt to create a 
common set of rules and regulation for authorities around the world. The represent a 
guideline for implementing reforms in the financial field. The relevance of such 
principles is also under the expertise sharing point of view, which was raised by the 
Doha Declaration as well. National authorities of developing countries have access to 
a forum whereby they can discuss technical points, share views and coordinate their 
actions. In order to achieve such goal, it is also desirable that the participation to such 
body by less developed countries is further encouraged: as of today emerging 
economies such as India and Brazil joined it, however there is still a lot to do under 
that point of view. In order to create universal rules the participation of the widest 
number of international actor is fundamental.
From the developing countries perspective, furthermore, capital control will play a 
relevant role in order to avoid the risk of sudden capital outflows due either by some 
difficulty in the country itself or by the so called “Tequila Effect”40 or contagion. 
Capital control can be structured either as a restriction on foreign exchange 
transaction or on capital account transactions (both on capital inflows and capital 
outflows) that the government can shape as taxes or quantitative restrictions to such 
transactions.41
                                                                                                                                     
39 For	 more	 information	 on	 the	 Compendium	 of	 Standards	 see	
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/fsb_members.htm.	 Standards	 are	 organised	 for	
sector	 and	 function.	 A	 general	 set	 of	 principles	 on	 “Key	 Standards	 for	 sound	 financial	 system”	
have	been	elaborated as	well,	which	aim	at	being,	inter	alia,	universal	and	flexible	in	order	to	be	
functional	for	as	many	countries	as	possible.	
40 The	name	comes	from	the	crisis	of	Mexico	in	1994,	due	to	the	depreciation	of	the	peso,	which	had	
as	 consequence	 the	 increase	of	 the	market	 volatility	 of	many	other	developing	 countries	 in	 the	
Latin	American	area,	as	a	massive	outflow	of	capital	was	triggered	by	the	loss	of	confidence	of	the	
investors	in	the	area.	On	financial	contagion	see	R.W.	Kolb,	Financial	contagion,	the	viral	threat	to	
the	wealth	of	nations,	2010.
41 On	the	relevance	of	capital	control	for	developing	countries	see	R.P. Buckley,	International	capital	
flows,	 economic	 sovereignty	 and	 developing	 countries,	 Yearbook	 of	 international	 financial	 and	
economic	law,	1999,	pp.	17-46,	according	to	which:	“[…]	for	as	long	as	a	developing	nation	has	a	
thin	 financial	 market,	 unsophisticated	 private	 sector	 risk	 management	 techniques	 and	 un	
unsophisticated	 and	 under-resourced	 capital	 market	 regulator,	 there	 are	 god	 arguments	 for	
control	on	capital	 in-flows”.	On	the	structure	of	the	new	financial	architecture	see	also	R.	Wade,	
The	Asian	debt-and-development	crisis	of	1997-?:	causes	and	consequences,	World	Development,	
1998,	 pp.	 1535-1553,	 where	 the	 author	 suggests:	 “	 the	 debate	 (i.e.	 on	 the	 international	 new	
regime)	 should	 focus	 on	 questions	 such	 as:	 should	we	make	 a	 sharp	 distinction	 between	 free	
trade	and	free	capital	movements,	seeking	to	encourage	the	former	while	constraining	the	latter?	
Are	international	financial	markets	“efficient”,	can	they	fail,	can	speculation	be	destabilizing?	Has	
the	 growth	 of	 derivative	 markets	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 leverage	 created	 the	 preconditions	 for	
aggressive	 intermediaries,	 such	 as	 hedge	 funds,	 to	 disrupt	 the	 financial	 markets	 of	 smaller	
countries?	 Does	 the	 growing	 securitization	 of	 credit	 in	 response	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 pension	
funds	 and	 mutual	 funds	 require	 the	 development	 of	 new	 forms	 of	 financial	 supervision	
comparable	to	those	which	have	long	existed	for	banks?	How	can	developing	countries	obtain	the	
benefits	of	 international	 lending- in	terms	of	investing	more	than	they	save- while	limiting	their	
exposure	to	the	costs	of	unstable	flows?.”
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d. Debt sustainability analysis
The concept of debt sustainability is a contentious notion: the debate on how to 
define it and which indicators should be taken into account, being also a political 
choice, has lasted for many decades. 
The definition of debt sustainability given by some author, and sharable, is “a 
country debt [is] sustainable if the country can meet its debt-service obligations 
without recourse to debt relief, rescheduling of debt or the accumulation of arrears 
and without unduly compromise growth”. 42
In next paragraph the relevance of the final part of the definition will be taken into 
account: the price for servicing massive amounts of debts is the lack of development 
of the country itself and bitter social consequences for its citizens.
The concept of debt sustainability became quite relevant once the debate on debt 
relief started and was supported by NGOs and the public opinion which cried out for 
the injustice of the situation of such countries suffocated by the burden of massive 
amount of debt.
The outcome of such debate was the institution of the highly indebted poor countries 
institutions (HIPC) whose objectives “[…] included debt sustainability, regularization 
of relations with creditors, poverty reduction, and, as a result of these objectives, 
growth”.43 The HIPC will be further discussed in chapter three.
The analysis of debt sustainability is key also for its preventive function: detect at an 
early stage the weaknesses of the debt structure of a country can avoid crisis if they 
efficiently dealt with.
The IMF carries on a program on debt sustainability, which includes public debt of a 
country and all the external debt (public and private) of such country. The framework 
has three main objectives:
 assess the current debt situation, its maturity structure, whether it has fixed 
or floating rates, whether it is indexed, and by whom it is held;
                                                                                                                                     
42 E.	Baldacci,	K.	Fletcher,	A	framework	for	fiscal	debt	sustainability	analysis	in	low	income	countries,	
in	Helping	countries	develop:	 the	role	of	 fiscal	policy,	eds	S.	Gupta,	B.	 J.	Clements,	G.	 Inchauste,	
2004,	p.130.
43 T.	M.	Callaghy,	 Innovation	in	the	sovereign	debt	regime:	from	the	Paris	club	to	the	enhanced	HIPC	
and	 beyond”,	 the	 World	 Bank	 publications,	 see	 at	
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/4BC77E9BEC2C
AAFC85256E4A00536A04/$file/hipc_wp_sovereign_debt.pdf.	 In	 the	 paper	 it	 is	 analysed	 the	 so	
called	“structural	dilemma”	of	developing	countries:	“A	central	structural	dilemma	of	our	times	is	
the	 emergence	 of	 a	 group	 of	weak	 states	 and	 economies	 that	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 benefit	 as	
easily	 or	 quickly	 from	 economic	 reform	 and	 democratization	 as	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 world.	 This	
dilemma	 poses	 important	 difficulties	 for	 the	 functioning	 and	 evolution	 of	 the	 international	
political	economy	and	for	international	peace	and	conflict”.
15
 identify vulnerabilities in the debt structure or the policy framework far 
enough in advance so that policy corrections can be introduced before 
payment difficulties arise;
 in cases where such difficulties have emerged, or are about to emerge, 
examine the impact of alternative debt-stabilizing policy paths.44
A further instrument to deal with debt sustainability is the Debt Sustainability 
Framework, already mentioned in the previous paragraph. The way the Debt 
Sustainability Framework works is by preparing Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessments (CPIA) for each borrowing country to classify countries by performance 
and determine different debt ratio thresholds for the selected indicators. Some 
authors, however, criticize such approach stating that it is too rigid and it doesn’t 
take into account externalities and sudden shocks of the economies due, for instance, 
to natural disasters.45 It works in relation to the level of debt relief to be granted to 
each country but it is not a comprehensive and conclusive approach to the issue.
e. Debt restructuring mechanisms
The occurrence of a financial crisis is the final stage for a country with an 
unsustainable debt burden. Dealing with the crisis in a fast and efficient way is a key 
point in order not to exacerbate the issue: hence the relevance of the creation of an 
appropriate debt restructuring mechanism for sovereign debt.
Three key points should be covered by such mechanism: (i) providing bridge 
financing to the country in difficulty; (ii) create a moratorium regime during the 
negotiation of the restructuring; (iii) creating a proper framework for negotiation 
with all parties involved.
The first points deals with the fact the in the international financial structure there is 
no “lender of the last resort” which can provide finance to countries in difficulties. 
For many years it has been questioned whether the IMF should play such role, but it 
became clear that the size of the bailouts needed were above the capacity of such 
institution. No financial institution is willing to lend into arrears to a developing 
country during a financial crisis. In order to solve such issue, the example could be 
national insolvency legislations, whereby a super seniority is granted to the new 
                                                                                                                                     
44 See	 IMF	 website	 on	 its	 Debt	 Sustainability	 Advice	 at	
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/index.htm.
45 B.	Ferrarini,	Proposal	for	a	contingency	debt	sustainability	framework,	World	Development,	2008,	
pp.	2547- 2952.
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finance granted to the borrower in financial distress. This point is analysed more in 
depth in chapter four.
The second issue deals with the problem of holdouts. Nowadays the main source of 
finance for countries is bond financing. When a crisis occurs, negotiating with 
thousands and thousands of bondholders, of very different nature, from the 
sophisticated investors such funds and other financial institutions to single private 
investors around the world becomes very difficult. And while the state is trying to 
work out a solution with the majority of such bondholders, it often occurs that single 
creditors break out the negotiation to pursue legal ways, trying to seize assets of the 
debtor located outside its state. If such kind of approaches were not allowed, by 
means of an automatic stay as soon as negotiation for the debt restructuring start, 
opportunistic investors such vulture funds would be discouraged from purchasing 
bonds purely to act in such way or to make its holdout value been paid by the 
country. This point as well will be further developed in the forth chapter.
The final point is a general query regarding the structure of the debt restructuring 
mechanism.46 Forum to deal with classes of debt already exist, such as the Paris Club 
or the London Club, and the intervention of the IMF is also relevant. However a final 
and global solution is still unfound. Two main proposals, the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism, promoted by the IMF and the contractual approach, have 
been raised and will be discussed in the third and forth chapter.
                                                                                                                                     
46 See	E.	J.	Eichengreen,	R.	Portes,	Crisis?	What	crisis?	Orderly	workouts	for	sovereign	debtors,	1995,	
M.	 Megliani,	 Debitori	 sovrani	 e	 obbligazionisti	 esteri,	 2009,	 S.L.	 Schwarcz,	 Sovereign	 Debt	
Restructuring:	a	bankruptcy	reorganisation	approach,	Cornell	Law	Review,	2000,	pp.	956- 1034.
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4) SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: A MODERN 
EXAMPLE 
This final short paragraph aims at bringing the financial crisis of a nation in the context of 
social consequences for its citizens. Very often the truly economic nature of the crisis and 
of the issue do not allow to focus properly on what a debt restructuring process means 
for the population.
Financial crisis means hunger, unemployment, no funds for education, environment 
protection and social services such hospitals and social unrest. It affects mainly 
vulnerable people, which live below the poverty line. 47
Therefore, the need for fast and efficient means to deal with the crisis, and in particular 
the institution of a debt restructuring mechanism is key in order to reduce the length of 
the crisis, which progressively worsts the conditions of the population.
After the Asian crisis in Thailand, such country became one of the top five countries in 
terms of wealth inequality.48 In Mexico, the Tequila crisis in the 90ies had devastating 
effects on the poorer segments of Mexico’s population, as did the crises that preceded it. 
Between 1994 and 1996, the poverty rate increased from 51 to 62 percent.49
In Argentina at the peak of the crisis in 2001, popular masses took to the streets all 
across Argentina, protesting against the economic decline and hardship brought by the 
recession. The protesters then organized in a structured movement, called the piqueteros, 
which gained political force and relevance in the national panorama.
As financial crisis have been interpreted as a “developing countries issues” the recent 
turnaround in the economy of the developed nations shows the financial stability is an 
issue which concerns all states, globally.
                                                                                                                                     
47 “External	debt	harms	countries	in	two	ways.	Diversion	of	resources	that	could	otherwise	be	used	
for	public	services	and	poverty	eradication	is	the	more	obvious	one,	and	is	frequently	the	focus	of	
debt	cancellation	campaigns.	And	indeed,	this	diversion	alone	should	be	grounds	for	cancellation	
of	 debt	 in	 deeply	 impoverished	 countries	 that	 should	 be	 feeding,	 housing,	 and	 educating	 their	
people	 rather	 than	 shipping	 25	 percent-and	 sometimes	 more-of	 their	 national	 revenues	 to	
wealthy	Northern	institutions.	But	probably	more	important	is	the	inextricable	link	between	debt	
and	 countries'	 vulnerability	 to	 the	 demands	 of	multilateral	 creditors.	 An	 indebted	 government,	
viewed	by	private	creditors	as	not	creditworthy,	has	little	choice	but	to	obtain	a	loan	from	the	IMF	
or	World	Bank	if	 it	wants	to	remain	part	of	the	global	economy.	Many	countries	have	signed	up	
for	multiple	structural	adjustment	loans	over	the	last	two	decades,	but	no	proof	has	emerged	that	
more	is	better.	The	requirements	of	the	IMF	and	World	Bank	constrict	economies	and	hit	the	most	
vulnerable	people,	 especially	women	and	 children,	with	disproportionate	 ferocity.”	 S.	Ambrose,	
Social	movements	and	the	politics	of	debt	cancellation,	Chicago	Journal	of	International	Law,	2005-
2006,	pp.	270-271.
48 Data	 from	 Thailand	 Development	 Research	 Institute	 see	 at	
http://www.tdri.or.th/en/php/index.php.
49 See	 E.	 Kalter,	 Policies	 for	 success	 under	 globalisation:	 the	 case	 of	 Mexico,	 IMF	 publication	 at	
http://emstrategies.com/uploads/0302cuba1112_1_.pdf.
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The social consequences of financial distress will be briefly analyzed in relation to a 
recent case which concerns a European country: Greece.
Since the beginning of the crisis the rate of unemployment in Greece climbed to 23.1%, 
with nearly 55% of those aged 15-24 out of work.50
A online newspaper in March 2012 reported: “A humanitarian crisis is unfolding in an 
impoverished Greek city where a deepening economic crisis has left thousands seeking 
food from an international charity more used to helping refugees and bringing aid to 
famine or disaster zones.”51
European readers are not used to such headlines, however that is the concrete evidence of 
the dramatic effects of crisis on the population, in any crisis, the story repeats. A more 
detailed analysis of the debt restructuring process of Greece will be carried out in the 
fourth chapter.
                                                                                                                                     
50 Greek	 unemployment	 soars	 to	 new	 record,	 more	 pain	 ahead,	 in	 Financial	 Post,	 see	 at	
http://business.financialpost.com/2012/08/09/greek-unemployment-rate-soars-to-new-record-
more-pain-ahead/.	 For	 an	 updated	 rate	 of	 unemployment	 in	 Greece	 see	 Eurostat	 statistics	 at	
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=teilm020&tableS
election=1&plugin=1.	
51 D.Kyvrikosaios,	 Poverty-stricken	 Greek	 town	 hits	 new	 low,	 at	
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/30/us-greece-poverty-idUSBRE82T11S20120330.
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CHAPTER TWO
SOVEREIGN EXTERNAL DEBT: SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1) PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DEBT
After the introduction on the growing relevance of the concept of sustainable 
development in the financial field in the first chapter, this second chapter will focus on 
the analysis of the main kind of financing available to developing countries in order to 
meet their financial needs for development.
Broadly speaking, the sources of external (i.e. from foreign third parties creditors) 
financings available to developing countries can be distinguished between “public” 
sources (i.e. funds which are made available by international organizations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF) and “private” sources, offered by private banks in their regular 
banking activity.
Such distinction is relevant also for the purposes of the third chapter and forth chapter, 
which will focus on the restructuring process of sovereign debt, whereby the distinction 
between the interests at stake and negotiation patterns of public and private institutions 
will be analysed and the different attitudes and outcomes of the process will be 
highlighted.
Mention will be made of hybrid entities such as the Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) as 
well, given their growing importance in the international financial system. SWF are 
formally public entities (given that they are owned by the governments) which act as 
private investors and/or lenders.52
SWF will also be analysed not only in their role of actors in the global financial markets, 
but also in relation to the rational for creating such entities as a reaction to the risks 
connected with global financial instability and excessive volatility of the markets, in order 
to protect developing countries from sudden crises as it happened in the ’90 in Asia.53
                                                                                                                                     
52 The	 International	Working	 Group	 of	 Sovereign	Wealth	 Funds,	 established	 by	 the	 International	
Monetary	 Fund,	 defined	 the	 SWF	 as:	 ”SWFs	 are	 special	 purpose	 public	 investment	 funds,	 or	
arrangements.	 These	 funds	 are	 owned	 or	 controlled	 by	 the	 government,	 and	 hold,	 manage	 or	
administer	 assets	 primarily	 for	 medium	 to	 long-term	macroeconomic	 and	 financial	 objectives.	
The	funds	are	commonly	established	out	of	financial	foreign	currency	operations,	the	proceeds	of	
privatisations,	 fiscal	 surpluses,	 and/or	 receipts	 resulting	 from	commodity	 exports.	These	 funds	
employ	 a	 set	 of	 investment	 strategies	which	 include	 investments	 in	 a	 foreign	 financial	 assets.”,	
IMF,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	– A	Work	Agenda,	29	February	2008,	p.	26.
53 See	next	chapter	in	relation	to	the	Asian	crisis	of	the	’90.
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The following paragraphs will describe the characteristics of the kind of financing offered 
by public and private actors in the international financial markets: developing countries 
which will look to achieve a balanced and sustainable mix of long and short54 term debt, 
concessional terms financings, bonds or loans and to select the right counterparty (public 
or private) to deal with. The results of all such choices will bring different results if and 
when the country faces financial difficulties and needs to start a dialogue with its 
creditors, as the following chapters will explain in more detail. 
After the sovereign debt crisis developed in the ‘80ies (which will be analysed in the next 
chapter) the relevance of responsible lending and borrowing in the international financial 
system has been stressed. In order to set out a “responsible lending and borrowing” 
framework, it is necessary to consider the peculiar features of sovereign debt: 55
 Intergenerational tensions: due to the fact that the persons that borrow money 
are not always the ones that will have to repay the sums borrowed. The moral 
hazard of over borrowing is connected to this very reason and in particular in 
relation to money raised to cover budget deficits, wars or bailouts of commercial 
enterprises, as borrowing for long term infrastructure projects and similar long 
term investment do not cause this kind of intergenerational issue, given that 
future generations will benefit of those investments as well.
 Government officials as agents: the debate involves the idea of looking at 
government officials as agents of or trustees for present and future citizens. It 
could be envisaged a fiduciary duty that governmental officials owe to the 
population and they could, consequently, be held responsible for actions in 
breach of such duty.
 Mixed motivations of certain lenders: as already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, profit for the bankers involved will often drive the structuring of the 
loans to certain sovereign borrowers rather than an actual planning for the 
country financial need. In relation to bilateral loans between governments, other 
kind of motivations for lending come into play, such as stimulating exports of 
capital goods from the creditor country or acquiring geopolitical influence over 
                                                                                                                                     
54 Short	term	loans	are	commonly	defined	as	those	loans	with	one	year	maturity	or	less,	while	long	
term	debt	is	the	debt	maturing	later	than	one	year	after	it	is	borrowed.
55 L.	B.	Buchheit	and	G.	Mitu	Gulati	correctly	point	out	that	the	term	“sovereign	debt”	sounds	like	an	
oxymoron:	“A	debt	– at	 least	of	 the	 financial	kind,	suggests	an	obligation	whose	performance	 is	
legally	enforceable	against	the	borrower.	The	word	sovereign,	however,	connotes	an	entity	that	is	
not	 subject	 to	 external	 constraints,	 least	 of	 all	 the	 tiresome	 constraint	 of	 repaying	 borrowed	
money.	Yet	sovereigns	borrow	money	all	of	the	time	and	they	pay	it	back	most	of	the	time.”	See	L.	
B.	Buchheit	and	G.	Mitu	Gulati,	Responsable	Sovereign	Lending	and	Borrowing,	UNCTAD	Discussion	
Papers,	no.	198,	April	2010,	pag.	1.
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the creditor. In both scenarios, however, the likely outcome will be a tendency to 
over-lending/over-borrowing. 
 The absence of a formal bankruptcy mechanism: sovereign borrowers are not 
bound by the rules of national bankruptcy regimes, and this results in both 
positive and negative consequences from the perspective of the sovereign 
borrower. As positive aspect, the creditors know that the only options are either 
to negotiate or to litigate (subject to the uncertainties of being able to enforce such 
judgment). On the other hand, they do not have any moratorium or other kind of 
court-relief orders imposed in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding or so called 
“cram-down” procedures which allow the borrower to force minorities into a 
deal negotiated and approved by the majority of the creditors.
 The sovereign debtor as a defendant: as countries benefit from immunities set 
out in international treaties and agreements, the ability for creditors to satisfy 
their claims over the country’s asset are limited to basically assets located outside 
the country and used for commercial purposes (rules regarding sovereign 
immunities will be further analysed in the forth chapter).56
Given the peculiarities of sovereign finance, just set out, lenders and borrowers will have 
an additional set of duties to comply with, in order to qualify as “responsible” lenders or 
borrowers.
Lenders will have to investigate rather than ignore or pretend not to be aware of the 
fiduciary duties that the government officials have vis-à-vis their citizens, in order not to 
favour corruption and the assumption by debtor countries of the so-called odious debts. 
Motivations to lend should be exclusively linked to commercial objectives rather then 
political ones and accurate due diligence on the borrower should be carried out before 
lending (in order to carefully assess the amount that the borrower will be able to repay) 
and after lending (in order to monitor what the borrower does with the money). 
Furthermore, in order to avoid situations in which the lender’s officers push the borrower 
to request a bigger loan that it needs, due to the fact that their bonuses are based on the 
actual size of the loans, lending institutions should make sure that the interest of the 
officers are aligned with the institutions long-term interests.
On the other hand, borrowers will have to carefully consider the amounts to be borrowed 
on the basis of the financial needs of the country and taking into account the fact that 
servicing the debt will be a long-term burden on the country. In working out the correct 
figure, borrowers should also consider that their borrowing capacity (usually measured 
                                                                                                                                     
56 See	 L.	 B.	 Buchheit	 and	 G.	 Mitu	 Gulati,	 Responsible	 Sovereign	 Lending	 and	 Borrowing,	 UNCTAD	
Discussion	Papers,	no.	198,	April	2010,	pag.	5-7.
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on the basis of the country GDP) should not reach the saturation point so that in the event 
of emergency which require additional funding, they will not face the choice of either 
printing additional money (with the inflation consequences liked to it) or requiring the 
official sector’s help. There is also a reputational aspect linked to the responsible 
behaviour of sovereign borrowers: given that the market will not forget about debtors 
dishonouring their commitments, the consequences of irresponsible borrowing will be 
inherited by future generations which will find it harder and more expensive to find 
creditors willing to lend.
In light of the above, a responsible borrower should comply with the following duties: (i) 
to repay its debts, other that in extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances such as 
natural cataclysm, wars etc.; (ii) to be transparent about amounts of money borrowed and 
guaranteed so that the borrowing capacity of a country can clearly be assessed; (iii) 
receive internal approvals for borrowing, in order to comply with their agency 
obligations vis-à-vis their citizens; (iv) appoint debt management officers to monitor the 
financial situation of the country at any moment.57
                                                                                                                                     
57 See	 L.	 B.	 Buchheit	 and	 G.	 Mitu	 Gulati,	 Responsible	 Sovereign	 Lending	 and	 Borrowing,	 UNCTAD	
Discussion	Papers,	no.	198,	April	2010,	pag.	8-17.	And	on	the	relationships	between	creditors	and	
borrowers	 in	 sovereign	 finance	 see	 also	 J.D.	 Aronson,	 International	 Lending	 and	 Debt,	 The	
Washington	Quaterly,	1983,	pp.	62-76.
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2) PUBLIC SECTOR CREDITORS
a. Multilateral creditors
i. International Monetary Fund 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was originally conceived in July 
1944, during the Bretton Woods meeting, as part of the framework for 
economic cooperation post World War II. The IMF was formally established 
in December 1945, when the first 29 member countries signed its articles of 
agreement.58
Each member funds the IMF through the payment of a “quota”, based, 
broadly, on the country’s position in the global economy, which also 
determines the voting and other participative rights of each member.59
The main function assigned to the IMF by its members is to guarantee 
international financial stability, through cooperation amongst the members.60
In order to achieve such goal, one of the main activities of the IMF is to create 
and promote standards codes of conduct for the members of the international 
                                                                                                                                     
58 See	 the	 IMF	Articles	 of	 Agreement	 at:	 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.	 The	
Articles	of	Agreement	have	now	same	 legal	 value	of	an	 international	 treaty	 for	 those	 countries	
that	 signed	 up	 to	 them.	 The	 Articles	 entered	 into	 force	 in	 December	 1945	 and	 have	 been	
subsequently	amended	in	1969,	1978	and	1992.
59 The	 quota	 system	 has	 been	 revised	 in	 2010,	 for	 more	 information	 see:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm.	On	the	history	and	internal	organization	
of	 the	 IMF	 see	 also	 D.K.	 Tarullo,	 The	 role	 of	 the	 IMF	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructuring,	 Chicago	
Journal	of	International	Law,	2005-2006,	pp.	287-300.		
60 Article	 1,	 which	 sets	 out	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 IMF,	 states:	 “The	 purposes	 of	 the	 International	
Monetary	Fund	are:	
(i)	 To	 promote	 international	 monetary	 cooperation	 through	 a	 permanent	 institution	 which	
provides	the	machinery	for	consultation	and	collaboration	on	international	monetary	problems.	
(ii)	 To	 facilitate	 the	 expansion	 and	 balanced	 growth	 of	 international	 trade,	 and	 to	 contribute	
thereby	to	the	promotion	and	maintenance	of	high	levels	of	employment	and	real	income	and	to	
the	development	of	 the	productive	resources	of	all	members	as	primary	objectives	of	economic	
policy.	
(iii)	To	promote	exchange	stability,	to	maintain	orderly	exchange	arrangements	among	members,	
and	to	avoid	competitive	exchange	depreciation.	
(iv)	 To	 assist	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 multilateral	 system	 of	 payments	 in	 respect	 of	 current	
transactions	 between	 members	 and	 in	 the	 elimination	 of	 foreign	 exchange	 restrictions	 which	
hamper	the	growth	of	world	trade.	
(v)	 To	 give	 confidence	 to	 members	 by	 making	 the	 general	 resources	 of	 the	 Fund	 temporarily	
available	 to	 them	under	 adequate	 safeguards,	 thus	providing	 them	with	opportunity	 to	 correct	
maladjustments	 in	 their	 balance	 of	 payments	 without	 resorting	 to	 measures	 destructive	 of	
national	or	international	prosperity.	
(vi) In	accordance	with	the	above,	to	shorten	the	duration	and	lessen	the	degree	of	disequilibrium	
in	the	international	balances	of	payments	of	members.	
The	Fund	shall	be	guided	in	all	its	policies	and	decisions	by	the	purposes	set	forth	in	this	Article.”
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financial systems, the “rules of the games” for all the international 
“players”.61
The IMF overviews the creation of such standards in particular in respect of 
three most sensitive areas: (i) monetary policies; (ii) statistics data, and (iii) 
fiscal transparency. The IMF in carrying out such function cooperates with 
other international Standard Setting Bodies such as the World Bank, the Bank 
for International Settlements and the World Trade Organization.62
Historically, the IMF covered several functions through the years: originally 
thought to control the exchange rate stability, once the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates collapses in the 70ies, the IMF took a prominent role 
in dealing with financial crisis resulting from the oil shocks and in assisting 
east European countries upon the dissolution of the Soviet block.
The focus of this paragraph is the lending activity of the IMF and its role in 
sovereign debt crisis (which will also be analysed in the following chapter 
more in detail).
One of the main functions of the IMF is to lend to those countries which are 
facing actual or potential balance of payment issues. The facilities granted by 
the IMF are both at concessional (i.e. which carry zero interest rate) or non-
concessional, depending on the financial situation of each borrower.
During the debt sovereign crisis in the ‘80ies, the IMF played the role of 
“lender of last resort”63, which would bail out countries with an excessive 
debt burdens, facing the incapacity to repay debts coming due.64
The role of the IMF in the context of sovereign debt crisis has been at the 
centre of many discussion and two main theories regarding such point 
developed: according to the first one, the fact that countries know they will 
be bailed out by the IMF, creates a moral hazard due to the fact that countries 
are conscious that notwithstanding wrong economical and financial choices 
                                                                                                                                     
61 On	this	see	R.M.	Lastra,	The	reform	of	the	international	Financial	Architecture,	Kluwer,	2001	and	F.	
Saccomanni,	A	new	architecture	or	new	system?	A	survey	of	 International	Monetary	reform	in	the	
1990s,	in	Open	Economics	Review,	vol.	11,	2000,	pp.	15	ss.
62 See	 the	 complete	 list	 of	 the	 Standards	 Setting	 Agencies	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/standards/agency.htm.	 	 The	 IMF	 is	 also	member	 of	 the	 Financial	
Stability	Board,	as	already	discussed in	the	previous	chapter.	On	the	cooperation	between	the	IMF	
and	other	Standards	Setting	Agencies,	see	S.	Morettini,	Il	fondo	monetario	internazionale	e	le	reti	
globali	 di	 regolatori	 finanziari,	 in	 Rivista	 Trimestrale	 di	 Diritto	 Pubblico,	 La	 regolamentazione	
globale	dei	mercati	finanziari,	S.	Battini	ed.,	Giuffrè,	2007,	pag.	293	ss.
63 The	concept	of	Lender	of	Last	Resort	was	originally	created	by	the	theoretical	contributions	of	H.	
Thornton,	in	An	Enquiry	into	the	Nature	and	Effects	of	the	Paper	Credit	of	Great	Britain,	1802,	and	
later	on	by	W.	Bagehot	in	Lombard	Street:	a	description	of	the	money	market,	1873.
64 On	the	evolving	role	of	the	IMF	see	K.	Alexander,	International	Economic	Law	and	the	lender	of	last	
resort,	in	Liber	Amicorum	Guido	Alpa	– Private	Law	beyond	the	national	systems,	M.	Andenas,	S.D.	
Alabart,	 Sir	 B.	 Markesinis,	 H.	 Micklitz,	 N.	 Pasquini	 eds.,	 British	 Institute	 of	 International	 and	
Comparative	Law,	2007,	pp.	24	ss.
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by investors and the government, they will still be rescued65, consequently 
IMF intervention should be limited in size and frequency in order to reduce 
moral hazard distortion66 and the IMF should have merely a facilitative role 
in the negotiations between the private sector lenders and the debtor 
countries,67 the second one sees the international financial crisis as the 
consequence of sudden lack of liquidity and investors’ panics, therefore a 
lender of last resort providing the necessary liquidity to avoid a shortfall in 
countries in difficulties is key to improve international financial stability.68
A short overview of the IMF funding arrangements will now be introduced, 
starting from the more traditional ones and the moving on to the most recent 
financing agreements offered by the IMF.69
 Stand-by arrangements: these are the main instruments through 
which the IMF makes available its funds to its members.70In order to 
benefit from a stand-by arrangement, the Minister of Finance or the 
Governor of the Central Bank of the country requesting the stand-by 
line of credit must sign a letter of intent to be addressed to the 
                                                                                                                                     
65 “IMF	 loans,	 then,	actually	offered	extraordinarily	generous	rebates	of	about	10%	below	market	
rates.	On	the	$117	billion	lent	to	East	Asia	under	IMF	auspices	thus	far,	the	region	is	saving	about	
$12	billion	a	year	in	interest	payment.	Over	three	years,	South	Korea,	Thailand	and	Indonesia	will	
have	 received	 a	 direct	 wealth	 transfer	 of	 at	 least	 $35	 billion,	 mostly	 from	 US	 and	 Western	
European	tax-payers.	But	this	$35	billion	figure	actually	understates	the	true	scale	of	the	transfer.	
Investor	 priced	 South	 Korea’s	 debt	 at	 a	 yield	 of	 14.5	 per	 cent	 only	 because	 there	was	 a	 good	
chance	 the	 IMF	would	 come	 in	 sooner	 or	 later	 and	 rescue	 them.	 Absent	 the	market-distorting	
activities	of	the	IMF,	the	risk	premium	on	this	sovereign	debt	would	have	been	even	greater.	More	
specifically,	 much	 of	 the	 $35	 billion	 will	 amount	 to	 a	 wealth	 transfer	 from	 middle-class	
Westerners	 to	 East	 Asia	 Governments,	 banks	 and	 their	 rich	 equity	 owners	 and	 from	 there	 to	
wealthy	Western	and	 Japanese	 investors	who	 risked	 capital	 in	 foolish	ways	 (or	perhaps	not	 so	
foolish	since	there	was	a	good	chance	they	would	be	bailed	out	in	the	end).	The	whole	series	of	
transactions	amounts	to	a	remarkably	regressive	tax”,	D.	Sacks	and	P.	Thiel,	The	IMF’s	big	wealth	
transfer,	in	I.	McQuillan	and	P.	Montgomery,	The	International	Monetary	Fund,	Hoover	Institution	
Press,	1999,	at	pag.	32.	
66 See	Meltzer	 Commission,	Report	 of	 the	 International	 Financial	 Institutions	 Advisory	 Commission,	
October	2001,	Washington	D.C.
67 See	 M.	 Knight,	 L.	 Schembri	 and	 A.	 Powell,	 Reforming	 the	 Global	 Financial	 Architecture:	 just	
tinkering	 around	 the	 Edges?,	 in	 D.	 Vines	 and	 C.	 Gilbert,	 The	 IMF	 and	 its	 critics,	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	2004,	pp.	14	ss.
68 See	S.	Fischer,	On	the	Need	for	an	International	Lender	of	Last	Resort,	1999,	unpublished,	available	
at:	http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/010399.HTM and	G.	Corsetti,	B.	Guimaraes,	
N.	Roubini,	International	lending	of	last	resort	and	moral	hazard:	a	model	of	IMF’s	catalytic	finance,	
National	 Bureau	 of	 Economic	 Research	 working	 paper	 series,	 2003,	 available	 at:	
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10125.	
69 See	 K.	 Alexander,	 International	 Economic	 Law	 and	 the	 lender	 of	 last	 resort,	 in	 Liber	 Amicorum	
Guido	Alpa	– Private	Law	beyond	the	national	systems,	M.	Andenas,	S.D.	Alabart,	Sir	B.	Markesinis,	
H.	Micklitz,	N.	Pasquini	eds.,	British	Institute	of	International	and	Comparative	Law,	2007,	pp.	30	
ss	 and	 the	 IMF	 factsheet	 on	 lending,	 available	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm.	
70 Such	 arrangements	 started	 in	 practice	 and	 were	 then	 officially	 introduced	 in	 the	 Articles	 of	
Agreements	which	now	make	reference	to	stand-by	arrangements	in	article	V	(3).
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Managing Director of the IMF, which sets out the undertakings the 
Fund requires in order to grant the facilities. 71Under article XXX (b) 
of the Articles of Association, stand-by arrangements are defined as 
“a decision of the Fund by which a member is assured that it will be 
able to make purchases from the General Resource Account72 in 
accordance with the terms of the decision during a specified period 
and up to a certain amount.”73 The non-compliance with the stand-
by arrangements term by the borrower may lead the Fund to deny 
the renewal of the credit line or may impact on the borrower’s 
capacity to draw under such credit line.
 Precautionary stand-by arrangements: these are lines of credit 
granted by the IMF to States in order to prevent a capital account 
crisis. The States undertake to the IMF not to draw from such 
facilities unless its economic and financial conditions worsen. Such 
arrangements replace, to a certain extent, the IMG Contingent Credit 
Line, created in 1999 as a precautionary defence to those countries 
potentially vulnerable to financial market crisis. The Contingent 
Credit Line expired in November 2003, and was never actually used 
by any country. Therefore, the Precautionary arrangements represent 
a replacement for the purpose of promoting crisis prevention.74
                                                                                                                                     
71 The	legal	value	of	the	Letter	of	Intent	is	debated:	according	to	the	former	IMF	General	Counsel	Sir	
Joseph	 Gold	 argued	 that	 a	 stand-by	 is	 an	 “arrangement”	 and	 not	 an	 agreement	 creating	 legal	
obligations,	while	others	argue	that	the	Letter	of	Intent	together	with	the	Stand-by	arrangements	
are	legally	binding	agreements.	See	A.	Lowenfeld,	International	Economic	Law,	Oxford	University	
Press,	2003,	pag.	516.	In	1979	the	Executive	Board	of	the	IMF	itself	expressed	its	position	on	the	
debate,	 stating	 that	 stand	 by	 arrangements	 have	 no	 contractual	 function.	 See	 Executive	 Board	
Decision	no.	6056	(79/38)	dated	2	May	1979.
72 “The	GRA	is	the	principal	account	of	the	IMF	and	handles	by	far	the	largest	share	of transactions	
between	the	IMF	and	its	membership.	The	GRA	can	best	be	described	as	a	pool	of	currencies	and	
reserve	 assets	 built	 up	 from	 members’	 fully	 paid	 capital	 subscriptions	 in	 the	 form	 of	 quotas.	
Quotas	 are	 the	 basic	 building	 blocks	 of	 the	 IMF.	 They	 broadly	 reflect	 each	 member’s	 relative	
economic	 size,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 quotas	 of	 similar	 countries.	 Quotas	 determine	 the	
maximum	amount	of	financial	resources	that	a	member	is	obligated	to	provide	to	the	IMF,	voting	
power	in	IMF	decision	making,	and a	member’s	share	of	SDR	allocations.	The	financial	assistance	
a	 member	 may	 obtain	 from	 the	 IMF	 is	 also	 generally	 based	 on	 its	 quota.	 “,	 see	 Financial	
Organization	and	Operation	of	the	IMF,	Pamphlet	series	no.	45,	2001,	pag.	19.
73 See	Articles	of	Association,	available	at:	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/.	
74 Amongst	 the	 Executive	 Directors	 of	 the	 IMF,	 it	 has	 been	 debated	 whether	 the	 expiry	 of	 the	
Contingent	Credit	Line	left	a	gap	in	the	instruments	to	prevent	financial	crisis	offered	by	the	IMF,	
as	the	Precautionary	arrangements	may	not	be	enough	to	provide	adequate	financial	support	in	
the	 event	 of	 an	 exogenous	 shock.	 See	 IMF	 Discusses	 Status	 Report	 on	 Crisis	 Prevention	 and	
Precautionary	Arrangements,	Public	Information	Notice,	no.	04/117:	“[…]	regular	precautionary	
arrangements	– while	useful	in	cases	where	pressures	are	likely	to	emerge	in	the	current	account	
– are	not	an	effective	 tool	of	 crisis	prevention	 for	members	 that	pursue	sound	policies	but	 still	
remain	 exposed	 to	 exogenous	 shocks	 and	 contagion”,	 available	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2004/pn04117.htm.
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 Extended arrangements:75 these arrangements offer a long-term 
support to developing countries, more flexible both in terms of time 
period and amount available. The Extended Fund Facility, in 
particular was established in 1974 in order to help those countries 
with longer-term balance of payment issues, which require overall 
economic reforms. The lines of credit granted under the terms of 
such arrangements have a 3 years term and their maturity is between 
four and ten years of the date of their execution. In addition to the 
Extended Fund Facility, the IMF established other six additional 
facilities, which all have as main purpose to deal with countries 
which suffered from a severe financial shock, impacting on the 
economic development perspectives of such country.76
 General Arrangements to Borrow (GABs): created in 1962 as an 
additional founding source, due to the fact that at the time the IMF 
memberships was growing much faster than the increases in its 
membership quotas and it could not meet the financial needs of its 
members. The GABs were created as international agreements 
between the IMF and each government or central bank of the main 
industrialised countries at the time in order to establish bilateral lines 
of credit between the IMF and such entities.77 Originally the scope of 
such credit lines was to grant to the IMF sufficient liquidity to act as 
lender to its members which were experiencing economic imbalances 
or temporary payment difficulties on a scale that would exceed the 
IMF resources.78 Before calling on the GABs, however, the IMF had 
to receive majority approval of the Executive Board and special 
majority approval of GAB participants. Once the IMF borrows from 
                                                                                                                                     
75 On	 the	 Extended	 Fund	 Facilities	 see	 also	 the	 IMF	 factsheet,	 available	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/eff.htm.	
76 The	six	additional	lines	include,	inter	alia:	(i)	Comprehensive	Development	Framework	(seeking	
to	direct	the	development	agenda	of	a	country	so	that	it	can	meet	the	United	Nations’	Millennium	
Development	Goals);	 (ii)	 Country-Assistance	 Program;	 (iii)	 the	Highly	 Indebted	 Poor	 Countries	
Debt	Relief	Strategies	(see	next	chapter	in	this	respect).
77 The	 original	 parties	 to	 the	GAB	were:	 Belgium,	 Canada,	 the	German	Bundesbank,	 France,	 Italy,	
Japan,	the	Netherlands,	Swedish	Riksbank,	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States.
78 The	 General	 Arrangement	 to	 Borrow,	 the	 Preamble:	 “In	 order	 to	 enable	 the	 International	
Monetary	Fund	to	 fulfil	more	effectively	 its	role	in	 the	 international	monetary	system,	 the	main	
industrial	 countries	 have	 agreed	 that	 they	 will,	 in	 a	 spirit	 of	 broad	 and	 willing	 cooperation,	
strengthen	the	Fund	by	general	arrangements	under	which	they	will	stand	ready	to	make	loans	to	
the	Fund	up	to	specified	amounts	under	Article	VII,	Section	1	of	the	Articles	of	Agreement	when	
supplementary	resources	are	needed	to	forestall	or	cope	with	an	impairment	of	the	international	
monetary	 system”.	 See	 IMF,	 Selected	 Decisions,	 Thirtieth	 Issue,	 available	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=1289-%2862/1%29.
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the GAB members, it has an obligation to repay the loan within five 
years and pro-rata to the commitments of each participant in the 
relevant loan. GABs were amended in 1978: one of the main 
amendments was to allow non IMF members to benefit from GAB, if 
certain criteria were met, namely: (i) the IMF has inadequate 
resources to meet expected or actual requests of financial assistance; 
(ii) a country’s balance - of-payments problems that are of a size that 
could threaten not only such country’s financial stability but the 
international monetary system stability. GABs have been criticized 
because too favourable vis-à-vis industrialised countries, which could 
easily receive the benefit of such loans and too difficult for non-GAB 
countries, which in order to receive financial support had to receive 
both special majority approval and prove that the crisis would have 
such far-reaching consequences that the international monetary 
stability would be jeopardise.79
 New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) and supplemental reserve 
facility: such new arrangements were introduced after the Mexican 
financial crisis in the ‘90ies, when it became clear that the IMF 
needed more resources to deal with financial crisis in developing and 
emerging market economies. The NAB includes the terms for 
bilateral credit arrangements between the IMF and 38 member 
countries and institutions, for an overall amount of SDR million
369,997.36.80 Unlike GABs, non-NAB countries that are IMF members 
are entitled to have access to NAB on the same terms and conditions 
as NAB countries. As per the Stand-by arrangements, NAB requires 
the entry into a Letter of Intent and the compliance with the 
undertakings included therein. In 1997 the Supplemental Reserve 
Facility was also implemented, during the Asian crisis (see next 
chapter), which provides for short term financing at market rate to 
IMF members suffering from a financial crisis. In order to draw from 
                                                                                                                                     
79 Evidence	that	the	requirements	to	be	met	were	too	difficult	for	non-GAB	countries	is	that	none	of	
such	countries	ever	received	funds	from	GAB	other	then	Russia	in	1998,	when	there	was	a	general	
consensus	on	the	risks	to	the	international	stability	that	the	financial	crisis	in	Russia	would	result	
into.	See	more	on	GAB	in	K.	Alexander,	International	Economic	Law	and	the	lender	of	last	resort,	in	
Liber	Amicorum	Guido	Alpa	– Private	Law	beyond	the	national	systems,	M.	Andenas,	S.D.	Alabart,	
Sir	B.	Markesinis,	H.	Micklitz,	N.	Pasquini	eds.,	British	Institute	of	International	and	Comparative	
Law,	2007,	pp.	34	ss.
80 See	 the	 list	 of	 NAB	 countries	 on	 the	 IMF	 website	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gabnab.htm.
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such facility the members have to comply with a restructuring 
programme under the supervision of the IMF.81
Low-income countries are allowed to borrow certain facilities on concessional 
terms (i.e. the loans carry which carry zero interest rate), while non-
concessional facilities bare the IMF’s market-related interest rate which is 
based on the Special Drawing Rights82 interest rate, revised weekly to take 
into account the variations in the short-term interest rates in the main 
international money markets.83 Generally the maximum amount that each 
country can borrow is a multiple of such country’s IMF quota, but there are 
exceptions to deal with exceptional financial crisis.84
The IMF has developed a set of financing instruments to deal with financial 
crisis and external crisis85 of its members, which often involve a sudden 
reverse in the international capital flow in the country. The IMF provides 
credit facilities in reasonably quick timeframes in order to provide the 
relevant country which some “breathing space” to deal with the sudden 
financial imbalance.
The process to receive funds from the IMF involves the evaluation by the IMF 
of the overall financial and economical situation of the country and the 
determination of the conditions at which the IMF is willing to advance the 
facilities. This is the so-called “IMF conditionality”, which attracted several 
criticisms and has been object of a lively debate between authors.
                                                                                                                                     
81 On	 NAB	 see	 K.	 Alexander,	 International	 Economic	 Law	 and	 the	 lender	 of	 last	 resort,	 in	 Liber	
Amicorum	Guido	Alpa	– Private	Law	beyond	the	national	systems,	M.	Andenas,	S.D.	Alabart,	Sir	B.	
Markesinis,	H.	Micklitz,	N.	Pasquini	eds.,	British	Institute	of	 International	and	Comparative	Law,	
2007,	pp.	40	ss.
82		 The	SDR	is	an	international	reserve	account,	supplemental	to	the	quotas	granted	by	each	member,	
whose	value	is	calculated	on	the	basis	of	four	key	international	currencies	(US	dollar,	Euro,	pound	
sterling	and	Japanese	yen)	and	it	is	an	exchangeable	instrument,	which	can	be	swapped	for	usable	
currencies.	 For	 more	 information	 on	 SDR,	 see:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm.	
83 The	 SDR	 interest	 rate	 is	 reset	 each	 Monday	 and	 can	 be	 checked	 at	 any	 time	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/sdr_ir.aspx.	
84 In	 particular,	 Stand-by	 arrangements,	 the	 Flexible	 Credit	 Lines	 and	 the	 Extended	 Fund	 Facility	
have	no	pre-set	cap.
85 The	 IMF	 defines	 external	 crisis	 as	 crisis	 which:	 “can be	 characterized	 by	 severe	 balance	 of	
payment	 problems,	which	 often	 lead	 to	 pressure	 on	 the	 currency,	 a	 large	 decline	 in	 consumer	
demand	 and	 investment	 by	 firms,	 higher	 unemployment,	 and	 lower	 incomes.	 Crises	 are	 often	
accompanied	by	heightened	uncertainty	in	financial	markets	and	declines	in	the	prices	of	stocks,	
bonds	and,	quite	frequently,	the	value	of	the	domestic	currency”,	while	financial	crisis	are	defined	
as	 crisis	 which:	 “can	 originate	 in	 or	 affect	 the	 financial	 sector,	 and	 can	 be	 caused	 by	 or	
accompanied	by	heightened	uncertainty	in	financial	markets,	 leading	to	declines	in	the	prices	of	
stocks	and	bonds.	They	can	also	be	caused	by	or	 lead	 to	difficulties	 in	banks	and	 the	payments	
system,	causing	damage	to	the	real	sector	and	to	economic	activity	more	generally”,	see	IMF	Crisis	
Lending	factsheet,	available	at:	http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/crislend.htm.
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The term “IMF Conditionality” refers commonly, to the conditions 
“attached” to the loans granted by the IMF to countries experiencing financial 
difficulties. The borrower undertakes to comply with certain economic and 
financial adjustments suggested by the IMF so that the IMF is sure that the 
borrower will be able to repay its debt. Loans are split in “tranches” which 
are advanced upon satisfaction of certain objectives. If the borrower does not 
reach the correspondent policy actions, it is not entitled to drawdown the 
additional tranche.
The objectives are included in the so-called Letter of Intent, (which sometimes 
has a memorandum of economic and financial policies attached to it) and 
they are general macro-policy goals to be met in order to restore the balance 
of payments of the country and facilitate the growth of the country.86
The IMF conditionality has gradually evolved, both due to the different kind 
of financial crisis, which have widespread since its establishment and, also, as 
answer to the frequent criticism that the IMF conditionality raised. 
The IMF guidelines on conditionality have been reviewed in 2002 in order to 
give more flexibility to each country and in order to allow a more tailored 
and less stringent approach to each crisis.87
The IMF conditionality rose, in the course of the years, severe criticism.
The main factor of criticism was that it was not perceived as a tool to allow 
developing countries to deal with their internal financial issues, due to the 
lack of effectiveness of the reforms suggested, but as a mean to introduce 
liberalisation reforms against the will of the relevant country. 
In the following chapter some specific cases will be analysed, in particular the 
Asian crisis and the Argentinian one, whereby the IMF intervention was 
proven to be not only not beneficial but the true reason for the situation 
getting worst.
Stiglitz pointed out, in relation to the financial policies driving the IMF 
actions: “The IMF is pursuing not just the objectives set out in its original 
mandate of enhancing global stability and ensuring that there are funds for 
countries facing a threat of recession to pursue expansionary policies. It is 
also pursuing the interest of the financial community…Simplistic free market 
ideology provided the curtain behind which the real business of the “new” 
mandate could be transacted. The change in mandate and objectives, while it 
                                                                                                                                     
86 On	 the	 IMF	 conditionality,	 see	 the	 IMF	 factsheet,	 available	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm.	
87 The	 updated	 version	 of	 the	 guidelines	 can	 be	 found	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.htm.
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may have been quiet, was hardly subtle: from serving global economic 
interests to serving the interests of global finance. Capital markets 
liberalisation may not have contributed to global economic stability, but it 
did open up a vast new markets for Wall Street”.88
The allegation is that IMF acted as a mean to force liberalisation, in particular 
capital account liberalisation, in order to favour private international finance, 
in particular banks and private investors which benefitted from the new 
financial markets which opened upon the implementation of the financial 
reforms imposed by the IMF in exchange for financing.89
The main negative outcome of liberalisation is volatility in the market, which 
exposes developing countries to risks of sudden capital outflows, such as in 
the Asian crisis. 
The World Bank, agrees upon the bad outcomes due to the excessive 
volatility, however, they point out that liberalisation had positive effects too, 
namely; “they permit the financing of trade deficits allowing countries to 
invest more than they save and thus accumulate capital faster; (ii) they permit 
the import of technology which is essential to build a productive capacity; 
and (iii) they may improve the working of the financial sector”.90
After the Asian crisis, which is admittedly the most unsuccessful of the IMF 
rescue policies, Malaysia refused IMF assistance and advise and rather than 
liberalising its economy, imposed strict capital controls, which, in the end, 
prevented the economic crisis to widespread in Malaysia too. 
A further source of criticism relates to the lack of accountability of the IMF to 
developing countries: given that developed countries supply the IMF with 
money to lend and they have the majority of voting rights, it seems the power 
they can exercise over the decisions the IMF has to take is unbalanced in 
respect of developing countries, which have a much smaller influence, voting 
                                                                                                                                     
88 See	J.	Stiglitz,	Globalisation	and	its	Discontents,	Allen	Lane,	2002,	pp.	206-207.
89 On	the	critics	to	the	IMF	conditionality	see	also:	J.	Dine,	The	IMF	and	its	Relation	to	Private	banks:	
Risk	Free	Banking?,	 in	Global	Governance	and	the	Quest	 for	 Justice,	vol.	2,	ed.	S.	MacLeod,	2006,	
pp.	 221-237.	 The	 author	 links	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	 provision	 of private	
finance	 from	 the	 banks	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 inequality	 in	 the	 borrower	 country,	 affecting	
especially	the	poorest	layers	of	the	society.	In	particular,	the	mechanics	fro	such	result	is:	“(i)	an	
insistence	on	capital	account	liberalisation	by	the	IMF;	(ii)	a	consequent	increase	in	the	provision	
of	 foreign	 finance	 often	 on	 a	 short-term	 basis	 and	 at	 rates	 poorly	 assessed	 for	 risk	 increased	
volatility	due	to	“hot	money”	 flowing	 freely	 in	and	out	 the	country;	(iii)	 the	 loss	of	control	over	
fiscal	 policy by	 the	 states;	 (iv)	 crises	 caused	 by	 poor	domestic	 policies,	 speculators	 and	 “herd”	
behaviour;	 (v)	 the	 IMF	 bailout	 response	 causing	 the	 repayment	 of	 the	 wealthy	 and	 poor	 risk	
assessment;	(vi)	the	imposition	of	conditionality	and	the	removal	of	many	public services”.	Ibid.	p.	
223.	 See	 also,	 on	 the	 same	 subject,	 B.	 Herman,	 The	 Players	 and	 the	 Game	 of	 Sovereign	 Debt,	
International	Affairs	working	paper,	The	New	School,	2002.
90 See	World	Bank,	Global	Development	Finance	2001,	World	Bank,	2001.
32
wise and that rather than supplying the IMF with funds, require financing to 
support them. As consequence of such critics, the IMF Board of Governors 
voted in 2008 in order to change the IMF income model, so that some of the 
influence exercised by developed countries was mitigated.91
Furthermore, on 24 May 2009 the Executive Board approved changes to the 
IMF conditionality, in response to the criticism raised by its borrowers. The 
changes concern three main points: (i) structural performances criteria are 
replaced by assessments of the need to implement structural changes in the 
context of general program reviews, so that the default of the country upon 
failure to meet the performance criteria is not automatically triggered any 
longer; (ii) access to IMF funding is based on certain fixed qualification 
criteria and not on the acceptance by the borrower of the IMF conditionality; 
(iii) creation of new flexible facilities (as described above) to meet the needs 
of developing countries.92
ii. World Bank
The World Bank (as the other multilateral development banks) was
established to transfer financial resources to selected governments in 
amounts and on terms that the governments could not get without such 
assistance.
As the IMF, the World Bank was established at Bretton Woods in 1944. On 27 
December 1945 the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (which is the original name of the World 
Bank) were signed.93
The original scope of the World Bank was to help with the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II. Nowadays, the reconstruction (which still 
remains in connection with developing countries needs in case of natural 
catastrophes and humanitarian emergencies) as main scope of the World 
Bank has been replaced by the focus of poverty reduction.
                                                                                                                                     
91 On	the	IMF	accountability	 issue	see	A.	Bloom,	The	Power	of	 the	Borrower:	 IMF	responsiveness	 to	
Emerging	 Markets	 Economies,	 New	 York	 University	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 and	 Politics,	
2011,	pp.	767-810.
92 See	A.	Bloom,	The	Power	of	the	Borrower:	IMF	responsiveness	to	emerging	market	economies,	New	
York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics,	2011,	pp.	793-804.
93 The	updated	version	of	 the	Articles	of	Association	can	be	 found	on	 the	World	Bank	website	at:	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049557~men
uPK:63000601~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600~theSitePK:29708,00.html.
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The World Bank is one of the main lenders to developing countries, but, 
differently from the IMF, it does not act as lender of last resort and does not 
have such an active involvement in debt crisis scenarios. The World Bank 
carries out its lending activities through the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and through the International 
Development Association (IDA), which is basically the concessional finance 
arm of the World Bank. 94
In terms of lending activity, the World Bank under the terms of its 
constitutional documents, is allowed to provide funds (both as loans or as 
guarantees) to member states and commercial enterprises established within 
the member states only.95 The Articles of Agreement specify that loans and 
guarantee should prioritise: (i) programs which involve more then one 
member state; and (ii) projects and programs which aim at integrating 
member states economies. The programs financed by the World Bank are of 
three kinds:96
 Investment operations: in this category fall loans, grants and any 
kind of financial assistance linked to the constructions of 
infrastructures to reduce poverty and to support sustainable 
development. In terms of allocation of the World Bank resources, this 
kind of activities involve almost 80% of the World Bank portfolio. 
Historically the funds were lent in order to allow the country to 
develop engineering works and other hardware infrastructure, while 
                                                                                                                                     
94 The	 International	Development	Association	 (IDA)	 is	 the	 part	 of	 the	World	Bank	 that	 helps	 the	
world’s	 poorest	 countries.	 IDA	 was	 established	 in	 1960	 with	 the	 aim	 to	 reduce	 poverty	 by	
providing	 loans	 (called	 “credits”)	 and	grants	 for	programs	 that	boost	 economic growth,	 reduce	
inequalities,	and	improve	people’s	living	conditions.	IDA	is	one	of	the	largest	sources	of	assistance	
for	 the	world’s	82	poorest	 countries,	40	of	which	are	 in	Africa.	 It	 is	 the	single	 largest	 source	of	
donor	funds	for	basic	social	services	in	these	countries.	IDA-financed	operations	deliver	positive	
change	 for	 2.5	 billion	 people,	 the	 majority	 of	 whom	 survive	 on	 less	 than	 $2	 a	 day.	 IDA	 lends	
money	on	concessional	terms.	This	means	that	 IDA	charges	little	or	no	interest	and	repayments	
are	stretched	over	25	to	40	years,	including	a	5- to	10-year	grace	period.	IDA	also	provides	grants	
to	 countries	 at	 risk	of	debt	distress.	 In	 addition	 to	 concessional	 loans	 and	grants,	 IDA	provides	
significant	 levels	 of	 debt	 relief	 through	 the	 Heavily	 Indebted	 Poor	 Countries	 Initiative	 and	 the	
Multilateral	 Debt	 Relief	 Initiative.	 More	 information	 on	 Ida	 on	 the	 IDA	 website	 at:	
http://www.worldbank.org/ida/.	
95 See	section	4	of	the	Articles	of	Agreement	of	the	IBRD:	”The Bank	may	guarantee,	participate	in,	or	
make	loans	to	any	member	or	any	political	sub-division	thereof	and	any	business,	industrial,	and	
agricultural	enterprise	in	the	territories	of	a	member	[…]”,	available	on	the	World	Bank	website	
at:	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049598~men
uPK:63000601~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600~theSitePK:29708~isCURL:Y,00.html.	
96 On	 the	 lending	 activity	 of	 the	 World	 Bank	 see	 the	 World	 Bank	 website	 at:	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120732~menuPK:
268725~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html.
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recently the World Bank included social targets within the scope of 
such projects, such as social development and improving public 
policy infrastructure. Usually the loans are advanced in tranche, 
which can be drawn down upon completion of certain steps (the so-
called milestone), so that the World Bank can monitor the 
effectiveness and the progresses of the project. Eligible borrowers are 
countries which are not in arrears with the World Bank group. The 
technical financing structure by means of which most of the 
investment operations are carried out is project finance. Project 
finance is a particular financing structure where, simplifying, lenders 
funds a certain project on the basis that the revenues produced by the 
project, once completed will be able to repay the initial debt. Project 
finance will be further analysed in the following paragraphs, from 
the private sector perspective: however the technical structure does 
not change. One of the main differences between commercial lending 
and project lending is that in the latter the aim is also to transfer 
expertise and know-how and to offer technical assistance. On 8 April 
3012 a new Investment Financing Policy wet into effect, in order to 
allow more flexibility in the policy framework of the World Bank and 
also to increase accountability and compliance and provide more 
adequate instruments to deal with small states and states affected by 
conflicts and with fragile economic and political situations.97 The 
reform was also focused on the World Bank policies in respect of: (i) 
procurement,98in order to pursuit open and competitive procurement 
procedures to avoid frauds and corruption and to introduce new 
innovative techniques; and (ii) social and environmental safeguard, 
required in connection with the confluence of internal and external 
factors like the growing importance of delivering environmentally 
and socially sustainable results, strengthening borrowers’ country 
institutions and systems and addressing emerging challenges at the 
global, regional, and country level.99
                                                                                                                                     
97 On	 the	new	policy	 see	 also	 the	World	Bank	Board	Paper	dated	1	November	2012,	 available	at:	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:22262276~pagePK:4
1367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html.	
98 On	the	reform	involving	the	World	Bank	procurement	policy,	see	the	Board	Approach	Paper	on	
the	 procurement	 policy	 dated	 29	 March	 2012,	 available	 at:	
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/03/16249953/world-banks-procurement-
policies-procedures-policy-review-approach-paper.	
99 On	the	reform	involving	the	World	Bank	safeguard	policies,	see	the	Board	Approach	Paper	on	the	
safeguard	 policies,	 available	 at:	
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 Development policy operations: the aim of such operations is to 
provide rapid financial assistance to developing countries in order to 
deal with actual or future development financing requirements both 
of domestic or external sources. Usually such operations are 
established to support the achievement of a set of development 
results through a medium-term program of policy and institutional 
actions. They can be structured as a single operation or a in the 
context of a more comprehensive plan of action, involving medium-
long term plan of actions, with tranches of the debt, again, available 
once certain objectives are met. In low-income countries which are 
eligible for International Development Association (IDA) assistance, 
such operations are also called Poverty Reduction Support Credits 
(PRSCs) and are granted on a concessional basis. As per the 
Investment Operations, eligible borrowers must not be in arrears 
with any member of the World Bank Group.
 Program-for-results operations: these operations differ from the 
previous two because the World Bank in this case acts as investor 
supporting a project created and promoted by the government of 
developing countries themselves rather then being projects proposed 
by the World Bank directly. The World Bank usually participates 
along with other public and private institutions and it contributes not 
only in terms of funds being provided to the countries but also by 
offering technical expertise and valuable know-how. Program-for-
results include project to invest in expenditures and activities, which 
can be on going or new, sectorial or sub-sectorial, and national or 
sub-national programs, as well as community development 
programs. The new approach embodied in the Program-for-results 
operations allows the World Bank to strengthen partnerships with 
governments and development partners, which co-participate in the 
financing of the programs, and to effectively support larger programs 
thanks to the pooled funding arrangements.100
                                                                                                                                     
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTSAFEPOL/0,,cont
entMDK:23275156~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:584435,00.html.	
100 On	Program-for-results	 see	 also:	World	Bank.	 2011.	A	new	 instrument	 to	 advance	 development	
effectiveness:	 program-for-results	 financing.	 Washington	 D.C.	 - The	 Worldbank.	
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/12/15590386/new-instrument-advance-
development-effectiveness-program-for-results-financing.
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It is also worth noting that the World Bank, since the ’80ies started to grant 
so-called Structural Adjustment Loans as well, which are not linked to a 
specific project but due to the liquidity crisis which many developing 
countries were facing in those years. The structure of such loans is very 
similar to the IMF loans, and they are subject to the terms of “letter of 
development policies” which have basically the same aim as the letters of 
intent stipulated by the IMF and its borrowers. The letter includes the 
conditions upon which the loans are granted and often cross refer to the 
conditions set out by the IMF given that usually the World Bank would grant 
assistance after that the IMF had already agreed with the countries the terms 
according to which loans would have been advanced to the country suffering 
of liquidity crisis. 
According to the Articles of Association, the following general conditions 
need to be met in order to receive financial support from the World Bank: 
i. When the member in whose territories the project is located is 
not itself the borrower, the member or the central bank or some 
comparable agency of the member which is acceptable to the 
Bank, fully guarantees the repayment of the principal and the 
payment of interest and other charges on the loan.
ii. The Bank is satisfied that in the prevailing market conditions the 
borrower would be unable otherwise to obtain the loan under 
conditions which in the opinion of the Bank are reasonable for 
the borrower.
iii. A competent committee, as provided for in Article V, Section 7, 
has submitted a written report recommending the project after a 
careful study of the merits of the proposal.
iv. In the opinion of the Bank the rate of interest and other charges 
are reasonable and such rate, charges and the schedule for 
repayment of principal are appropriate to the project.
v. In making or guaranteeing a loan, the Bank shall pay due regard 
to the prospects that the borrower, and, if the borrower is not a 
member, that the guarantor, will be in position to meet its 
obligations under the loan; and the Bank shall act prudently in 
the interests both of the particular member in whose territories 
the project is located and of the members as a whole.
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vi. In guaranteeing a loan made by other investors, the Bank 
receives suitable compensation for its risk.
vii. Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special 
circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects of 
reconstruction or development.101
It is clear from the conditions above that the World Bank does not conceive 
grants as general mean to support its members, given that in order to 
advance loans or guarantee, the World Bank has to carefully assess the 
capacity of the borrower to repay the debt and being able to service it 
throughout the life of the facility. The ratio for such approach is the need for 
the World Bank to be perceived in the international market as a credible 
player, which therefore has to assess the creditworthiness of its borrowers on 
the basis of what could be defined as commercial banks criteria.102
The main difference between loans and guarantees entered into with member 
countries and agreements with non-member is the legal character of the 
respective agreements.103 Loans and guarantees with member states are 
international agreements as both parties to it have international legal 
personality and therefore such agreements are treaties as a matter of 
international law and are registered with the United Nations as such. On the 
other hand, loans and guarantees entered into with non-state borrowers 
cannot be governed by international law, given that non-state entities do not 
have international law personality. The main topic of discussion in relation to 
such agreements is the governing law clause of the General Conditions 
applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements, which states the non-
applicability of municipal law to such agreements.104 The negative 
formulation of the sentence aims at excluding the applicability of any 
national law to the agreements, implicitly stating that international law is the 
law applicable to the loan and the guarantee agreement. However it has been 
                                                                                                                                     
101 Section	 4	 of	 the	 IBRD	 Articles	 of	 association,	 available	 at:	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049598~men
uPK:63000601~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600~theSitePK:29708~isCURL:Y,00.html.	
102 On	 the	 lending	activity	of	 the	World	Bank,	F.	Seatzu,	 Il	Panel	di	 ispezione	della	Banca	Mondiale,	
Giappichelli,	2008,	pp.	35- 47.
103 J.W.	 Head,	 Evolution	 of	 the	 governing	 law	 for	 loan	 agreements	 of	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 other	
Multilateral	Development	Banks,	American	Journal	of	International	Law,	1996,	pp.	214- 234.
104 Section	10.01	of	the	General	Conditions	applicable	to	Loan	and	Guarantee	Agreements	reads:	“The	
rights	and	obligations	of	 the	Bank,	 the	Borrower	and	 the	Guarantor	under	 the	Loan	Agreement	
and	 the	 Guarantee	 Agreement	 shall	 be	 valid	 and	 enforceable	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 terms,	
notwithstanding	the	law	of	any	State	or	political	subdivision	thereof	to	the	contrary.”
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observed how stating more clearly that the governing law of the agreements 
is public international law would granter greater certainty in respect of the 
sets of standards and procedures in accordance with which disputes need to 
be resolved.105
The World Bank has developed in time a sophisticated structure to overview 
and to assess the development of the programs financed, in order to make 
sure that the funds advanced to the relevant borrower are used in accordance 
with the terms of the loan agreement. 
Furthermore, the World Bank can be held accountable for the projects that 
they finance by people that argue to be negatively affected or likely to be 
negatively affected by such projects. The Board of Executive Directors created 
the Inspection Panel in 1993 to ensure that people106 have access to an 
independent body to express their concerns and seek recourse. The panel will 
have to assess if the World Bank in financing the project acted in violation of 
its internal policies and guidelines, the so-called Operating Policies and 
Procedures.107
The Independent Pane represent a relevant step forwards in terms of 
accountability of international organizations generally, in particular because 
it gives a right to affected people to bring a claim directly to the World Bank, 
without the need to go through the government or any other entity.108
The World Bank was the first organization to create an accountability 
mechanism in favour of affected people, but the other International Financial 
Institutions such as the IMF, International Finance Corporation and the 
                                                                                                                                     
105 See	 J.W.	Head,	Evolution	 of	 the	 governing	 law	 for	 loan	 agreements	 of	 the	World	Bank	 and	 other	
Multilateral	Development	Banks,	American	Journal	of	International	Law,	1996,	p.	230.
106 People	entitled	to	bring	a	claim	are:	“Any	group	of	two	or	more	peoples	in	the	country	where	the	
Bank	financed	project	is	located	who	believe	that,	as	a	result	of	the	Bank’s	violation	of	its	policies	
and	 procedures,	 their	 rights	 or	 interests	 have	 been,	 or	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 adversely	 affected	 in	 a	
direct	and	material	way.	They	may	be	an	organization,	association,	society	or	other	grouping	of	
individuals	and/or:	(i)	a	duly	appointed	local	representative	acting	on	explicit	instructions	as	the	
agent	of	 adversely	 affected	peoples;	 (ii)	 in	exceptional	 cases,	 a	 foreign	 representative	 acting	 as	
agent	of	adversely	affected	peoples;	and	(iii)	an	Executive	Director	of	the	Bank	in	special	cases	of	
serious	alleged	violations	of	the	Bank’s	policies	and	procedures.”	See	the	World	Bank	web	site	in	
relation	 to	 how	 to	 file	 a	 complain	 at	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:219113
32~menuPK:566350~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html.	
107 For	a	detailed	analysis of	the	operation	of	the	Inspection	Panel,	see	F.	Seatzu,	Il	Panel	di	ispezione	
della	Banca	Mondiale,	Giappichelli,	2008.
108 Examples	of	 the	 grounds	 for	 complaints	 are:	 inadequate	 compensation	 for	 forced	 resettlement;	
destruction	 of	 culturally	 significant	 or	 ecologically	 unique	 landscapes;	 loss	 of	 traditional	 user-
rights	 to	 forest	 or	 other	 natural	 resources;	 loss	 of	 access	 to	 resources	 or	 livelihoods;	
environmental	degradation;	threats	to	community	health	or	safety	resulting	from	increased	levels	
of	air	pollution	or	poor	road	design;	loss	of	livelihood	resulting	from	regulatory	or	policy	reforms;	
and	 poor	 project	 implementation	 stemming	 from	 inadequate	 consultation,	 participation,	 or	
information-sharing.  
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regional development banks followed such trends shortly after. Each 
accountability mechanism varies in size, scope, and structure, however they 
all share a common intention: to provide recourse for citizens and 
communities adversely affected by IFI-funded projects, particularly in 
instances when IFIs are alleged to have failed to follow their own social and 
environmental safeguard policies, guidelines, standards, or procedures.
The accountability mechanisms of the International Financial Institutions are 
now reunited in the Independent Accountability Mechanisms Network, 
which allows members of different independent accountability mechanism to 
stay in touch with members of other institution having the same role, in order 
to share experiences, know-how and keep track of progresses in the 
principles of accountability.109
An additional point of interest, in respect of the World Bank’s guidelines and 
policies is the increasing relevance that such internal instruments reached, 
becoming basically de facto global rules setting generally acknowledged 
international standards, adopted by corporations as well as public and 
private financial institutions, governments and export credit agencies.110
This trend is linked to the pressure that corporations and financial 
institutions receive from NGO, consumers and stakeholders to comply with 
acceptable standards of corporate social responsibility. Some of the stories of 
social and environmental devastation connected with international projects, 
affected the public opinion and in the end influenced also the way in which 
funds are lent.111 Lenders grew progressively more aware of the 
environmental and social “creditworthiness” of projects to be financed, 
realizing that being perceived as supporting environmentally reckless 
investment was, in short, “bad for business”. In order to deal with the 
changed panorama and be perceived as environmental and social engaged, 
“Corporate and governmental actors alike defend themselves by wrapping 
                                                                                                                                     
109 On	 independent	 accountability	 mechanisms	 see	 the	 paper	 by	 K.	 Lewis,	 Citezen-driven	
accountability	 for	 Sustainable	 Development,	 available	 on	 the	 Word	 Bank	 web	 site	 at:	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64129253
~pagePK:64132081~piPK:64132054~theSitePK:380794,00.html.	
110 On	 this	 point	 see	 N.	 Affolder,	 Cachet	 not	 cash:	 another	 sort	 of	 World	 Bank	 group	 borrowing,	
Michigan	State	Journal	of	International	Law,	1996,	pp.	141-165.
111 For	instance,	in	1997	the	International	Finance	Corporation	threatened	to	call	the	debt	in	relation	
to	the	construction	of	the	Pangue	hydroelectric	dam	on	the	Bio	Bio	river	in	Chile	due,	because	the	
project	had	failed	to	meet	 the	environmental	conditions	set	out	 in	 the	 loan	agreement.	See	R.	S.	
Frye,	 The	 Role	 of	 Private	 Banks	 in	 Promoting	 Sustainable	 Development,	 from	 Outside	 Counsel’s	
Perspective,	Law	and	Policy	in	International	Business,	1997/1998,	p.	484.
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themselves in the cloak of environmental and social responsibility that the 
World Bank standards represent. Reputation becomes the battleground.”112
In such context, private financial institutions developed the so-called 
“Equator Principles”, which will be further analyzed in the following 
paragraphs, relating to commercial banks. 
In the context of the lending activities of the World Bank, it is worth 
mentioning also the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an international 
organization part of the World Bank group established in 1956 in order to 
promote private investment in developing countries, which is seen as the 
way forward in terms of developing finance.113 Historically the IFC was only 
allowed to carry out debt kind of investment, only in 1961 the IFC 
shareholders allow the first equity investment to occur,114 drawing the main 
distinction between the IFC and the other multilateral organizations, such as 
the IBRD and the other multilateral development banks, which generally 
carry out lending activity only and not equity investment or anyway in a 
smaller scale. 
In the ‘70ies the IFC adds to its offer to developing countries also advisory 
services, providing business and financial expertise and assistance to such 
countries. This is quite a relevant step for the purpose of “rebalancing” the 
equilibrium between industrialised countries and commercial banks and 
developing countries as borrowers in terms of knowledge and experience of 
the financial market, which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was one of 
the main reasons for numerous debt crisis.
A further point of interest is that the IFC, since 1984 is financially 
autonomous, by means of the issuance of IFC bonds in the international 
financial markets, therefore it is not subject to pressure from its members in 
                                                                                                                                     
112 N.	Affolder,	Cachet	not	cash:	another	sort	of	World	Bank	group	borrowing,	Michigan	State	Journal	
of	International	Law,	1996,	pag.	147.
113 See	 the	 IFC	 website	 at:	
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/home.	
114 As	 further	 step,	 the	 IFC	 then	 created	 several	 private	 equity	 funds	 focused	 on	 investments	 in	
emerging	countries.	The	relevance	of	equity	investment,	structured	through	creation	of	dedicated	
investment	 funds,	 is	explained	by	 the	 IFC	on	 its	website:	 “IFC	backs	private	equity	 funds	 in	the	
emerging	markets	because	funds,	with	their	unique	provision	of	both	equity	capital	and	expertise,	
have	a	significant	impact	on	company	growth	and	job	creation.	The	majority	of	private	equity	in	
emerging	markets	 is	growth	equity,	using	 little	 leverage	and	depending	on	sustained	growth	of	
companies	 to	 generate	 returns.	The	private	 equity	 fund	helps	 companies	 to	 improve	 focus	 and	
negotiate	the	transformations	and	risks	of	rapid	growth.	Rapidly	growing	companies	create	jobs:	
the	 average	annual	 rate	of	 job	creation	within	 companies	backed	by	 IFC-supported	 funds	 since	
2000	has	been	22%,	well	in	advance	of	regional	rates	of	job	growth	of	2-3%.”	See	ICF	website	at:	
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/indus
tries/home.
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terms of sources of financing to carry out its activities. The IFC was the first 
international organisation to properly focus on the development of a capital 
markets for emerging economies: in 1971 the IFC created a specific 
department, the Capital Markets Department, to focus on the development of 
local banks, financial intermediaries and local stock markets. This is 
particularly important in light of the evolution of the sources of finance for 
developing countries: as it will be described in the following chapter, 
historically the trend for countries has been to move from bank loans to 
bonds, therefore the IFC support in such field played quite a relevant role. 
iii. Multilateral development banks
Other institutions carrying out lending activities to developing countries are 
the so –called multilateral development banks, which are part of the World 
Bank group, and as the IBRD aim at provide financial support and 
professional advice for economic and social development activities in 
developing countries, but each of them focuses on a specific region of the 
world. The multilateral development banks are:
 African Development Bank: was founded in 1964 in order to 
promote sustainable development and poverty reduction in Africa. 
Its shareholders currently are 53 African countries and 24 non-
African countries. As the World Bank, it offers loans both on 
concessional and non-concessional terms but, differently from the 
World Bank, eligible borrowers are only the countries located in the 
African region;115
 Asian Development Bank: was founded shortly after the African 
Development Bank, in 1966, to improve the development of countries 
in Asia and in the Pacific. The members of the bank are 67, of which 
48 located in the Asian and Pacific region and 19 from different 
regions. The bank offers a variety of financial products both to 
sovereign and non-sovereign borrowers in the Asian and Pacific 
region;116
                                                                                                                                     
115 See	the	African	Development	Bank	website	at:	http://www.afdb.org/en/.
116 See	also	the	Asian	Development	Bank	website	at:	http://www.adb.org/.
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 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: was 
established in 1991, after the end of the Soviet Union, in order to help 
ex-soviet countries to develop and integrate with the rest Europe and 
since then it became the largest financial investor in the region which 
stretches from central Europe to central Asia and the southern and 
eastern Mediterranean. The members of the bank are 64, both from 
the European region and from the rest of the world, plus the 
European Union and the European Investment Bank;117
 Inter-American Development Bank Group:  was founded in 1959 in 
order to reduce poverty and inequality in the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. The bank is the leading source of development 
financing for Latin America and the Caribbean and offers also 
technical advise and research support. The shareholders of the banks 
are currently 48, which include 26 countries located in the Latin 
American and Caribbean regions, which are also the main borrowers 
of the bank.118
One of the main differences between the IBRD and multilateral development 
banks is that latters have mandate to lend not exclusively to member states, 
but also to any other country in that region.119Each multilateral development 
bank has a "private lending arm", to deal specifically with loans to private 
sector borrowers in the relevant region, rather than to public entities.
For completeness, it is worth mentioning that there are also multilateral 
financial institutions which carry out lending activities in favour of 
developing countries. They have a narrower ownership/membership 
structure and focus on special sectors or activities and they are, namely: (i) 
the European Investment Bank; (ii) International Fund for Agricultural 
Development; (iii) Islamic Development Bank; (iv) Nordic Development 
Fund; (v) Nordic Investment Bank; (vi) OPEC Fund for International
Development. 
                                                                                                                                     
117 See	 the	 European	 Bank	 for	 Reconstruction	 and	 Development	 at:	
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/homepage.shtml.	
118 See	 the	 Inter-American	 Development	 Bank	 Group	 at:	 http://www.iadb.org/en/inter-american-
development-bank,2837.html#.UbOWCL_3iRs.	
119 On	 the	 operations	 and	 mandate	 of	 multilateral	 development	 banks	 see	 G.	 Handl,	 The	 Legal	
Mandate	of	Multilateral	Development	Banks	as	Agents	for	Change	toward	Sustainable	Development,	
American	Journal	of	International	Law,	1998,	pp.	642- 665.
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Given that in the context of sovereign debt restructuring, both multilateral 
banks and multilateral financial institutions generally follow the same 
dynamic as the World Bank, for simplicity going forward reference to 
multilateral institutions will make reference to the World Bank Group as well 
as multilateral development banks and other multilateral financial 
institutions.
b. Bilateral creditors: 
Bilateral loans are offered by certain governments directly to the governments or 
public entities of developing countries. We list such kind of loans for completeness, 
however as for the purposes of the restructuring of such debt, they are treated as the 
debt grated by multilateral and official creditors, no further analysis will be carried 
out in this chapter. The mains point of interest has been anticipated in the 
introductory paragraph, in relation to the political and strategic reasons which are 
usually behind this kind of financings.
c. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF)
As anticipated in the introductory chapter, SWF are investments vehicles created by 
national governments in order to manage specific portions of their financial 
resources.120
There are a variety of SWF, differentiated primarily on the basis of: (i) the financial 
resources used by the governments to set them up; and (ii) on the basis of the 
investment objective of each fund.
In relation to the first category, SWF can be established using the funds deriving from 
foreign-currency reserves, commodity export reserves121 and governmental budget or 
pensions surpluses.
As far as the second category is concerned, SWF are classified as:
 Stabilization funds: these are funds created by countries with relevant 
quantities of non-renewable sources, which manage these funds in order to 
                                                                                                                                     
120 The	International	Working	Group	of	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	defines	SWFs	on	the	basis	of	three	
elements:	(i)	the	ownership	of	SWFs	by	the	general	government	(both	central	and	subnational);	
(ii)	 investments	 strategies	 must	 involve	 foreign	 financial	 assets;	 (iii)	 their	 objectives	 and	
purposes,	as	they	are	established	for	macroeconomic	purposes	and	to	reach	financial	objectives.	
See	 Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	Generally	accepted	principles	and	practices,	 “Santiago	Principles”,	
October	2008,	pag.	27,	available	at:	http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm.		
121 Commodity	funds	manage	55%	of	the	wealth	managed	by	the	aggregate	of	the	SWF,	and	54%	of	it	
relates	 to	 surplus	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 oil.	 CONSOB	 – Discussion	 Papers:	 I	 Fondi	 Sovrani	 e	 la	
regolamentazione	degli	investimenti	nei	settori	strategici,	S.	Alvaro,	P.	Ciccaglioni,	Discussion	Paper	
n.	3,	July	2012,	p.	5.
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avoid negative economic consequences in the event the prices of their non-
renewable resources drop. They aim, therefore, at reducing the risks 
connected with the volatility of the prices of those commodities on which 
their economy is based;
 Saving funds: whose aims is creating a reserve of wealth for future 
generations;122
 Development funds: which have as investment objective the development of 
social and economics target such as key infrastructures;
 Pension reserve funds: which aim at strengthening the pension system of the 
countries;
 Strategic funds: established in order to invest in national enterprises in order 
to promote their competitiveness.123
The development of SWF has been one of the most noteworthy features of the 
international financial system in the last decade124: most of the SWF has been 
established after 2002 and between December 2001 and October 2007 the reserves 
managed by SWF rapidly increased from US 2.1 trillion to US 6.2 trillion. It is also 
important to note that, under the geographical point of view, the vast majority of the 
increase in the funds managed by SWF was located in developing countries. Main 
protagonists of such sudden development were Asian countries, in particular India 
and China, due to export related resources, and commodity-producing countries, in 
particular oil exporting countries in the Middle East.125
Table: first 30 SWF in terms of assets managed126
                                                                                                                                     
122 IMF,	 Stabilization	 and	 Saving	 Funds	 for	 Non-renewable	 Resources:	 Experience	 and	 Fiscal	 Policy	
Implications,	Occasional	Paper,	2009,	p.	9.
123 France	and	 Italy	have	established	strategic	 funds	 in	 the	past	decade,	 respectively:	 (i)	 the	Fonds	
Stratégique	 d’Investissement (FSI),	 created	 in	 2008	 in	 order	 to	 grant	 stability	 to	 the	 national	
companies	 which	 are key	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 country;	 and	 (ii)	 the	 Fondo	 Strategico	
Italiano,	 created	 in	 2011,	 whose	 aim	 is	 to	 make	 equity	 investments	 in	 companies	 which	 are	
strategic	for	the	Italian	economy.	
124 For	completeness,	SWF	are	not	a	new	figures	of	the	international	financial	system,	in	particular	in	
relation	to	countries	with	great	availability	of	natural	resources,	where	SWF	were	established	for	
the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 1950s:	 in	1953	 a	 SWF	was	 established	 in	Kuwait	 and	 in	 1956	 a	 SWF	was	
created	in	the	Pacific	Island	of	Kiribati	too,	out	of	the	resources	generated	by	its	guano	mines.	The	
Economist,	Asset-backed	Insecurity,	17	January	2008.
125 S.	 Griffith-Jones	 and	 J.	 A.	 Ocampo,	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds:	 a	 developing	 countries	 perspective,	
paper	 prepared	 for	 the	 workshop	 on	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds	 organized	 by	 the	 Andean	
Development	Corporation,	London	18	February	2008,	p.	2	and	3.
126 Data	at	April	2011,	table	from	CONSOB	– Discussion	Papers:	I	Fondi	Sovrani	e	la	regolamentazione	
degli	investimenti	nei	settori	strategici,	S.	Alvaro,	P.	Ciccaglioni,	Discussion	Paper	n.	3,	July	2012,	p.	
5.
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Country Sovereign Wealth 
Fund
Assets managed 
(in US billion)
Percentage on the 
overall amount
1.
UAE – Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment 
Authority 
625 15,7
2.
Norway
Government 
Pension Fund 
530 29,0
3.
China 
SAFE Investment 
Company 
347 37,7
4.
China 
China Investment 
Corporation 
332 46,0
5.
Singapore 
Government of 
Singapore 
Investment 
Corporation 
315 53,9
6.
China – Hong Kong 
Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio 
293 61,4
7.
Kuwait 
Kuwait Investment 
Authority 
202 66,4
8.
Singapore Temasek Holdings 140 69,9
9.
China 
National Social 
Security Fund 
120 72,9
10.
UAE  Dubai World 100 75,4
11.
Russia 
National Welfare 
Fund
88 77,6
12.
Qatar 
Qatar Investment 
Authority 
80 79,6
13.
Australia 
Australian Future 
Fund 
71 81,4
14.
Libya 
Libyan Investment 
Authority 
70 83,1
15.
Algeria 
Revenue Regulation 
Fund 
61 84,7
16.
Brunei 
Brunei Investment 
Agency 
39 85,7
17.
US – Alaska
Alaska Permanent 
Fund 
39 86,7
18.
South Korea
Korea Investment 
Corporation 
37 87,5
19.
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 36 88,5
20.
Kazakistan 
Kazakhstan 
National Fund 
30 89,2
21.
Kazakistan 
Samruk Kayna 
National Welfare 
Fund 
29 89,9
22.
Venezuela 
National 
Development Fund 
27 90,6
23.
France 
Strategic Investment 
Fund 
91,2 91,2
24.
Russia Reserve Fund 25 91,8
25.
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 24 92,4
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26.
UAE – Abu Dhabi 
Mubadala 
Development 
Company 
23 93,0
27.
Ireland
National Pensions 
Reserve Fund 
22 93,6
28.
UAE – Abu Dhabi 
International 
Petroleum 
Investment 
Company 
21 94,1
29.
Canada 
Alberta’s Heritage 
Fund 
15 94,4
30.
US –New Mexico 
Mexico New Mexico 
State Investment 
Council 
15 94,7
Total
3,767 94.7%
Some authors127 tried to investigate the rationale behind the decision to set up a SWF, 
in particular for developing countries, and the following main theories have been 
analysed:
 “Wealth substitution motive”: the rationale for countries to create a fund is to 
switch from natural resources asset into foreign exchange assets in case there 
is a current account surplus (i.e. if the sale of the resources would not just 
entirely consumed or transformed into domestic investment). In this case the 
key element to be evaluated is whether the resource if left under ground 
would be more valuable in the long term rather than being covered in other 
kind of assets. To the extent that (i) the funds deriving by the sale of the 
natural resource are invested in capital assets that aim at reaching a 
sustainable long-term growth, as an inter-generational equity; and (ii) the 
profits deriving out of such investments are higher than the expected 
increase in the value of the natural resource, the right balance it is 
undoubtedly struck. On the other hand, if the extraction of natural resources 
results simply in an overconsumption or over investment in infrastructure 
and other activities which may have little social impact, resources may be 
better left under ground and transformed into other assets at a later stage;
 “Resilient surplus motive”: such rational belongs to countries which do not 
have economies based on natural resources. It is the result of either an “over-
competitiveness” in the production of tradable goods and services or 
voluntary exchange rate undervaluation, out of which they receive the 
                                                                                                                                     
127 S.	 Griffith-Jones	 and	 J.	 A.	 Ocampo,	 Sovereign	Wealth	 Funds:	 a	 developing	 countries	 perspective,	
paper	 prepared	 for	 the	 workshop	 on	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds	 organized	 by	 the	 Andean	
Development	Corporation,	London	18	February	2008.
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resources necessary to set up the fund resilient to growth and exchange rates, 
as protective measure;
 “Counter-cyclical motive”: linked to two different set of circumstances: (i) the 
cyclical swings in exportation volumes and prices; and (ii) cyclical swings in 
the commodity prices. In “good” times, resources are accumulated and 
directed to the constitution of SWF which, once the prices will decrease will 
help the national economy out of the returns of investment made; 
 “Self-insurance motive”: this rational is linked to excess of flow of cash into 
the country out of investments generally rather than due to the commodity 
prices or trade trends, but the aim the SWF is the same as per the previous 
point: to protect the financial stability of the country. As the capital flow in 
developing countries is strongly pro-cyclical, SWF represent a self-insurance 
for the country in order to be protected from risks of capital flow 
reversibility, to avoid replicating what happened in Asia in the 1970s, where 
the crisis quickly spread from a country to the other resulting into a massive 
outflow of capital from economies rather sound.128
We will now analyse what are the main investment targets for SWF, in order to reach 
the objectives in their constitutional documents. 
Recent studies show that the appetite of SWF is mainly focused on equity 
investments, bonds and some real estate investments.
In relation to equity investments, the industries which seem more attractive for SWF 
are: (i) natural resources; (ii) industries connected to natural resources such as 
processing industries and transportation; (iii) financial services. 129
A positive aspect of the investments carried out by SWF is that they tend to hold 
“long” term participation, which has a stabilising effect against the risk of volatility of 
                                                                                                                                     
128		 See	next	chapter	for	a	more	detailed	analysis.
129 In	recent	years	SWF	have	invested	in	participations	in	banks	(generally	welcomed	as	it	is	usually	
for	 small	 portions	 of	 equity	 which	 does	 not	 involve	 sitting	 in	 bank	 boards):	 in	 2007	 Temasek	
Holdings	 invested	 2	USD	billions	 in	Barclays,	 In	 2007	and	2008	China	 Investment	 Corporation	
invested	5	USD	billion	in	Morgan	Stanley	together	with	Kuwait	Investment	Authority	and	Korea	
Investment	 Authority,	 respectively	 2	 USD	 billion	 each.	 More	 recently	 (2010	 and	 2011	
respectively)	 Qatar	 Investment	 Authority	 invested	 in	 Agricultural	 Bank	 of	 China,	 Banco	
Santander,	 Barclays	 and	 Credit	 Suisse.	 More	 recently	 SWF	 invested	 in	 equity	 participation	 in	
hedge	funds	and	private	equity	funds.	Abu	Dhabi	Investment	Authority	bought	a	7.5%	stake	in	the	
private	equity	funds	Carlyle	Group	and	a	9%	stake	in	Apollo	Management	and	China	Investment	
Corporation	bought	a	10%	stake	in	the	private	equity	fund	Blackstone.	See	CONSOB	– Discussion
Papers:	I	Fondi	Sovrani	e	la	regolamentazione	degli	investimenti	nei	settori	strategici,	S.	Alvaro,	P.	
Ciccaglioni,	Discussion	Paper	n.	3,	July	2012,	p.	11	and	S.	Griffith-Jones	and	J.	A.	Ocampo,	Sovereign	
Wealth	Funds:	a	developing	countries	perspective, paper	prepared	for	the	workshop	on	Sovereign	
Wealth	Funds	organized	by	the	Andean	Development	Corporation,	London	18	February	2008,	p.	
30.
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the markets.130 As SWF look for long-term revenues rather than very volatile assets, 
some SWF have also approached the mezzanine lending market, which typically 
provides for higher returns (more risky investment) and longer investment.131
On the other hand, SWF raised some concern in the context of the debates for 
transparency and more accountability in the international financial markets, as 
anticipated in the previous chapter. 
Three main topic have been discussed in connection with the investment strategy of 
SWF: (i) the lack of transparency in relation to the size of the assets managed and 
their investment objectives; (ii) the risk connected to potential market abuse 
behaviours on their part; (iii) the risk of having investments carried out for 
strategic/political reasons.
In order to address the first concern, in 2008 the International Working Group of 
Sovereign Funds132 (IWG) was founded with the objective to agree upon a set of 
principles for SWF to guarantee the transparency and stability of the international 
financial system. 
The main achievement of the International Working Group was the preparation of
the so-called “Santiago Principles”.
The IWG in preparing the basic principles to guide the conduct of SWFs were driven 
by the following four objectives:
 to help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of capital and 
investment;
 to comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the 
countries in which they invest;
 to invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return related 
considerations; and
                                                                                                                                     
130 As	 the	 International	 Working	 Group	 of	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds	 points	 out:	 “SWFs	 also	 bring	
substantial	benefits	to the	global	markets.	Their	ability	in	many	circumstances	to	take	a	long-term	
view	 in	 their	 investments	 and	ride	out	business	 cycles	brings	 important	diversity	 to	 the	 global	
financial	 markets,	 which	 can	 be	 extremely	 beneficial,	 particularly	 during	 periods	 of	 financial	
turmoil	 or	macroeconomic	 stress.”	 See	 Sovereign	Wealth	 Funds,	 Generally	 accepted	 principles	
and	 practices,	 “Santiago	 Principles”,	 October	 2008,	 available	 at:	 http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm.		
131 Mezzanine	financing	are	usually	repaid	bullet	at	their	maturity	date.
132 The	 International	Working	Group	was	originally	 created	by	25	 countries:	Australia,	Azerbaijan,	
Bahrain,	 Botswana,	 Canada,	 Chile,	 China,	 Equatorial	 Guinea,	 Iran,	 Ireland,	 South	Korea,	 Kuwait,	
Libya,	Mexico,	New	Zealand,	Norway,	Qatar,	Russia,	Singapore,	Timor-Leste,	Trinidad	&	Tobago,	
the	United	Arab	Emirates,	the	United	States,	and	Vietnam.	Saudi	Arabia,	the	OECD,	and	the	World	
Bank	were	 permanent	 observers.	 See	 original	web	 site	 of	 the	 International	Working	 Group	 at:	
http://www.iwg-swf.org/.
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 to have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that provides 
for adequate operational controls, risk management and accountability.133
The preparation of the Santiago Principles was based on the analysis of the practices 
used by the majority of SWFs and by the review of principles already applied in other 
international fora. 
The IWG in putting together such principles was also aiming at promoting a better 
knowledge of what SWFs are and what their modus operandi is both in the countries 
where such funds invest134 and generally in the international financial markets.
The IWG presents the Santiago Principles (or GAPP, generally accepted principles 
and practices) as “…a voluntary set of principles and practices that the members of the IWF 
support and either have implemented or aspire to implement. The GAPP denotes general 
practices and principles, which are potentially achievable by countries at all levels of economic 
development.”135
The Santiago Principles are 24, and each principle has a set of sub-principles, further 
clarifying the scope of each principle. The principles cover a variety of areas, starting 
from the legal framework in which SWFs operate, their policy, the need for 
cooperation with domestic fiscal and monetary authorities of the countries in which 
they invest, the way in which SWFs are funded, their governance, the need for 
having a defined accountability framework in the constitutive documents of each 
SWF, the duty to comply with disclosure requirements of the countries in which they 
operate, general principles to guide their investment policy and risk management.136
                                                                                                                                     
133 See	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	Generally	accepted	principles	and	practices,	 “Santiago	Principles”,	
October	2008,	pag.	4,	available	at:	http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm.		
134 In	relation	to	recipient	countries,	in	June	2008t	he	OECD	Investment	Committee	adopted	a	report	
on	 recipient	 countries	 policies	 in	 relation	 to	 SWFs:	 “The	 OECD	will	 continue	 its	 work	 on	 how	
governments	 can	 maintain	 their	 commitment	 to	 open	 international	 investment	 policies	 –
including	for	SWFs	– while	also	protecting	essential	security	 interests.	The	resulting	framework	
will	 foster	 mutually-beneficial	 situations	 where	 SWFs	 enjoy	 fair	 treatment	 in	 the	 markets	 of	
recipient	countries	and	these	countries	can	confidently	resist	protectionism	pressures”.	See	OECD	
Investment	 Committee	 Report,	 4	 April	 2008,	 available	 at:	
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/oecddeclarationonsovereignwealthfundsandrecipientcountrypolicies.htm.	
135 See	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	Generally	accepted	principles	and	practices,	 “Santiago	Principles”,	
October	2008,	pag.	5,	available	at:	http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm.		
136 The	Santiago	Principles	are:	(1)	The	legal	framework	for	the	SWF	should	be	sound	and	support	its	
effective	operation	and	the	achievement	of	 its	stated	objective(s);	(2)	The policy	purpose	of	 the	
SWF	 should	 be	 clearly	 defined	 and	 publicly	 disclosed;	 (3)	 Where	 the	 SWF's	 activities	 have	
significant	 direct	 domestic	 macroeconomic	 implications,	 those	 activities	 should	 be	 closely	
coordinated	with	the	domestic	fiscal	and	monetary	authorities,	so	as	to	ensure	consistency	with	
the	 overall	 macroeconomic	 policies;	 (4)	 There	 should	 be	 clear	 and	 publicly	 disclosed	 policies,	
rules,	 procedures,	 or	 arrangements	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 SWF's	 general	 approach	 to	 funding,	
withdrawal,	 and	 spending	 operations;	 (5)	 The	 relevant	 statistical	 data	 pertaining	 to	 the	 SWF	
should	be	reported	on	a	timely	basis	to	the	owner,	or	as	otherwise	required,	for	inclusion	where	
appropriate	in	macroeconomic	data	sets;	(6)	The	governance	framework	for	the	SWF	should	be	
sound	and	establish	a	clear	and	effective	division	of	roles	and	responsibilities	in	order	to	facilitate	
50
In 2009, the International Working Group of Sovereign Funds reached the consensus 
for turning the working group in a more structured and permanent forum: the 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) was created between the 
same members which had originally founded the International Working Group.137
The IFSWF has a voluntary nature and its goal is to promote the exchange of views 
and discussions amongst its members and to facilitate the understanding and 
application of the Santiago Principles.
In 2010 a survey on the implementation of the Santiago Principles amongst the 
members of the IFSWSF was launched in order to assess the impact of such principles 
on its members.138
                                                                                                                                     
accountability	 and	 operational	 independence	 in	 the	 management	 of	 the	 SWF	 to	 pursue	 its	
objectives;	 (7)	 The	 owner	 should	 set	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 SWF,	 appoint	 the	 members	 of	 its	
governing	body(ies)	in	accordance	with	clearly	defined	procedures,	and	exercise	oversight	over	
the	SWF's	operations;	(8)	The	governing	body(ies)	should	act	in	the	best	interests	of	the	SWF,	and	
have	a	clear	mandate	and	adequate	authority	and	competency	to	carry	out	its	functions;	(9)	The	
operational	management	of	 the	 SWF	 should	 implement	 the	 SWF’s	 strategies	 in	an	 independent	
manner	 and	 in	 accordance	 with	 clearly	 defined	 responsibilities;	 (10)	 The	 accountability	
framework	for	the	SWF's	operations	should	be	clearly	defined	in	the	relevant	legislation,	charter,	
other	 constitutive	 documents,	 or	 management	 agreement;	 (11)	 An	 annual	 report	 and	
accompanying	financial	statements	on	the	SWF's	operations	and	performance	should	be	prepared	
in	 a	 timely	 fashion	 and	 in	 accordance	 with	 recognized	 international	 or	 national	 accounting	
standards	in	a	consistent	manner;	(12)	The	SWF's	operations	and	financial	statements	should	be	
audited	annually	in	accordance	with	recognized	international	or	national	auditing	standards	in	a	
consistent	manner;	(13)	Professional	and	ethical	standards	should	be	clearly	defined	and	made	
known	 to	 the	members	of	 the	 SWF's	 governing	body(ies),	management,	 and	 staff;	 (14)	Dealing	
with	 third	 parties	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 SWF's	 operational	 management	 should	 be	 based	 on	
economic	and	financial	grounds,	and	follow	clear	rules	and	procedures;	(15)	SWF	operations	and	
activities	in	host	countries	should	be	conducted	in	compliance	with	all	applicable	regulatory	and	
disclosure	requirements	of	the	countries	in	which	they	operate;	(16)	The	governance	framework	
and	 objectives,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 SWF's	 management	 is	 operationally	
independent	 from	 the	 owner,	 should	 be	 publicly	 disclosed;	 (17)	Relevant	 financial	 information	
regarding	 the	 SWF	 should	 be	 publicly	 disclosed	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 economic	 and	 financial	
orientation,	so	as	to	contribute	to	stability	in	international	financial	markets	and	enhance	trust	in	
recipient	 countries;	 (18)	 The	 SWF's	 investment	 policy	 should	 be	 clear	 and	 consistent	 with	 its	
defined	objectives,	risk	tolerance,	and	investment	strategy,	as	set	by	the	owner	or	the	governing	
body(ies),	and	be	based	on	sound	portfolio	management	principles;	(19)	The	SWF's	 investment	
decisions	should	aim	to	maximize	risk-adjusted	financial	returns	in	a	manner	consistent	with	its	
investment	policy,	and	based	on	economic	and	financial	grounds;	(20)	The	SWF	should	not	seek	
or	 take	 advantage	 of	 privileged	 information	 or	 inappropriate	 influence	 by	 the	 broader	
government	in	competing	with	private	entities;	(21)	SWFs	view	shareholder	ownership	rights	as	
a	 fundamental	 element	 of	 their	 equity	 investments'	 value.	 If	 an	 SWF	 chooses	 to	 exercise	 its	
ownership	 rights,	 it	 should	do	so	 in	 a	manner	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 its	 investment	policy	 and	
protects	 the	 financial	 value	 of	 its	 investments.	 The	 SWF	 should	 publicly	 disclose	 its	 general	
approach	 to	 voting	 securities	 of	 listed	 entities,	 including	 the	 key	 factors	 guiding	 its	 exercise	 of	
ownership	rights;	(22)	The	SWF	should	have	a	framework	that	identifies,	assesses,	and	manages	
the	risks	of	its	operations;	(23)	The	assets	and	investment	performance	(absolute	and	relative	to	
benchmarks,	 if	 any)	 of	 the	 SWF	 should	 be	 measured	 and	 reported	 to	 the	 owner	 according	 to	
clearly	defined	principles	or	standards;	(24)	A	process	of	regular	review	of	the	implementation	of	
the	GAPP	should	be	engaged	in	by	or	on	behalf	of	the	SWF.
137 The	IWG	reached	a	consensus	on	6	April	2009	in	Kuwait	City	(known	as	the	Kuwait	Declaration)	
to	establish	the	International	Forum of	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds.	The	first	meeting	of	the	IFSWF	
was	held	in	Baku	(Azerbaijan)	in	October	2009,	followed	by	meetings	in	Sydney	in	May	2010	and	
in	Bejing	in	May	2011.
138 See	 International	 Forum	 of	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds,	 IFSWF	 Members’	 Experiences in	 the	
Application	of	the	Santiago	Principles,	7	July	2011,	available	at	www.ifswf.org/pst/stp070711.pdf	.
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The survey showed that 95% of the member’s practices were fully or partially 
consistent with the Santiago Principles. In relation to the four main areas on which 
the Santiago Principles, the main findings were:
 Legal framework, Objectives and Coordination with Macro Policies: all 
members disclose their legal basis and often their policy objective too, the 
rules for their funding and withdrawal are generally set out in the national 
legislation, therefore publicly available;
 Institutional Framework and Governance Structure: most of the members 
have sound governance framework, are accountable to their legislature and 
have to prepare audited financial statements and annual reports which are 
publicly available. Most members have also a defined code of ethics and 
policies to deal with third parties;
 Investment and Risk Management Framework: all members try to maximize 
long-term risk adjusted return and seek for responsible investments in 
accordance with long-term macroeconomic concerns, most of them discloses 
information on investments and internal policies and objectives and try to 
implement a dynamic approach to risk management;
 Value of transparency: most of the member see transparency as a value and 
state to get practical benefits from being open with other players in the global 
market.139
The final balance in relation to the implementation of the Santiago Principles seems 
therefore quite positive and gives the chance to SWFs to let the public know about 
their operations and being compliant with such principles gives to the participating 
members a “title” to spend on international markets and in the recipient countries.
However, it must be noted that the survey on the implementation of the Santiago 
Principles is limited to the IFSWF members, therefore in relation to other SFWs the 
concerns relating to the lack of transparency and accountability and the political 
reasons behind their investments still remain.
A further note of interest is a recent development in the role of SWFs: the financial 
support of developing countries.140 In 2010 the World Bank launched a new program, 
                                                                                                                                     
139 See	 International	 Forum	 of	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds,	 IFSWF	 Members’	 Experiences	 in	 the	
Application	 of	 the	 Santiago	 Principles,	 7	 July	 2011,	 pag.	 6-10,	 available	 at	
www.ifswf.org/pst/stp070711.pdf	.
140 On	SWFs	and	human	rights	generally	and	the	impliactions	on	development	see	P.J.	Keenan	and	C.	
Ochoa,	 The	 human	 rights	 potential	 of	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds, in	 Georgetown	 Journal	 of	
International	 Law,	 2009,	 pp.	 1151- 1179	 and	 R.	 Sarkar,	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Funds:	 furthering	
development	or	impeding	it?,	in	Georgetown	Journal	of	International	Law,	2009,	pp.	1181- 1207.
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based on the constitution of a 600 million USD fund for less developed countries, 
financed by SWFs owned by South Korea, The Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and 
Azerbaijan.141 However, given that SWFs for their very nature (i.e. sources of 
profitable investment for their government) are not aid or charity vehicles, reliance 
on them to deliver development goals may be misguided.142
d. Public creditors in sovereign debt restructuring
The distinction between public sector creditors and private sector creditors is 
meaningful in the context of debt restructuring proceedings, as it will be better 
analysed in the following chapter.
In a nutshell, public creditors negotiate the terms of the restructurings with the 
relevant borrower in the context of the Paris Club and they are strictly connected and 
mainly follow the activities and decisions taken by the IMF, given that usually 
multilateral creditors agreed upon a deal with the borrower once the IMF has already 
set the conditions according to which it will agree to assist and usually provide 
additional finance to the country experiencing financial distress.
Private creditors rely equally on the IMF intervention and leading role, however they 
have a separate forum to negotiate with the borrower in the context of debt 
restructuring.
                                                                                                                                     
141 See	The	Washington	Post,	World	Bank	gets	help	from	sovereign	wealth	funds	to	invest	in	developing	
nations,	 18	 April	 2010,	 available	 at:	 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/17/AR2010041702921.html.	
142 On	the	concerns	raised	by	the	operation	of	SWFs	see	also	E.	F.	Greene	and	B.A.	Yeager,	Sovereign	
wealth	funds	– a	measured	assessment,	Capital	Markets	Law	Journal,	2008,	vol.	3	no.	3	pp.	247-274	
and	Y.C.L.	Lee,	A	reversal	of	neo-colonialism:	 the	pitfalls	and	prospects	of	 sovereign	wealth	 funds,	
Georgetown	Journal	of	Inernational	Law,	2009,	pp.	1109-1149.
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3) PRIVATE SECTOR CREDITORS
The second main category of players in the context of entities financing developing 
countries are private entities, mainly commercial banks lending to government and 
corporations and investors which subscribe bonds issued by the developing countries. 
Historically, bank loans used to be the main source of capital for emerging economies, 
however after the sovereign debt crisis of the ‘80ies (as better described in the following 
chapter), the issuance of bonds was used to refinance such loans, so that now the main 
source of financing is bonds. A short overview of the kind and percentage of 
indebtedness of some developing countries will be presented in the final paragraph 
below.
a. Commercial banks financing
Historically, developing economies represented key clients for commercial banks in 
the ‘80ies, when European and American banks were overloaded by petrodollars 
coming from OEPC countries which were benefitting from a raise in the cost of oil. 
As bonuses of bankers were proportionate to the amount of financing arranged, 
during that period massive loans were advanced to developing countries, with little 
or no analysis of how much debt was beneficial or at least capable of being repaid by 
the borrower. A deeper analysis of this phenomenon and its consequences is carried 
out in the following chapter.
For the purposes of this paragraph, is enough to highlight the kind of financing 
offered to sovereign borrowers: the loans were advanced to deal with the general 
needs of the country, and they were not linked to a specific project to be developed or 
milestone to be met in order to receive additional tranches of the loan.
The quantum of the loan was usually based on the GDP of a country, (sometimes 
exceeding it) without keeping some “headroom” to deal with sudden need of 
supplemental financing in connection with natural or human disasters. The 
borrowing capacity would be saturated, leaving such countries exposed to the risks 
connected to sudden and unexpected risks.
The two main common form of financing from developing countries will now be 
shortly analysed: (i) general corporate loans, to finance budget deficit; and (ii) project 
finance structures.
i. Loans: loans are usually advanced by commercial banks operating in 
pools, the so-called syndicated loans, in order to raise more capital 
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due the fact that each bank has to advance a smaller amount, which 
is easier in terms of risk and exposures that banks are willing to 
accept. Historically, the birth of syndicated loans is linked to the 
need to advance high amounts of debt and the unwillingness and/or 
impossibility for single banks to deal with such requests, as better 
described in the next chapter. Syndicated loans consists of an 
investor group, opposed to a single creditor,  which the borrower has 
to deal with throughout the life of the facility. They create the issue 
of how to deal with the relationships between the creditors 
themselves, which requires some sort on inter-creditors arrangement,
to regulate procedural issues such as voting requirement and 
majorities, particularly important on the context of restructuring. In 
connection with loans generally, it is worth mentioning that the 
trend has been to get the main players to agree upon certain 
prevailing standards, which have originally developed in 
industrialised countries but which have recently involved emerging 
markets as well. In Europe, the most authoritative voice in such 
respect is the Loan Market Association (LMA)143, which was founded
in 1996 by banks operating in the market. The LMA's aim is to 
"encourage liquidity in both the primary and secondary loan market 
by promoting efficiency and transparency, as well as developing 
standards of documentation and codes of market practice, which are 
widely used and adopted".144 Similar organizations developed in 
other regions of the world, such as the Loan Syndications and 
Trading Association (LTSA)145 in the USA and the Asia Pacific Loan 
Market Association.146
Although during the crisis the general trend for commercial banks 
was to reduce or withdraw completely loans advanced to developing 
countries, the African region was a notable exception to such trend. 
This has been explained by a combination of three factors: (i) the 
African region was not directly touched by the crisis; (ii) 
international lenders recognised the potential growth opportunities 
in Africa; (iii) the volumes of loans started from a very low base, 
                                                                                                                                     
143 The	members	of	the	LMA	are	currently	470	and	consists	of	banks,	non-banks	investors,	law	firms,	
rating	agencies	and	service	providers.
144 See	The	Loan	Book,	Loan	Market	Association,	eds.	N.	Voisey	and	A.	Slocombe,	2011,	p.	3.
145 More	info	available	on	their	website,	at:	http://www.lsta.org/.	
146 More	info	available	on	their	website,	at:	http://www.aplma.com/.
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representing a small proportion of all emerging markets loans 
(between approximately 3% and 5%). The availability of funds for 
African borrowers was also due to the expansion of Chinese banks' 
operations in that region, which supported the demand of new 
financing together with European and domestic and regional 
banks.147
A significant development in the approach of the LMA has been the 
introduction of a specific set of standard documentation for loans to 
be advanced to borrowers located in development countries 
jurisdictions.148 Upon request from the main commercial players in 
the market, the LMA prepared a standard form loan agreement to be 
used as starting point for the negotiations with developing countries 
borrowers. This is a clear sign of the relevance of this kind of 
transactions in the market.
The assumptions included in the documentation are that the 
borrower is a corporate borrower (i.e. such documents do not 
purport to deal with loans to governments or public entities) 
incorporated in a development market jurisdictions and that the 
loans are either secured or unsecured (separate sets of documents 
have been prepared in such respect) and the loans are advanced in 
one or more currencies (again, separate set of documents are 
contemplated for such options).
The LMA acknowledges that the nature of developing market 
transactions is such that producing a common standard for all of 
them is an ambitious goal, given that each standard form will need to 
be adapted in respect of the specific structure and the peculiar 
jurisdictional and credit related risks connected to each transaction. 
However, as the LMA states: "…it was still felt that it would be a step 
forward in promoting the efficiency of the market if a document was 
produced which was a good starting point for the draftsman; which 
provided a common framework and language for those involved in 
these transactions[…]".149
                                                                                                                                     
147 See	The	Loan	Book,	Loan	Market	Association,	eds.	N.	Voisey	and	A.	Slocombe,	2011,	pp.	79-81.
148 The	 standard	 documents	 are	 available	 for	 download	 to	 all	 LMA	 registered	 users	 at:	
http://www.lma.eu.com/.	
149 See	LMA,	Users	guide	to	the	recommended	form	of	facility	agreement	for	use	in	developing	market	
jurisdictions,	p.	2,	available	to	LMA	registered	users	at	http://www.lma.eu.com/.
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Content wise, it is worth noting that the standard forms documents 
deal with the environment and in particular "Environmental Claims" 
and "Environmental Law", due to the growing relevance of 
environmental issues for lenders in the market.
The relevance for the lenders of clauses which deal with 
environmental issues is linked to many factors, mainly: (i) 
environmental claims may impair the ability of the borrower to 
repay the debt; (ii) the lenders themselves could be held liable for 
ongoing violations or environmental remediation; (iii) from a pure 
asset perspective, environmental contaminations could result in the 
impairment of the value of the collateral; (iv) the lenders could be 
held liable for cleanup costs; and (v) the stigma effect on the lenders. 
On this final point, it is worth noting that the financial institutions 
realised that the mere association of their names with major 
environmental problems could seriously affect the institution's
image.
Summing up, either due to the willingness of the lenders to minimize 
losses and maximising returns or due to the lenders' environmental 
policy objectives, the final outcome is that, in the recent years, 
lenders have made an important contributions on environmental 
protection and sustainable development as a necessary consequence 
of their efforts to minimise their risks.150
ii. Project Finance
Project finance is a specific financing structure developed in order to 
fund in an effective way the constructions and operation of projects 
in both developed and developing countries. The essence of project 
finance is that repayment of the loan is limited to the assets of the 
project (and the equity contribution of the sponsors).  Project finance 
is also called "limited recourse" financing (i.e the lenders' recourse is 
limited to an identifiable pool of assets, the project assets and not 
generically to the entirety of the assets of the borrower and 
guarantors). Lenders in a project financing look to the future cash 
flow projected to be generated by the project and any payment in 
respect of the residual value of the project assets at the end of project 
                                                                                                                                     
150 On	the	environmental	issues	in	connection	with	private	source	of	financing,	see	R.	S.	Frye,	The	role	
of	private	banks	in	promoting	sustainable	development,	from	outside	counsel's	perspective,	Law	and	
Policy	in	International	Business,	1997-1998,	pp.	481- 499.
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life for repayment of the loan and interest, rather than the analysing 
the credit worthiness of the borrower itself (as in the context of 
regular corporate financings), which is a special purpose vehicle 
which has no assets other than the project itself.
As already discussed in the previous paragraphs, project financing is 
the financing tool by means of which all the main projects in 
developing countries have been funded. Lenders in respect of such 
financing vary, as it could be just a number of commercial banks 
pooling together or it could involve official creditors as well, such as 
the World Bank or other multilateral development banks and export 
agencies. As anticipated, the advantage from the commercial banks' 
perspective, to have the official creditors "on board" is that official 
creditors will carry out the monitoring of the projects, as part of their 
internal procedures, on which private financers will rely upon.
A further point of interest in respect of this kind of structure, is the 
development of a specific set of environmental and social principles, 
the so-called Equator Principles, which the borrowers have to 
comply with in order to be eligible for the financing.
On 4 June 2003 several of the world's largest banks announced their 
adoption of the Equator Principles, a set of voluntary guidelines 
developed for managing social and environmental issues relating to 
projects, particularly in the emerging markets. Following major 
redrafts in 2006 and 2013, 79 financial institutions in 35 countries 
have now officially adopted the Principles, covering over 70 per cent 
of international project finance debt in emerging markets.151
The Equator Principles are based on, and expressly incorporate, a 
number of the policies and guidelines of the International Finance 
Corporation. 152In adopting the Equator Principles, each financial 
institution undertakes to develop individual internal practices and 
policies consistent with the framework established by the Equator 
Principles. Each financial institution is then expected to provide 
direct loans and project finance advisory services only to projects 
whose sponsors demonstrate the ability and willingness to comply 
with the Equator Principles' processes, and meet their substantive 
                                                                                                                                     
151 Statistics	 from	 the	 Equator	 Principles	 Association's	 website:	 http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep.	
152 The	 full	 version	 of	 the	 Equator	 Principles	 is	 available	 on	 the	 Equator	 Principles	 Association's	
website	at:	http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf.
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standards, similar to those which apply in the case of loans from the 
IFC.153
In the context of sovereign debt restructuring, commercial banks group together in 
the so-called London Club, in order to deal with the negotiation with the borrower as 
a unite front. The activity of the London Club is analysed in the following chapter. 
The main common feature in relation to private debt in the context of debt 
restructuring is the so-called “socialization” of private sector debt.154 What usually 
happens as a result of the negotiations with public and private creditors during a 
financial crisis, is that the government represent all debtors located in its territory vis-
à-vis the creditors. Corporate borrowers are protected by the government and do not 
have to face separate negotiations. However, as supplemental step, the government 
guarantees for all the debt granted to such national private borrowers, so that on one 
hand their credit risk is enhanced (for the benefit of the creditors, mainly private 
creditors) but on the other hand this results in a heavy charge put on the common 
people of such country, given that such loans will be ultimately serviced higher taxes 
and lower social services.155
b. Bonds
The main structural difference between bonds and loans, from the borrower 
perspective, is that bonds create a single relationship between the bond issuer and 
each bondholder, rather than a sole relationship between a group of banks and the 
borrower.
In the '80ies, the creditors' class was overwhelmingly composed by commercial 
banks, in the '90ies, bank loans were replaced in vast majority by bonds issuances. 
Hence why the final chapter focuses on the restructuring of sovereign debt in the 
"bondholders era", analysing the main differences in the negotiation process between 
banks and bondholders and the developments in the contractual arrangements 
between the issuers and the holders of the bonds. For the purposes of this paragraph, 
few main features of sovereign bonds will be set out.156
                                                                                                                                     
153 On	 the	 Equator	 Principles	 see	 M.	 Marco,	 Accountability	 in	 international	 project	 finance:	 the	
Equator	 Principles	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 third-party-beneficiary	 status	 for	 project	 affected	
communities,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal,	2010-2011,	pp.	452- 503.
154 On	the	issue	of	socialization	of	private	sector	debt	see	R.P.	Buckley,	International	Financial	System	
– Policy	and	Regulation,	Kluer	Law	International,	2008,	pp.	156-159.
155 On	this	topic	see	also	R.P.	Buckley,	The	Fatal	Flaw	in	International	Finance:	The	Rich	Borrow	and	
the	Poor	Repay,	World	Policy	Journal,	2002/2003,	pp.	59-64.
156 On	 sovereign	 bonds	 see	 M.	 Megliani,	 Debitori	 sovrani	 e	 obbligazionisti	 esteri,	 Giuffre'	 Editore,	
2009.
59
What makes bonds attractive from a borrower perspective, it a combination of 
factors, amongst which, the most relevant ones are: (i) bigger quantum of funds 
potentially available, given that the international financial market is a much bigger 
source of funds than commercial banks; (ii) their term is usually longer than bank 
debt (and given that long term debt gives more stability to the borrower, this is quite 
a relevant aspect); and (iii) covenants and undertaking required by creditors are 
overall less stringent than for bank loans. The downsides of bonds are that they 
usually bear a higher interest rate than bank loans and that bonds have a very liquid 
market which allows investors to sell them rapidly, causing a destabilising effect for 
the sovereign borrower, which upon a consistent sale of its bonds on the market, is 
perceived by the international market, as affected by a reduced creditworthiness, 
which will eventually result in a further outflow of money from the country (as in the 
Asian crisis, see next chapter).
Sovereign can issue bonds by means of two procedure: (i) through a issuance on the 
market without using a investment banks as intermediary; or (ii) using investment 
banks as their intermediary vis-à-vis the market.
The first procedure is cheaper, given that no fees for the intermediary are required, 
however the sovereign country has to take the risk that a some (or all) of the bonds 
will not be underwritten by investors, therefore only countries with a high 
international rating (which are therefore sure to offer to the market an attractive 
product) can allow themselves to use such procedure.
The second procedure, on the other hand, gives the issuer the certainty that all the 
bonds will be subscribed, given that the investment banks will take responsibility to 
look for a group of banks willing to underwrite the whole amount of the issuance 
(the so-called underwriters). Banks will not underwrite the bonds in order to hold 
them, but with a view to place them on the market.157
The main contractual provisions of the bond issuance are:
i. Monetary clauses: which include clauses dealing with the conditions 
of the issuance (i.e. whether the issuance is at par or below the face 
value of the bonds) and the pricing of the bonds (i.e. if the interest 
rate is fixed or floating). Currency wise, sovereign bonds, in 
particular bonds issued by developing countries, are issued in a 
currency which is not the national currency of the issuer. This is due 
to the fact that otherwise bonds would not be attractive for the 
                                                                                                                                     
157 For	more	 information	 on	 the	 steps	 and	 procedure	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	 sovereign	 bonds,	 see	M.	
Megliani, Debitori	sovrani	e	obbligazionisti	esteri,	Giuffre'	Editore,	2009,	pp.	15-60.
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market, due to the devaluation risk and the overall control of the 
debtor on its own currency. In this category also falls the clauses 
dealing with repayment of the principal amount of the bonds, which 
can either be a repayment in full at the end of the life of the bond or 
it can amortise throughout the term of the bonds (but the first option 
is the more common).
ii. Non monetary clauses: amongst the clauses which do not deal with 
the economics of the issuance, the most relevant clauses are the 
covenants granted by the issuer, in particular the pari passu covenant 
and the negative pledge covenant, and the events of default. The pari 
passu covenant aims at granting that all creditors are treated equally, 
so that they all receive the same treatments in respect of repayment 
of interest and principal (this specific clause will be further analysed 
in the final chapter, as it became a quite relevant clause in the context 
of debt restructuring). The negative pledge clause, on the other hand, 
aims at prohibiting the issuer to grant security and any kind of liens 
to other creditors, in prejudice of the bondholders. In the event the 
issuer is in breach of such clause, it will have to grant the same 
security offered to third party creditors to the bondholders as well. 
Events of default are key terms of the bonds as well, given that they 
regulate the situation in which the bondholders are entitled to get an 
exit and be repaid, due to a breach of the contractual terms by the 
issuer or certain changes in the factual situation. The cross default, in 
particular, is a standard event of default, which allows the 
bondholders to declare their debt due in the event the issuer keep to 
make regular payments in respect of its bonds obligations, but 
defaults under other debt instruments, showing a situation of 
financial distress. As final boilerplates clauses, the governing law 
clause is included (governing law is almost invariably either New 
York law or English law), the jurisdiction clause and the waiver of 
sovereign immunity (which will be analysed in the final chapter).158
iii. IMF clause: the IMF clause was introduced in the offering 
memorandum of bonds between 1978 and 1985, which was a period 
of several sovereign debt restructurings. Under the terms of such 
clause, the issuer undertakes to maintain its membership in and 
                                                                                                                                     
158 On	 the	 contractual	 terms	of	 the	bonds,	 see	M.	Megliani,	Debitori	 sovrani	 e	 obbligazionisti	 esteri,	
Giuffre'	Editore,	2009,	pp.	30-37.
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eligibility to use the resources of the IMF. Unless cured within a 
certain time period, the loss of membership causes the occurrence of 
an event of default, which triggers the acceleration of the maturity of 
the debt. This clause is included for issuances by developing 
countries which are not established issuers, seen as to big to be 
abandoned, such as Brazil, Mexico or India.159 Some writers 
suggested that the clause was a "seal of approval" proving to the 
international community that the issuer was creditworthy.160
Historically, however, notwithstanding the several sovereign 
financial crisis, no sovereign lost its eligibility to use IMF funds. 
Interestingly enough, in fact, the IMF criteria for eligibility are 
unlikely to be of any comfort to the lenders, which was proven by 
the fact that not even Argentina, during the worst years of its 
financial crisis, was anywhere close to lose its eligibility.161 The most 
plausible explanation for the introduction of such clause is the fact 
that it obliges the IMF to be part of the relationships between the 
issuer and the bondholders: "The private lenders were anxious to 
secure the IMF's involvement because they were finding it 
remarkably hard to directly control sovereign debtors in the same 
way that they might control corporate debtors. The IMF clause, we 
contend, emerged as an ex-ante mechanism to draw the IMF into the 
relationship and, indeed, to give it notice of this fact."162
                                                                                                                                     
159 As	 some	 authors	 point	 out,	 such	 clause:	 "The	 IMF	 clauses	 raises	 the	 stakes	 if	 the	 IMF	 should	
withdraw	 membership	 or	 eligibility:	 by	 doing	 so,	 it	 would	 trigger	 the	 acceleration	 of	 the	
sovereign's	debt.	The	IMF	is	a	political	body	and	it	does	not	wish	to	be	blamed	for	such	a	financial	
calamity, either	 to	 individual	 sovereigns	or	 to	 the	 global	 economy.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 parties	 to	
sovereign	 debt	 contracts	 use	 IMF	 clauses	 to	 co-opt	 the	 IMF,	 by	 exploiting	 its	 responsibility	 to	
preserve	 international	 financial	 stability.	The	clause	cements	 the	 IMF's	commitment	 to	monitor	
the	 borrower,	 and	 to	 be	 a	 leading	 force	 in	 any	 debt	 restructuring,	 by	 providing	 emergency	
financing	 and	 intervening	 in	 the	 economic	 management	 of	 the	 sovereign."	 M.	 Gulati	 and	 G.	
Triantis,	 Contracts	 without	 law:	 sovereign	 versus	 corporate	 debt,	 University	 of	 Cincinnati	 Law	
Review,	2006-2007,	p.	999.
160 D.	 D.	 Bradlow,	 International	 borrowing:	 negotiating	 and	 structuring	 international	 debt	
transactions,	International	Law	Institute,	1986.
161 See	M.	Gulati	and	G.	Triantis,	Contracts	without	law:	sovereign	versus	corporate	debt,	University	of	
Cincinnati	Law	Review,	2006-2007,	p.	1001.
162 See	M.	Gulati	and	G.	Triantis,	Contracts	without	law:	sovereign	versus	corporate	debt,	University	of	
Cincinnati	Law	Review,	2006-2007,	p.	1001.
62
4) EXTERNAL DEBT TRENDS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In order to complete the overview on the sources of financing available for developing 
countries, it is worth briefly considering some recent trends in respect of international 
debt.163
In respect of trends for official and private flows to developing countries, it has been 
noted that in 2008, as consequence of the financial crisis, the level of private financing 
dropped dramatically, requiring the IMF and the World Bank to step in and offer 
emergency financing. Consequently, in 2009 the data shows that the inflow from official 
creditors exceeded the level of private funds advanced, and historically that had not 
happened since 2002. 
However, in 2010 the previous trend was back, showing a strong resumption of inflows 
from private creditors, with the parallel reduction of financing from official creditors. In 
terms of figure, in 2011 USD 30 billions were advanced by official creditors (of which 
USD 2.4 billion on concessional terms), against the USD 81 billion advanced in 2009.
In respect of destination of funds granted by private lenders, the beneficiary of the 
recover in such inflows were mainly private sector borrowers, which received funds from 
banks and other financial institutions mainly for projects and in connection with their 
export activities. Number wise, the inflows tripled in 2011, being equal to USD 110 
billion. Geographically speaking, 80% of such figure was directed to Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia.
A further point of interest, in terms of sources of financing, is that the bond issuance in 
international capital markets raised, showing a 49% increase against 2010. The main 
driver of such raise was issuance by corporate borrowers.
Finally, in terms of the entities requesting financing within developing countries, we note 
that the general trend has been a shift from debt owed by private sector borrowers rather 
than public sectors debts. In 2011 the amount owed by private sector borrowers was 
equal to USD 2,616 billion, which is almost double the figure for 2000.
In respect of capacity to repay debts, calculated as a ration of the external debt service to 
export earnings, developing countries have seen a significant improvement, due to the 
increased export earnings but also as outcome of successful debt restructuring processes 
and debt relief both from official and private creditors in the context of the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (see next chapter) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (see 
next chapter).
                                                                                                                                     
163 Data	are	taken	from	the	World	Bank	report	issued	in	2013,	International	Debt	Statistics,	available	
at	http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ids-2013.pdf.	
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In order to complete the overview, the split between official and private debt and 
between bonds and commercial banks loans in respect of some developing countries will 
be reported below.164
Country Overall amount of 
long term external 
debt (in million)
Official creditors 
debt165(in million) 
Private creditors 
debt (bonds166) (in 
million)
Private creditors 
dent (commercial 
banks loans) (in 
million)
Brazil USD 357,738 USD 36,517 USD 77,239 USD 11,759 
Cameroon USD 2,562 USD 2,078 0 USD 23 
Chile USD 77,826 USD 933 USD 18,699 USD 3,825
China USD 197,776 USD 66,840 USD 41,570 USD 2,456
Colombia USD 64,968 USD 16,580 USD 25,929 USD 1,800
Cote D'Ivoire USD 10,108 USD 9,670 0 USD 80
Guatemala USD 13,712 USD 4,728 USD 785 0
Guinea 
Bissau
USD 219 USD 219 0 0
India USD 250,171 USD 75,711 USD 27,378 USD 15,375
Indonesia USD 172,327 USD 66,481 USD 43,556 USD 4,800
Jordan USD 7,496 USD 5,294 USD 895 USD 23
Liberia USD 187.2 USD 187.2 0 0
Malaysia USD 48,697 USD 3,263 USD 24,753 USD 4,350
Mexico USD 231,325 USD 28,399 USD 159,102 USD 17,926
Peru' USD 37,751 USD 10,721 USD 18,302 USD 121
South Africa USD 91,909 USD 1,449 USD 45,152 USD 6,423
The figures above confirms that countries which are able (due to their economic and 
financial situation) to have access to the international capital markets, tend to use bonds 
as main source of private financings (most of them still having official sector support). On 
the other hand, countries which do not have access to such pool of resources, still rely 
heavily on official sector help, getting to the extreme situation of the poorest countries 
such as Guinea Bissau and Liberia, which rely exclusively on official creditors' support.
                                                                                                                                     
164 Data	 referring	 to	 statistics	 for	 2011	 and	 taken	 from	 World	 Bank	 report	 issued	 in	 2013,	
International	 Debt	 Statistics,	 available	 at	 http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ids-
2013.pdf.
165 Which	includes	also	publicly	guaranteed	debt.
166 Both	guaranteed	and	not	guaranteed.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Sovereign defaults are nothing new to the history of countries.
Throughout the sixteenth and eighteen centuries European countries such as England, 
Spain and France repeatedly went through debt crises due, inter alia, to the excessive costs 
of wars that they had undertaken. 
Historically, defaults on the repayment of debt would be dealt by means of a combination 
of rescheduling and debt relief.167 Military intervention was also considered as means for 
recovery of the unpaid sums. It was not until the beginning of the 19th century that the 
Argentinian Secretary of State at the time, Luis Drago, established the modern doctrine 
according to which public debts do not represent a justification for the violation of the 
territorial integrity of a sovereign state.168
And it was in the nineteenth century that debt crises, defaults, and debt restructurings
began to dramatically increase, both in terms of incidence and in terms of geographical 
spread. This was the result of increasing cross-border debt ows, newly independent 
governments and the development of modern nancial markets and of the modern 
international financial architecture.
We will now focus on some examples of recent sovereign debt crises of developing 
countries, namely the Latin American crises of the 1980s and the Asian one.
a) The Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s – the over indebtedness issue 
There are three primary causes of the Latin American crises in the 1980s: (i) the 
banking policies of developed countries; (ii) a change in the global economy in the 
late 1980s; and (iii) the economic policies and conditions in the borrower countries 
themselves.169. 
                                                                                                                                     
167 H.	 James,	 Deep	 Red	 – The	 International	 debt	 crises	 and	 its	 historical	 precedents,	 the	 American	
Scholar,	1987,	pp.	334-336.	
168 See	the	1907	Drago	Porter	Convention.	Article	1.1	reads:	“The	contracting	powers	agree	not	 to	
have	recourse	to	armed	forces	for	the	recovery	of	contract	debts	claimed	from	the	government	of	
one	country	by	the	government	of	another	country	as	being	due	to	its	nationals”.	Such	principle	is	
now	generally	acknowledged	and	covered	by	the	general	prohibition	on	use	of	force	contained	in	
article	2.4	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations.
169 A.G.	Santos,	Beyond	Baker	and	Brady:	deeper	debt	reduction	for	Latin	American	sovereign	debtors,	
New	York	University	Law	Review,	1991,	pp.	66-111.
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In the 1970s US and European banks experienced a period of high liquidity due to the 
“petrodollars” that members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) deposited with them. OPEC quadrupled oil prices in 1973-1974, which 
resulted in a flow of USD 13.8 billion from OPEC to the six largest US banks by the 
end of 1975.170
Banks granted loans to Latin American countries on the basis of an overly optimistic 
assessment of their economies and on the assumption that sovereign borrowers were 
immune from bankruptcy risks and would have not defaulted.171
Together with the increased liquidity, there were two technical innovations in the 
loan markets that made possible the structuring of transactions in amounts 
previously unheard of: (i) the development of syndicated lending; and (ii) the 
introduction of floating interest rates. By means of syndicated lending172 massive 
loans were advanced, loans that would have otherwise been beyond the capacity of 
any single bank. 173
The introduction of floating interest rates allowed banks to meet the demand from 
borrowers for five to seven year term loans in circumstances in which banks were 
themselves only able to borrow from the Euromarkets to fund such loans for periods 
up to six months. The solution to such mismatch was for a bank to set the interest 
rate on the loans as a floating rate that resets periodically (every six months or less) 
upon each consecutive expiry and reborrowing of the bank's short term funding from 
the Euromarkets at a margin over the bank’s cost of funding as it borrowed and 
reborrowed in the Euromarkets.174 This mechanic enabled the bank to transfer the 
interest rate risk to the debtor.175 Summing up, that the high liquidity, ability to share 
risk with other banks and transfer risk to borrowers together with the optimistic 
assessment on the countries credit risk resulted in high volumes of lending into Latin 
America in the 1970s and in the 1980s.
                                                                                                                                     
170 P.A.	Wellons,	World	Money	and	Credit	– the	crisis	and	its	causes,	 in	Boston,	Division	of	Research,	
1983,	p.	23.
171 On	 sovereign	 risk	 assessment	 see	 A.	 Haynes,	 The	 law	 relating	 to	 international	 banking,	
Bloomsbury	Professional	2011,	pp.	55-75.
172 A	 syndication	 occurs	 when	 few	 principal	 organizers	 work	 on	 a	 loan	 package	 in	 which	
participations	are	sold	to	other	lenders	which	do	not	come	into	direct	contact	with	the	borrower.
173 J.N.	 Brooks,	Participation	 and	 syndicated	 loans:	 intercreditor	 fiduciary	 duties	 for	 lead	 and	 agent	
banks	under	US	 law,	 Butterworths	 Journal	 of	 International	Banking	 and	Financial	 Law,	1995,	p.	
275.
174 J.	 Levison,	 the	 International	 Financial	 System:	 a	 flawed	 architecture,	 in	 Fletcher	 Forum	 World	
Affairs,	1999.
175 The	effects	of	fixed	and	floating	interest	rates	for	sovereign	borrowers	are	analysed	by	Buckley,	
see	 R.P.	 Buckley,	 International	 capital	 flows,	 economic	 sovereignty	 and	 developing	 countries,	
Yearbook	of	International	Financial	and	Economic	Law	1999,	pp.	21-24.
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The second main cause of the crises, and related to the first, was the change in the 
economic climate in developed countries at the end of the 1980s, during which time 
there was a period of recession which resulted in a sharp rise in interest rates. 
Following the development and proliferation of floating rate loans to Latin American 
countries referred to above, as the rate of interest charged on such loans followed the 
market, the cost of servicing the debt correspondingly increased.
The other main cause of the crises was the monetary and fiscal policy of the Latin 
American countries during the previous decade, each of which relied almost 
exclusively on loans for its economic growth. A considerable portion of such loans 
was advanced to inefficient public sector spending, which did not generate the 
necessary earnings to service the debt.176
In 1982 Mexico declared its inability to service its debt and Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia 
and Venezuela followed shortly after.
The US Government did not take any action in respect of these country defaults 
initially, preferring to allow commercial banks and the International Monetary Fund 
to deal with it.177
In the following years commercial banks reduced their exposure to Latin American 
countries, although pursuant to so-called “involuntary lending”178 they were still 
required to continue lending to the extent the debtors did not fall into arrears. It was 
crucial for American commercial banks that their debtors did not default on interest 
payments since at that time regulatory rules required that banks declared any loans 
from which interest payments had not been received within ninety days of their due 
date to be non-performing. If a debt was declared non-performing, the bank had to 
maintain adequate loss-reserves for such loan. If loans advanced to Latin America 
                                                                                                                                     
176 See	P.	Kuczynski,	Latin	American	Debt,	1988.
177 See	A.G.	 Santos,	A.G.	 Santos,	Beyond	Baker	and	Brady:	 deeper	debt	 reduction	 for	 Latin	American	
sovereign	debtors, New	York	University	Law	Review,	1991,	pp.	66-111.
178 Traditionally,	debt	 renegotiations	with	public	and	private	creditors	had	been	conditioned	upon	
the	implementation	of	an	IMF	program.	The	banks’	reliance	on	the	IMF	strengthened	its	power	in	
negotiations	with	countries	needing	 financial	assistance.	 Initially,	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	crises,	
the	IMF	would	also	provide	the	relevant	countries	with	new	money	to	solve	what	it	had	originally	
been	interpreted	as	simply	a	liquidity	issue	for	the	countries.	However	when	it	became	clear	that	
was	not	 the	case	and	that	 they	were	dealing	with	real	sovereign	 insolvency,	 the	 IMF	decided	to	
take	a	different	approach:	since	it	was	not	any	longer	willing	and	able	to	give	the	debtor	countries	
the	financial	assistance	they	needed	to	service	their	external	debt,	it	started	to	condition	its	loans	
upon	further	lending	by	the	existing	commercial	 lenders.	This	was	intended	to	create	a	close	tie	
between	the	IMF	and	the	private	creditors.	Since	the	banks	were	unwilling	to	risk	further	loans	to	
a	debtor	country	without	IMF	assurance	of	the	country's	improved	creditworthiness,	a	reciprocal	
requirement	emerged.		The	IMF	could	reliably	assure	the	creditworthiness	of	a	debtor	only	if	the	
country	agreed	to	implement	an	IMF	adjustment	program,	but	the	IMF	would	approve	a	program	
only	if	it	included	new commercial	lending,	and	the	commercial	banks	would	fund	such	loans	only	
if	the	IMF	approved	the	program.	As	a	result,	private	creditors	and	the	IMF	started	to	draft	joint	
renegotiations	 packages.	 See.	 R.	 MacMillan,	 The	 next	 sovereign	 crisis,	 Stanford	 Journal	 of	
International	Law,	1995,	p.	317-321.
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countries had been declared non-performing in 1982, most of the lenders would not 
have had sufficient capital to maintain the required reserves. 179
The burden of such new financing was shared amongst the lenders: each bank 
contributed pro rata to the amount of outstanding loans as of a specified date.180
With a view to avoiding defaults and the regulatory consequences, the approach that 
banks followed in the following years was to search for contingent solutions by 
means of rescheduling repayment of principal due and extending new loans to 
enable the debtors to make the interest payments as scheduled. 
The IMF, hoping to find a quick solution to the liquidity issue, instituted a practice of 
conditioning the granting of new finance upon acceptance by the debtor country of 
the implementation of austerity measures, which would include efforts to balance 
current accounts by restricting imports, devaluing local currency in order to move 
towards more “realistic” exchange rates and balancing domestic budgets.181
In 1985, after several rounds of rescheduling of sovereign debt, it became clear that 
the policy that had been pursued by banks and the IMF did not represent a long-term 
solution to the debt crises.182 Such policy had the merit of preventing the collapse of 
the American banking system as a result of all the loans advanced to Latin American 
countries being declared non-performing, but did not address the necessity of 
ensuring that the debt burden of such countries became sustainable. 
(i) The Baker Plan
On 9 October 1985, at the annual meeting of the World Bank and of the 
IMF, the US Secretary to the Treasury, James A. Baker, announced a plan 
to solve the debt crises.183
                                                                                                                                     
179 See	P.J.	Power,	Sovereign	Debt	and	the	Secondary	Market,	Fordham	Law	Review,	p.	2709-2710.
180 See	 L.	 Buchheit,	 the	 Capitalization	 of	 Sovereign	Debt:	 an	 Introduction,	 University	 of	 Illinois	 Law	
Review,	1988,	pp.	401	ff.
181 See	B.	Orr,		After	a	decade	bankers	say	“adios”	to	Latin	debt	crisis,	A.B.A.	Banking	Journal,	1992,	p.	
36	ff.
182		 In	 1983	 a	 regular	 pattern	 for	 rescheduling	 had	 developed.	 As	 first	 step	 a	 steering	 committee	
would	be	established	to	act	as	an	advisory	group	and	liaise	with	the	all	bank	creditors.	Usually	the	
members	 of	 such	 committee	would	 be	 the	major	money-centre	 banks.	 The	 steering	 committee	
would	require	then	the	debtor	to	undertake	a	rescheduling	of	its	official	debts	(i.e.	debts	towards	
other	 countries	 or	 international	 institutions).	 	 As	 further	 step	 the	 steering	 committee	 would	
request	 the	 country	 to	 implement	 an	 economic	 program	 designed	 by	 the	 IMF	 (a	 "structural	
adjustment").	 Following	 these	 preliminary	 steps,	 the	 rescheduling	 would	 be	 implemented	 by	
means	of:	 (i)	new	commercial	bank	 loan,	usually	with	a	grace	period	on	 interest	repayments	of	
between	two	and	four	years;	(ii)	new	3	year	term	loans	from	the	IMF;	and	(iii)	the	rescheduling	of	
existing	 commercial	 bank	 loans	 over	 longer	 maturities	 and	 with	 substantial	 grace	 periods	 on	
capital	 repayments.	See	R.	P.	Buckley,	Rescheduling	as	 the	groundwork	 for	 secondary	markets	 in	
sovereign	debt, in	Devon	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Policy,	1998,	pp.	300-301.
183 See	statement	by	J.A.	Baker	before	the	Joint	Annual	Meeting	of	the	IMF	and	World	Bank,	October	
1985,	Seul	South	Corea.
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The Baker plan required the implementation of the following actions: (i) 
new three year term loans for an amount equal to USD 29 billion184 being 
advanced by commercial banks and by the IMF to the fifteen most 
indebted countries (which at the time included not only Latin American 
countries but some African countries also)185 to allow interest payments to 
remain current; (ii) continued payment of interest to commercial banks at 
market rates; (iii) rescheduling of principal payments on both official and 
commercial debt; (iv) IMF conditionality; and (v) voluntary debt reduction 
through new financing arrangements.
The new finance was conditional upon the debtors putting in place 
“market-oriented” reform policies such as deregulation, privatization and 
liberalization of trade in order to encourage further private-sector 
initiatives (" structural adjustment").186
By the late 1980s, it became clear that the Baker Plan did not achieve its 
objectives: sovereign debtors had simply continued to grow progressively 
more leveraged due to the new loans and due to the fact that creditors had 
granted no debt forgiveness.
As the principal amounts of the rescheduled loans began to mature and 
the debtors were once again in the position of not being able to repay their 
debts, there was a general understanding that a different approach would 
be required to reduce the debts of the defaulting countries to sustainable 
levels.
(ii)     The growth of the secondary market187 for sovereign debt
Trades of discounted debt of Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) and the 
corporations of LDCs had existed in a very small scale since the 1970s and 
they largely represented a way by which banks and other creditors could 
manage their developing country portfolios.
                                                                                                                                     
184 Baker	 proposal	 called	 upon	 new	 loans	 from	 commercial	 bank	 for	 an	 amount	 equal	 to	 USD	 20	
billion	and	from	the	IMF	for	an	amount	equal	to	USD	9	billion.	Id.
185 The	 so-called	 Baker	 Fifteen,	 namely,	 Argentina,	 Bolivia,	 Brazil,	 Chile,	 Colombia,	 Cote	 D’Ivorie,	
Ecuador,	Mexico,	Morocco,	Nigeria,	Peru,	the	Philippines,	Uruguay,	Venezuela	and	Yugoslavia.
186 The	concept	of	structural	adjustment	introduced	by	the	IMF	has	already been	analysed	in	chapter	
2.
187 Secondary	market	means	 the	market	whereby	 investors	 trade	between	 themselves,	 rather	 that	
with	the	borrower	of	a	loan	or	the	issuer	of	securities.
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The development of this immature market into the modern sovereign debt 
secondary market took place at the beginning of the 1980s and was a 
result of the following main reasons:
 The desire of banks to sell their outstanding loan positions to 
willing buyers at a substantial discount to face value;
 The desire of some banks to adjust their LDC loan portfolios 
by means of loan swaps;
 The development of a debt conversions schemes (see 
following paragraph on debt-to-equity swaps).188
From a technical banking perspective, the rescheduling process had a 
direct impact on the growth of the sovereign debt secondary market for 
the following three reasons189:
 Single debtor: the documentation required to reschedule the 
relevant debt would provide for the replacement of the hundreds 
of different entities as borrowers with the relevant state itself as a 
single borrower of all the distressed loans (or the nation’s central 
banks would act as borrowers and the state would act as 
guarantor). Consequently, all the loans would thereafter be traded 
at one price, based on the state’s creditworthiness. This simplified 
the secondary trading process considerably providing for an 
increased volume of trading- there was no need to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of multiple borrowers; all loans carried the same 
credit risk and were effectively fungible.
 Single agreement: the restructuring documentation required 
for the rescheduling process allowed the provisions relating to the 
transferability of all of the distressed loans to be recorded in a 
single contract establishing whether and how the debt could be 
transferred to other investors. Prior to the rescheduling process 
there were thousands of lengthy loan agreements, each with 
differently negotiated transfer provisions/restrictions. Therefore 
                                                                                                                                     
188 R.	P.	Buckley,	The	transformative	potential	of	a	secondary	market:	emerging	markets	debt	trading	
from	1983	to	1989,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal,	1998,	pp.	1152-1238.
189 R.P.	 Buckley,	 Rescheduling	 as	 the	 groundwork	 for	 secondary	 markets	 in	 sovereign	 debt,	 Denver	
Journal	of	International	Law	and	Policy,	1998,	pp.	305-309.	See	also	R.P.	Buckley,	The	practice	of	
emerging	markets	loan	sales,	Journal	of	International	Banking	Law,	1999,	pp.	151-154.
70
trading the debt would have required have access to and 
knowledge of such agreements, increasing legal costs and slowing 
the trades.
 Standardization of the transfer provisions: rescheduling 
resulted relatively quickly in the transfer/assignment clauses190
becoming standardized for large portions of a country’s 
indebtedness. Many restructuring agreements of that period 
shared the same clauses regarding assignment and transfers.191
Originally trading consisted of sovereign debt swaps between banks, in 
which the seller granted no assurances as of the recoverability of the debt. 
The purchaser would therefore represent that it had conducted its own 
analysis as to the creditworthiness and financial status of the borrower, 
acknowledging that it had no recourse to the seller. The purchaser of the 
loan instrument was also required to undertake to provide any new 
funding that the relevant debtor country may request from its lenders in 
connection with any rescheduling of the loan.192
Notwithstanding the risk of non-payment of the loan, the sovereign debt 
secondary market became highly attractive to those investors looking to 
make equity investments in the relevant country and who were in need of 
local currency to purchase plant and equipment, since they could buy it at 
a discounted price the debt and then ask the country to convert the foreign 
currency debt into local currency. Such request would meet the country’s 
needs to exchange their dollar denominated debt obligations for an 
equivalent amount of local currency and the exchange would be 
                                                                                                                                     
190 On	the	nature	of	transfers	of	sovereign	loans	see	R.P.	Buckley,	The	law	of	emerging	markets	loan	
sales,	Journal	of	International	Banking	Law,	1999,	pp.	110-114.
191 For	instance,	the	transfer	provision	was	in	substance	identical	in	each	of:	(i)	the	$3,700,000,000	
Term	 Credit	 Agreement	 dated	 as	 of	 1	 August	 1985	 among	 the	 Banco	 Central	 de	 la	 Republica	
Argentina	as	borrower,	the	Republic	of	Argentina	as	guarantor,	Citibank	N.A.	as	agent	and	other	
lenders;	 (ii)	 the	New	Restructure	Agreement	dated	29	August	1985	among	 the	United	Mexican	
States	 as	 obligor,	 Banco	 de	 Mexico as	 the	 central	 bank	 of	 the	 United	 Mexican	 States	 and	 the	
lenders	 listed	 therein.	 The	 same	 provisions	were	 also	 inserted	 by	way	 of	 addendum	 in	 (i)	 the	
Restructuring	 Agreement	 dated	 16	 December	 1986	 among	 the	 Repubic	 of	 Chile	 as	 Obligor,	
Companies	Luxembourgeoise	A.G.,	Dresdner	Bank	International	as	Servicing	Bank	and	others;	and	
(ii)	 the	 $925,000,000	 Credit	 Agreement	 dated	 20	 May	 1985	 among	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 the	
Philippines	 as	 borrower,	 the	 Republic	 of	 the	 Philippines	 as	 guarantor,	 Manufacturers	 Hanover	
Trust	 Company	 as	 Agent,	 and	 others.	 See	 R.P.	 Buckely,	 Rescheduling	 as	 the	 groundwork	 for	
secondary	 markets	 in	 sovereign	 debts,	 Denver	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 and	 Policy,	 1998,	
footnote	no.	53.
192 R.P.	 Buckely,	Rescheduling	 as	 the	 groundwork	 for	 secondary	markets	 in	 sovereign	 debts,	 Denver	
Journal	of	International	Law	and	Policy,	1998,	pp.	305-320.
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implemented by means of debt-for-equity swaps (see below paragraph on 
debt-for-equity swaps).193
The secondary market also gave debtors the opportunity to benefit from 
debt buy-backs194, pursuant to which they could purchase their own debt 
at a discount to face value, representing one of the most efficient ways to 
reduce their debt.195
As soon as banks started to sell their sovereign loan portfolio on the 
secondary market, offering significant discounts to the face value of the 
loans, investors began to purchase sovereign debt with the intention of 
speculating on short-term appreciation in the value of the country’s debt 
as its economy improved. The discounts allowed investors to profit 
materially even where the relevant countries were only able to repay a 
small percentage of the face amount of the debt.196
The growth of the sovereign loan secondary market has historical 
relevance in the context of the structuring of a new plan proposed by the 
American government to deal with the Latin American crises: the 
securitization of sovereign loans under the Brady Plan.
(iii) The Brady Plan
On 10 March 1989, the US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady, proposed a 
new set of principles to be applied in the context of the Latin American 
debt crisis, which took the name of Brady Plan.
The original version of the Brady Plan included the following major 
features:
                                                                                                                                     
193 Id.
194		 A	debt	buy-back	involves	the	acquisition	of	the	debt	by	or	on	behalf	of	the	debtor	either	directly	
from	the	creditors	or	through	secondary	market.
195 Debtors	would	usually	request	consent	or	at	least	communicate	to	their	lenders	their	intention	to	
buy	back	debt:	the	lenders	were	aware	that	the	monies	used	to	repurchase	the	debt	were	in	fact	
the	 same	 monies	 that	 they	 had	 been	 forced	 to	 advance	 by	 means	 of	 interim	 financing	 and	
attempts	 to	 buy	 back	 debt	 by	 debtors	 inevitably	 added	 to	 tensions	 in	 the	 lender/borrower	
relationship.	Lenders	were	also	worried	about	the	moral	hazard	of	the	buy	back	mechanic:	given	
that	secondary	market	prices	of	sovereign	debt	would	 inevitably	decrease	following	a	default,	a	
country	 contemplating	 a	 buy-back	 of	 its	 debt	would	 an	 incentive	 to	 default	 in	 order	 to	 benefit	
from	the	lower	purchase	price.	See	P.	Power,	Sovereign	Debt:	the	rise	of	the	secondary	market	and	
its	implications	for	future	restructurings,	Fordham	Law	Review,	1996,	pp.	2717-2718.
196 R.	MacMillan,	The	next	sovereign	debt	crisis,	Stanford	Journal	of	International	Law,	1995,	pp.	305	
ff.
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 Commercial banks would either reduce the outstanding 
principal of their sovereign loans portfolios or reduce the 
amount of interest payable on such loans;
 In return for the concessions described above, commercial banks 
would be offered an improved debt instruments from the credit 
risk perspective (i.e. guaranteed or collateralized) for the 
remaining principal (and maybe a portion of the interest) due on 
their loans;
 Such credit improvement would be the result of new funds 
granted by the IMF, the World Bank and some bilateral official 
lenders, such as Japan.  
 Debtor countries would be entitled to benefit from these 
measures only upon acceptance of structural adjustment as 
proposed by the IMF.197
According to Secretary Brady’s view, the Plan was to be implemented by 
means of individual market-based transactions, whereby: (i) creditors 
would be invited to partake on a voluntary basis (ii) debt relief would be 
linked to conversion of loans into collateralised bonds;198 (iii) debtor 
countries would be entitled to buy back their debt; and (iv) debt-equity 
schemes would be promoted.199
In practice, the implementation of the Brady Plan by the various debtor 
countries was somewhat different. 
Debtor countries imposed the Plan on their creditors by providing them 
with a set of options, a "menu", among which they could choose in the 
context of a one off transaction by means of which the debtor would 
obtain debt reduction and new money.
We will now review a few examples of how the Brady Plan was 
implemented in the context of the restructuring of the sovereign debt at 
the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s.
                                                                                                                                     
197 See	L.	C.	Buchheit,	The	background	to	Brady’s	initiative,	in	the	International	Financial	Law	Review,	
1990,	pp.	29-30.
198 A	first	version	of	this	mechanism	was	applied	in	the	context	of	the	issuance	of	the	so-called	Aztec	
bonds,	 issued	by	Mexico	 in	1987,	by	means	of	which	almost	USD	20	million	were	 converted	 in	
bonds.	 See	R.P.	 Buckley,	The	 transformative	 potential	 of	 a	 secondary	market:	 emerging	markets	
debt	trading	in	1983-1989,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal,	1997-1998,	pp.	1198-1202.
199 See	R.	P.	Buckley,	International	Financial	System,	policy	and	regulation,	Kluwer	Law	International,	
2008,	p.41.
73
MEXICO
Negotiations on the restructuring of Mexican debt began in May 1989. In 
September 1989 a term sheet was distributed to the banks, in February 
1990 a debt restructuring agreement was signed, and in March 1990 the 
first Brady bonds were issued. 200
Banks were offered the following options:
 Discounted bonds: the original loans could be converted into 
newly issued 30-year bonds paying Libor plus 13/16%. The 
principal was discounted by an amount equal to 35% of face 
value. Zero-coupon201 US Treasury bonds of matching maturity 
purchased by Mexico collateralized the principal component of 
the bonds. Such collateral, however, was not available to 
bondholders prior to the maturity of the bonds (i.e. only after 30 
years).202 Interest was collateralized by a guarantee granted by the 
Mexico government and rolling over every eighteen months.203  
 Par bonds: loans could be converted into bonds with the 
same face value as the loans, with interest discounted from the
original ones at a fixed rate of 6.25%. The same collateral as per 
discounted bonds applied.
 New loans: banks could elect to participate in new loans in 
the following four years for an amount equal to 25% of their 
medium-long term exposure to Mexico.204
                                                                                                                                     
200 Id.
201 Zero-coupon	 bonds	 are	 bonds	 on	 which	 the	 issuer	 makes	 no	 periodic	 interest	 payments:	 the	
bonds	are	issued	at	a	discount	from	their	face	value	which	represents	the	issuer’s	interest	cost	for	
the	borrowing.	See	Black’s	Law	Dictionary.
202 See	Prospectus	of	Prudential	Distressed	Securities	Fund,	Inc.	16	January	1996:	“In	the	event	of	a	
default	with	respect	to	collateralized	Brady	Bonds	as	a	result	of	which	the	payment	obligations	of	
the	 issuer	 are	 accelerated,	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 zero	 coupon	 obligations	 held	 as	 collateral	 for	
payment	of	principal	will	not	be	distributed	to	investors,	nor	will	such	obligations	be	sold	and	the	
proceeds	distributed.	The	collateral	will	be	held	by	the	collateral	agent	to	the	scheduled	maturity	
of	 the	 defaulted	 Brady	 Bonds,	 which	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 outstanding,	 at	 which	 time	 the	 face	
amount	of	 the	collateral	will	equal	 the	principal	payments	which	would	have	then	been	due	on	
the	Brady	Bonds	in	the	normal	course”.
203 The	purchase	of	the	US	treasury	bonds	was	funded	by	means	of	USD	20	billion	granted	by	the	IMF	
and	the	World	Bank	and	USD	4.5	billion	granted	by	Japan.	S.G.	Santos,	Latin	American	Debt,	New	
York	University	Law	Review,	1991,	p.	79.
204 The	new	money	option	contained	a	paradox:	new	monies	were	crucial	to	purchase	the	collateral	
for	 the	 Brady	 bonds	 to	 be	 issued,	 to	 make	 coupon	 payments	 on	 the	 Brady	 bonds	 and,	 more	
generally,	 to	 guarantee	 the	 economic	 growth	 of	 Mexico.	 However,	 in	 the	 event	 that	 too	 many	
banks	 elected	 to	 advance	 new	 monies,	 the resulting	 net	 increase	 would	 jeopardise	 the	 debt-
reduction	effect	that	the	proposal	was	trying	to	achieve.	See	R.P.	Buckley,	International	Financial	
System,	 policy	 and	 regulation, Kluwer	 Law	 International,	 2008,	 p.	 42.	 This	 option	 was	
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The outcome of the implementation to Mexico of the Brady Plan has been 
criticized for the inadequateness of the proposed debt reduction, which 
did not achieve the goal of releasing the country from its excessive debt 
burden.205
However some authors point out some positive consequences resulting 
from the Plan. 206 In primis, Mexico regained access to capital markets since 
international confidence had been restored, capital flows had recovered 
and Mexico was able to retire an aggregate amount of USD 7.2 billion 
from the market on favourable terms by means of debt buy-backs.207
Furthermore, the Brady restructuring modified two material features of 
the lending boom which had occurred in the 1970s: (i) a relevant amount 
of borrowing on floating interest rates was replaced by borrowing on 
fixed interest rates, so that Mexico was better protected against interest 
rate rises208; (ii) the nature of a material amount of its borrowing shift from 
loans to bonds.209
PHILLIPINES210
                                                                                                                                     
complementary	 to	 the other	previous	ones,	 since	 the	 creditor	would	 still	 have	 to	 exchange	 the	
original	debt	for	new	bonds.
205 The	nominal	debt	reduction	was	equal	 to	USD	14	billion.	However,	when	this	 is	combined	with	
the	amount	of	new	financing,	the	amount	of	borrowing	by	Mexico	did	not	change	materially.	See	
M.	 Monteagudo,	 The	 debt	 problem:	 the	 Baker	 Plan	 and	 the	 Brady	 Initiative:	 a	 Latin	 American	
perspective,	the	International	Lawyer,	1994,	p.	80.	See	also	A.G.	Santos,	Beyond	Baker	and	Brady:	
deeper	 debt	 reduction	 for	 Latin American	 sovereign	 debtors, New	 York	 University	 Law	 Review,	
1991,	p.	80.
206 See	M.A.	Walker,	Mexico,	more	than	a	debt	crisis, International	Financial	Review,	1992,	p.	33;	R.P.	
Buckley,	International	Financial	System,	policy	and	regulation, Kluwer	Law	International,	2008,	p.	
46.
207 A	more	detailed	analysis	of	such	mechanism	is	carried	out	in	the	following	paragraphs.
208 On	 the	 effects	 of	 fixed	 and	 floating	 interest	 rates	 see	 R.P.	 Buckley,	 International	 capital	 flows,	
economic	sovereignty	and	developing	countries,	Yearbook	of	International	Financial	and	Economic	
Law	1999,	pp.	21-24.
209 See	R.P.	Buckley,	The	 facilitation	of	 the	Brady	Plan:	emerging	markets	debt	 trading	 from	1989	to	
1993,	 Fordham	 International	 Law	 Journal,	 1998,	 p.	 1812.	 See	 also	 J.	 Clark,	Debt Reduction	 and	
Market	Reentry	under	the	Brady	Plan,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York	Quarterly	Review,	1994,	
p.	62:	“The	Brady	restructurings	did	not	achieve	significantly	more	near-term	cash	flow	relief	for	
debtors	 than	 the	 previous	 approach.	 But	 they	 did provide	 a	 more	 stable	 long-run	 financial	
framework	that,	in	combination	with	structural	reforms	by	debtors	and	a	favourable	environment	
of	lower	global	interest	rates,	helped	to	restore	market	access”.
210 The	 Philippine	 restructuring	 which	 took	 place	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 will	 be	 analysed	 here	
notwithstanding	the	fact	that	geographically	it	would	not	be	appropriate,	because	chronologically	
it	 belongs	 to	 the	Brady	 era	 and	 the	 financial	 instruments	 that	 have	 been	 used	 reflect	 this.	 The	
Philippines	 will	 be	 considered	 also	 in	 next	 paragraph	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 later	 crisis	 which	
widespread	in	the	late	1990s	in	Asia.	
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The Philippines were the second country to start negotiations with its 
creditors following the proposal of Secretary Brady. Such restructuring 
represents a more anomalous case of sovereign debt restructuring, since it 
was structured as a two steps transaction, whereby only the second step 
fell within the classical Brady restructuring scheme.
In early 1990 the Philippines proposed to their commercial banks creditors 
to either advance new money purchasing transferable bonds issued by the 
country or selling their exposure back discounted 50% of face value. This 
offer came together with the undertaking of the Philippines to grant their 
creditors options to exchange their loans for new collateralised loan 
instruments, on the basis of a voluntary and market based transactions, in 
the following couple of years.211
Using the proceeds of such new loans, the Philippines were able to 
repurchase more than USD 1.3 billion of its existing indebtedness at a 50% 
discount through one single cash buyback transaction. In 1992 a second 
buyback transaction was carried out, by means of which further 1.26 
billion of commercial bank debt was purchased by the Philippines.212
When the second part of the restructuring was presented to the creditors, 
it was in the shape of a one-off transaction based on the Mexican 
implementation of the Brady Plan. 
The menu offered to creditors by the Philippines was as follows:
 25-year bonds: bonds with a 25 years maturity fully 
collateralised for principal and a rollover guarantee covering 14 
months of interest, with a fixed coupon of 4.25%, which would 
rise to 6.5% starting from year six.
 15-year bonds: bonds with 15 years maturity, not 
collateralised for principal, with a rollover guarantee covering 12 
months interest for the first six years. Interest rates were fixed, 
commencing at 4% rising to 6% in year six, turning into a floating 
interest rate equal to Libor plus 13/16th% starting from year 
seven.
                                                                                                                                     
211 See	L.	Buchheit,	The	Background	to	Brady’s	initiative,	International	Financial	Law	Review,	1990,	p.	
31	 and	 R.P.	 Buckley,	 International	 Financial System,	 policy	 and	 regulation,	 Kluwer	 Law	
International,	2008,	p.	47.
212 See	L.	Buchheit,	Philippines	takes	two	bites	from	Brady	apple,	International	Financial	Law	Review,	
1992,	p.	35.
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 New money: banks could advance new money up to 25% of 
their respective exposure. New money would have been 
advanced purchasing newly issued bonds with 17 years maturity 
bearing interest of Libor plus 13/16th%.213
A comparison between the Mexican approach and the Philippine 
formulation highlights one main difference: in Mexico, the package 
offered to creditors would focus on debt and debt service reduction, while 
new money would play an ancillary role. Mexico offered an integrated 
approach whereby new money is considered as alternative to debt 
reduction. The way in which Philippine implemented the Brady Plan was 
more focused on receiving new finance in order to carry out a buyback 
transaction which served two purposes: debt reduction at significant 
discount and as exit vehicle from the new finance. The second part of the 
debt restructuring granted further debt relief in the context of an already 
improved economic situation.214
VENEZUELA 
The restructuring of the Venezuelan debt involved a contextual 
restructuring of the public and private sector. In 1990 the Brady Plan for 
Venezuela was agreed with the commercial debtors of the country. The 
table below sets out the main features of such financing plan, showing, 
inter alia, the amount of debt allocated to each option.215
                                                                                                                                     
213 R.P.	 Buckley,	 International	 Financial	 System,	 policy	 and	 regulation,	 Kluwer	 Law	 International,	
2008,	p.	47.
214 See	L.	Buchheit,	The	Background	to	Brady’s	initiative,	International	Financial	Law	Review,	1990,	p.	
31.
215 Table	 taken	 from	 M.	 H.	 Stumpf,	 Venezuela:	 separating	 public	 and	 private	 debt,	 International	
Financial	Law Review,	1992,	p.	36.
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The Venezuelan restructuring had several features in common with the 
Mexican one, with few differences represented by the options of 
temporary interest reduction bonds and the option of debt buyback at the 
secondary market price.216
No Paris Club debt was restructured;217 the debt owned to commercial 
banks only was restructured in the context of the 1990 Financing Plan.
A peculiarity of this restructuring was that in parallel with the 
rescheduling of the debt owned by the pubic sector to external creditors, a 
plan to restructure the debt owned by the private sector was put in place 
as well. 
In 1990 the Venezuelan Government adopted Decree No 1,307, which 
provided the delivery of foreign exchange for payment of external private 
sector debt to be covered by exchange rate guarantees issued by the 
government. Pursuant to the same Decree, the Central Bank of Venezuela 
                                                                                                                                     
216 R.P.	 Buckley,	 International	 Financial	 System,	 policy	 and	 regulation,	 Kluwer	 Law	 International,	
2008,	p.	47.
217 An	analysis	of	the	Paris	Club	activities	and	the	definition	of	Paris	Club	debt	will	follow	in	the	next	
paragraphs.
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was authorised to: (i) in relation to debts not exceeding the overall amount 
of USD 10 million, deliver foreign exchange for an amount equal to 35% of 
the net unpaid amount of such debt; (ii) in relation to debts exceeding 
USD 10 million, deliver foreign currency denominated 20 year-bonds for 
up to 70% of the unpaid balance and delivering same kind of bonds for 
overdue interest on such debt, covered by exchange rate guarantees. As a 
result of such plan, USD 479 million in foreign exchange was delivered to 
the debtors.218
ARGENTINIA
As final example, we will shortly described the terms of the Argentinian 
restructurings, which occurred in 1992 and in 2003-2005.
The first restructuring followed the Mexican model and offered to 
commercial creditors the following options:
 Par bonds: 30-year fixed interest rate par bonds. The interest 
rate was fixed at 4% at year one and then increasing at 6% in year 
seven. Such bonds were fully collateralised for principal and had 
a 12-months rollover interest guarantee;
 Discount bonds: they had a 35% discount of principal on the 
original face value of the loans, interest equal to Libor plus 
13/16th% and they would benefit from the same collateral as per 
the par bonds;
 New Money.219
In the 1990s, Argentina also implemented a major economical reform in 
compliance with the structural adjustment program requested by the IMF. 
Examples of such reforms are the liberalization of its capital account by 
relaxing capital control and pegging the peso to the US Dollar. 
Notwithstanding the implementation of the reforms suggested by the 
IMF, in 2001 Argentinian economy collapsed turning what many thought 
as one of the main success of structural adjustment IMF policy into the 
                                                                                                                                     
218 M.	H.	Stumpf,	Venezuela:	separating	public	and	private	debt,	 International	Financial	Law	Review,	
1992,	p.	36.
219 R.P.	 Buckley,	 International	 Financial	 System,	 policy	 and	 regulation,	 Kluwer	 Law	 International,	
2008,	p.	50-51.
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biggest sovereign default in modern history.220  The role of the IMF and 
criticisms moved to it will be analysed in the following paragraphs.
The starting point of negotiations was the aggressive proposal of the 
Argentinian Government requesting a 75% nominal haircut and no 
recognition of past-due interest. At the end of three years of negotiation 
on 25 February 2005 the USD 102.6 billion debt swap closed. The menu 
consisted of:
 Par bonds: old Brady bonds would be exchanged for a new bond 
with 3.2% coupon and 35 years maturity;
 Discount bonds: old Brady bonds would be exchanged at a 
nominal discount of 66% with an 8.28% coupon and 30 years 
maturity;
 Quasi-par bonds:  old Brady bonds would be exchanged for 
consumer price indexed Argentine peso denominated bonds, 
implying a 31% nominal cut due to pesoization, with a 3.31% 
coupon and 42 years maturity.221
The terms and the conditions of the offering memorandum, quite 
innovative in respect of the terms of previous offering memorandum of 
sovereign bonds will be analysed in the following chapter.
The outcome of the restructuring process was a reduction by 30% of 
Argentinian public debt, accounting for 72% of its GDP.222
A more detailed analysis of the debt instruments used in the context of the 
restructurings briefly reviewed herein will now follow.
b) The Asian Crisis in the 1990s – a liquidity issue
A short overview of the Asian crisis will now follow, mainly in order to highlight 
some different features of it, since it was defined as a liquidity crisis, versus the over 
indebtedness crisis of the Latin American countries.
The first symptoms of the crisis manifested in 1997 in Thailand, namely the 
depreciation of its currency, the baht, and in October a currency crisis223 exploded, 
which shortly after moved to Malaysia and the Philippines too. 224
                                                                                                                                     
220 Id.	 See	 also	 G.	 Gomez-Giglio, A	 new	 chapter	 in	 the	 Argentine	 saga:	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	
Argentine	sovereign	debt,	Journal	of	International	Banking	Law	and	Regulation,	2005,	pp.	345-349.		
221 See	 J.	Diaz-Cassou,	A.	Erce	Dominguez	and	 J.	Vazquez-Zamora,	Recent	episodes	of	 sovereign	debt	
restructurings.	A	case-study	approach,	2008,	Documentos	Ocasionales	Banco	de	España.
222 G.	Gomez-Giglio,	A	new	chapter	in	the	Argentine	saga:	the	restructuring	of	the	Argentine	sovereign	
debt,	Journal	of	International	Banking	Law	and	Regulation,	2005, p.	346.  
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Buckley traces back the origin of crisis to five main causes: (i) the kind of 
indebtedness incurred by the Asian countries; (ii) excess of liquidity; (iii) the 
weakness of the financial sector of such countries; (iv) fixed exchanged rates; and (v) 
loss of confidence in the market.225
Hagan judged this crisis as a result of the globalization of financial markets.226 Wade 
defines it as “panic triggering debt deflation in a basically sound but under-regulated 
system”. 227 Sachs commented on it saying: “There is no ‘fundamental’ reason for 
Asia’s financial calamity except financial panic itself. Asia’s need for significant 
financial sector reform is real, but not a sufficient cause for the panic, and not a 
justification for harsh macroeconomic policy adjustments. […] Asia is reeling not 
from a crisis of fundamentals but a self-fulfilling withdrawal of short-term loans, one 
that is fuelled by each investor’s recognition that all other investors are withdrawing 
their claims. Since short-term debts exceed foreign exchange reserves, it is ‘rational’ 
for each investor to join in the panic”.228
As noted above, the Brady plan facilitated the development of a secondary market for 
the sovereign loans, granting access to developing countries to capital markets. At 
such point in time the source of the majority of the sovereign debt was the issuance of 
sovereign bonds.229 The lost of confidence of the market in the Asian economies 
brought to an outflow of capitals, causing a currency depreciation which had the 
effect of deepening the crisis.230 The IMF package prepared to deal with the crisis was 
ineffective for two reasons: (i) US and Japan did not contribute enough to the bail out, 
so that the funds available were not enough to address the crisis; (ii) the 
conditionality imposed by the IMF as condition to the loans required a structural 
                                                                                                                                     
223 Buckley	 defines	 the	 Asian	 crisis	 as	 a	 “[…]	 currency	 crisis	 developed	 into	 a	 more	 generalized	
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Financial	System,	policy	and	regulation,	Kluwer	Law	International,	2008,	p.	56.
224 On	the	history	and	causes	of	the	crisis	see	R.	Wade,	The	Asian	debt-and-development	crisis	of	1997-
?:	 causes	 and	 consequences,	 World	 Development,	 1998,	 pp.	 1538-1545.	 For	 a	 study	 of	 the	
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Hedge	funds	and	the	Asian	currency	crisis	of	1997,	Department	of	Finance,	working	paper	series	
1998,	 13	 January	 1998,	 available	 at	
http://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/2451/26859/2/wpa98014.pdf.	
225 Id.	p.	56-66.
226 S.	Hagan,	Sovereign	debtors,	private	creditors	and	the	IMF,	Law	and	Business	Review	of	Americas,	
2002,	p.	53-54.	
227 R.	 Wade,	 The	 Asian	 debt-and-development	 crisis	 of	 1997-?:	 causes	 and	 consequences,	 World	
Development,	1998,	pp.	1538.
228 J.	Sachs,	The	IMF	and	the	Asian	flu,	The	American	Prospect,	March-April	1998,	p.17.
229 As	 already	 observed	 above,	 the	 Philippines	 were	 one	 of	 the	 first	 countries	 to	 issue	 bonds	
according	to	the	implementation	of	a	Brady	plan.
230 On	 the	 relevance	 of	 management	 of	 capital	 flows	 in	 emerging	 markets	 see	 R.P.	 Buckley,	
International	 capital	 flows,	 economic	 sovereignty	 and	 developing	 countries,	 Yearbook	 of	
International	Financial	and	Economic	Law,	1999,	pp.	17-46.
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reform of the economy of the Asian country involved, which was interpreted by the 
market as a sign of the unsoundness of the economy of such countries, pushing 
investors to withdraw from them.231
The IMF has been criticized for how it dealt with the Asian crisis, arguing that it was 
not able to understand the real causes of the crisis, delivering consequently the 
wrong diagnosis and imposing measures which were judged as too harsh, and which 
did not keep into account social consequences.232
Trying to draw a conclusion, the Asian crisis could be defined as one of the first 
modern crisis, whereby over indebtedness is one of the components of the crisis, but 
not the main reason, contrary to what happened in the Latin American countries. The 
access of developing countries to capital markets exposed them to new risks and 
changed the rules of how to deal with the crisis, as it will be analysed in the fourth 
chapter.
                                                                                                                                     
231 Wade	commented	that	the	IMF	intervention	during	the	Asian	crisis	“amounted	to	screaming	fire	
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2) FINANCIAL STRUCTURES USED IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVEREIGN 
RESTRUCTURINGS
The following pages mechanics used in sovereign workout since the Brady era will be 
analysed, trying to highlight pros and cons of each instrument.
a) Brady bonds, securitization and secondary market
The innovative idea of the Brady Plan, as it has been observed above, was to
securitize sovereign loans, by converting syndicated loans into bonds (the so-called 
Brady Bonds). The classical Brady Plan would set forth the steps to pool together all 
the loans which a single country owed to its commercial creditors, repackage them as 
bonds which were then offered to the public or exchanged for existing loans owned 
by the creditors. The proceeds of the bonds are used to refinance the loans (or 
portions of the loans) either by means of new money received by the pubic or by 
means of set off against outstanding loans in case of exchanges with existing loans, so 
that the country’s obligations under the various loan agreements are extinguished at 
the end of the process, either because the debts have been repaid in full or because 
they have been partially repaid and partially waived by the creditors.233
The securitization of loans was beneficial both for the banks, which were provided 
with an exit option, so that they could put an end to the cycle of debt rescheduling 
and could take off their books the distressed sovereign loans234, and for the sovereign 
country for the following reasons: 
 Brady bonds were issued at a discount either in principal or interest from the 
loans from which they were converted (as noted in the review of the 
implementation of Brady Plans in the restructuring of sovereign debts in the 
previous paragraphs), reducing the sovereign’s debt service obligations;
 Most Brady bonds had a 30-years maturity date, which was a maturity 
considerably longer then the maturity of the loans from which they were 
converted;
                                                                                                                                     
233 P.J.	 Power,	 Sovereign	 Debt:	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 secondary	 market	 and	 its	 implications	 for	 future	
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globalisation	of	the	emerging	debt	market,	Journal	International	Banking	Law,	2000,	p.	103-108.
234 Securitization	gave	the	banks	liquid	bonds,	rather	than	relatively	illiquid	loans.	It	also	triggered	a	
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sovereign	 loans,	 if	 they	 wished.	 See	 R.P.	 Buckley,	 The	 facilitation	 of	 the	 Brady	 Plan:	 emerging	
markets	debt	trading	from	1989	to	1993,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal,	1998,	p.	1887.
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 Brady bonds were collateralised, as seen above, for principal by zero-coupon 
US Treasury bonds of matching maturities and for interest, usually 12-18 
months, by a rollover guarantee, making remote the possibility of a default, 
at least in respect of the principal amount.235
The effect of the securitization of the bank loans was also to create a new creditor 
class, the bondholders. The restructurings pre-Brady had been characterised by a 
small and homogeneous class of commercial bank creditors. Future 
restructurings had to deal with a diverse class of creditors made up by pension 
and mutual funds, insurance companies, investment firms and sophisticated 
individual investors which are not subject to the same external institutional 
pressures to participate in sovereign debt restructurings as commercial banks 
were.236 The consequences of this transformation of the class of creditors will be 
further analysed in the following chapter. 
As anticipated in the previous paragraphs, the success of the Brady Plan was 
connected with the development of the secondary market, which facilitated the 
acceptance by creditors of the innovative features of sovereign restructurings.237
Such facilitation was due to four main factors:
 The secondary market provided for a prototype: the relevant parties 
could see their loans being traded each day and that made it easy for 
them to conceive the securitization of such loans into bonds;
 The existing secondary market could have been a market for bonds: the 
existing market could readily adapt to the trade of bonds, making the 
banks comfortable of the possibility to trade such new debt instruments;
 The market had already foreseen appetite for such bonds: the active 
trading of loans on the secondary market was as strong indication that 
investors would have been interested in purchasing distressed sovereign 
loans converted into bonds;238
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84
 The discount offered on the secondary market was a strong argument 
for debt relief: it was difficult for banks to oppose to debt relief in the 
securitization process when most banks were already selling their loans 
at steep discounts in the secondary market.239
On the other hand, the conversion of an always increasing amount of loans into 
bonds resulted into the transformation of the secondary market itself, which had 
now to meet the needs of new investors: the market which used to be a small and 
heavily negotiated one turned into something more similar to a standard 
securities market.240 Bond trades became cheaper and quicker, the number of 
investors raised, since many prohibitions preventing them from investing in 
loans were not applicable to bonds and since a Brady restructuring was seen as a 
stamp of approval for a nation’s economic policies so that Brady bond would 
benefit from the perceived improvement in the creditworthiness of the country. 
As a result, in 1992 it was estimated that more than USD 500 billion face value of 
less developed countries debt was traded. 241
b) Debt buy-backs
As anticipated in the previous paragraphs, debt buy-backs consist in the 
acquisition of debt by the debtor itself either directly from its creditors or in the 
secondary market.
From a creditors’ perspective, debt buy-backs were not particularly welcome for 
the following three reasons242:
 Lenders interpreted the buy-backs mechanic as a mere transfer of the 
debtors’ foreign exchange reserves to the selling banks. Truth is that such 
transfer would have only occurred in case the buy-back price had 
overvalued the debt, in other words if the real value of the debt was less 
that the price paid in the context of the buy-back. Supporting the not 
sharable theory that secondary market undervalued the real value of 
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debts, major commercial banks involved in the LDC loan market were 
able to create a strong impediment for the growth of buy-backs.
 Buy-backs had an obvious debt forgiveness component. Debtors were 
able to discharge their debts at discount prices. Many lenders of the time 
would consider buy-backs as an excessive gift to sovereign debtors.
 Buy-backs as moral hazard, already mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs. Moral hazard was any situation in which the sovereign 
debtor is rewarded for its financial misbehaviour.243 Being the secondary 
market acutely sensitive to the actions of the debtor country, the debtors 
had a direct tool to operate on the prices of its own debt, to facilitate buy-
backs transactions.
The only pros for creditors were that this was an efficient way to get 
distressed loans out of the banks books and to avoid to be forced into the 
practice of involuntary lending, as noted in the previous paragraphs.
From the sovereign borrowers’ perspective, debt buy-backs had only two 
downsides: (i) they would not represent a replacement for foreign direct 
investment (as equity swaps, as we will highlight in the following 
paragraph); (ii) some argue they would produce a negative effect for the 
return of the debtor country to financial markets, since the stigma of having 
bought its own debt at a high discount would label the debtor country as one 
to which prospective lending business would not be acceptable.244
The positive aspects for the borrower, beyond the debt relief component, 
which was obviously the most important one, were: (i) debt buy-backs had 
not inflationary effects, since they were made in foreign currency and funded 
from foreign exchange reserves, not involving therefore printing money nor 
issuing local currency bonds; (ii) the debtor nation retained its productive 
national assets; and (iii) they did not favour foreign investors over local 
ones.245
Under the banking technical point of view, debt buy-backs would require 
amendments in the underlying loan documentation.246 Amendments were 
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necessary because loan agreements would usually include the following 
clauses247: 
 Sharing clause: according to which payments received by any creditor 
through exercise of any right of counterclaim, set-off or otherwise, which 
exceed what has been received by any other creditor should be shared 
with the other creditors so that all creditors benefit equally for any 
recovery;
 Prepayment clause: according to which any prepayments by the debtor 
should be on certain dates and in multiples of a certain amount;
 Mandatory prepayment clause:  which typically confers remedies to the 
lenders in case the debtor services comparable indebtedness in a manner 
preferential to its servicing the lenders under the loan agreement.248
Debt buy-backs could trigger such previsions since it could be interpreted ad 
a payment received by the selling bank only and as a prepayment from the 
borrower. In order to proceed with the purchase of its own debt, therefore, 
the debtor had to receive the lenders’ consent to a waiver of the terms of the 
loan agreement or to agree with the lenders an amendment to the loan 
agreement.249
Examples of debt buy-backs arrangements are the 1988 Bolivian agreement 
and the Chilean agreement of the same year, which implement different 
approaches.
The Bolivian agreement provided for the acquisition by Bolivia of USD 253 
million paying USD 28 million, which had been founded by means of 
donations received by several countries and managed by the IMF. Bolivia 
had offered the banks two options: (i) being paid in cash; (ii) being paid by 
                                                                                                                                     
to	but	the	debts	and	acquires	beneficial	ownership	of	the	debts	through	participation	share.	See	
R.P.	Buckley,	Moral	hazard	and	other	delights,	International	Financial	Law	Review,	1991.
247 R.P.	Buckley,	The	transformative	potential	of	a	secondary	market:	emerging	markets	debt	 trading	
from	1983	to	1989,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal,	1998,	p.	1220.
248 Furthermore,	 other	 technicalities	would	need	 to	be	 amended	 in	order	not	 to	put	 the	borrower	
into	a	technical	default,	such	as:	(i)	breakage	costs	provisions,	which	protect	lenders	against	any	
loss	due	by	a	repayment	by	the	debtor	on	a	date	which	breaks	into	the	lenders’	matched	funding	
of	 the	 loan;	(ii)	certain	provisions	regarding	the	maintenance	of	 foreign	currency	accounts	with	
the	debtor	nation’s	central	bank;	(iii)	certain	events	of	default.	Id.
249 On	 the	 difficulties	 connected	 to	 amend	 the	 terms	 of	 a	 loan	 agreement	 due	 to	 unanimity	
requirement	inserted	in	amendment	clauses	of	restructuring	agreements	see	R.P.	Buckley,	Making	
amends	for	amendments,	International	Financial	Law	Review,	1991,	pp.	11-12.
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exchange of zero coupon bonds collateralised by triple-A rated bonds held in 
trust by the IMF.250
Chile was able to repay in full its USD 439 million for USD 248 million. Chile 
arguments to convince banks to accept this agreement was its good record of 
timely service and its current availability of foreign exchange due to the rise 
in world copper price in the previous years.251
c) Debt-for-equity swaps
Debt-equity conversion is the “process through which any debt instrument 
issued by or on behalf of any development country borrower, public or 
private, is converted into an equity investment in that country”252. The debt 
can be usually swapped for (i) equity in local business; or (ii) used for capital 
investments in the debtor nation.253
Such conversion programs require the debtor country to establish its debt-to-
equity policies and procedures, such as industries in which swaps are 
allowed, the sources of local currency to be utilised, the administrative 
process to review and approve the swaps and the conversion rate.254 The 
                                                                                                                                     
250 The	transaction	brought	to	the	cancellation	of	about	50%	of	Bolivian	external	debt	with	banks.	M.	
Monteagudo,	 The	 debt	 problem:	 the	 Baker	 plan	 and	 the	 Brady	 initiative:	 a	 Latin	 American	
perspective,	The	International	Law,	spring	1994,	p.	71.
251 Id.
252 A.	Hilton,	Debt-Equity	swaps:	costs,	benefits	and	prospects,	Financial	Times	Business	Information,	
1988.	A	proposal	coming	from	two	economists	of	the	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	was	
to	structure	debt-to-equity	swaps	in	the	context	of	a	sovereign	debt	restructuring	in	the following	
way:	the	debtor	country	should	have	been	allowed	to	pay	interests	on	its	loans	or	bonds	in	local	
currency,	 and	 then	 the	 creditors	would	 have	 been	 allowed	 to	 invest	 such	 local	 currency	 in	 the	
country	 itself.	Dividends	and	other	proceeds	deriving	 from	such	 investments	 should	have	been	
then	paid	in	local	currency	to	such	investors/creditors	and	after	a	certain	period	such	payments	
in	local	currency	would	have	been	eligible	for	conversion	into	foreign	exchange.	See	F.	Modigliani	
and	R.	Dornbusch,	Easing	the	Mexican	interest	burden,	Wall	Street	Journal,	3	January	1989.
253 On	the	mechanics	of	debt-to-equity	swaps	see	W.	Elali,	Debt-equity	swaps	and	the	alleviation	of	
the	LDCs	debt	problem,	International	Journal	of	Commerce	&	Management,	1995,	pp.	60-62	and	
D.	Asiedu-Akrofi,	A	comparative	analysis	of	debt	equity	swap	programs	in	five	major	debtor	country,	
Hastings	International	and	Comparative	Law	Review,	1988-1989,	pp.	540-541.
254 The	exchange	rate	can	either	be	fixed	by	the	central	banks	or	the	rate	can be	established	through	
an	auction	so	that	 investors	bid	 for	 their	right	 to	covert	 their	debt	 into	equity.	See	M.	Schubert,	
Trading	debt	for	Equity,	 the	Banker,	1987,	p.	18.	The	attraction	of	such	schemes	is	 that	investor	
who	has	receive,	for	example,	88	cents	worth	of	pesos	for	one	dollar	of	debt,	may	have	paid	only	
50	 or	 60	 cents	 on	 the	 dollar.	 R.P.	 Buckley,	The	 transformative	 potential	 of	 a	 secondary	market:	
emerging	 markets	 debt	 trading	 from	 1983	 to	 1989,	 Fordham	 International	 Law	 Review,	 1997-
1998,	p.	1179.	On	regulation	aspects	for	the	debtor	country	see	L.	Maktouf,	Some reflections on 
debt-for-equity	 conversions,	 The	 International	 Lawyer,	 winter	 1989,	 p.	 915-916.	 On	 the	
implementation	 of	 conversion	 programs	 in	 developing	 countries	 see	 D.	 Asiedu-Akrofi,	 A	
comparative	 analysis	 of	 debt	 equity	 swap	 programs	 in	 five	 major	 debtor	 country,	 Hastings	
International	 and	 Comparative	 Law	 Review,	 1988-1989,	 pp.	 541-565	 and	 the	 Guide	 to	 Debt	
Equity	Conversions,	pp.	68-110.
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table below summarizes the key steps and shows the key actors of the 
conversion process:255
From the debtor’s perspective, the advantages that debt-equity swaps 
highlighted by literature are the following256:
 It is a strong incentive for foreign direct investment, due to the 
favourable exchange rates offered by such programs;257
                                                                                                                                     
255 Table	taken	from	United	Nations	Centre	onTransnational	Corporations,	Debt	equity	conversions,	a	
guide	for	decision-makers,	1990,	p.	7.
256 R.P.	 Buckley,	 Debt	 exchanges	 revisited:	 lessons	 from	 Latin	 America	 for	 Eastern	 Europe,	
Northwestern	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 &	 Business,	 1998,	 pp.	 660-662,	 L.	 Maktouf,	 Some	
reflections	on	debt-to-equity	conversions,	The	International	Lawyer,	winter	1989,	pp.	909-919	and	
D.	 Asiedu-Akrofi,	 Comparative	 analysis	 of	 debt	 equity	 swap	 programs	 in	 five	 major	 debtor	
countries,	Hastings	International	and	Comparative	Law	Review,	1988-1999,	pp.	537-573.
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 Transfer of resources: this program represented a channel trough 
which technology, patents, new management skills etc. could be 
introduced in developing countries;258
 Replacement of debt with equity: the conversion of the debt into 
equity implies the reduction of the outstanding external debt of the 
debtor and the related debt service obligations;259
 Repatriation of flight capital: the favourable exchange rate would 
make attractive the repatriation of flight capital by local investors;260
 “De-dollarization”: since in the short term these programs convert an 
obligation to be serviced in foreign exchange into a local currency 
obligation.261
 Encourages private sector initiative and can support privatization 
programmes: in cases it facilitated the privatization of not profitable 
state-owned companies which represented a burden for the debtor 
country’s economy.262
However, debt for equity swaps have drawbacks too,263 some of them quite 
relevant, reason for which debt buy-backs have been generally considered as 
                                                                                                                                     
257 See	 United	Nations	 Centre	 on	Transnational	 Corporations,	Debt	 Equity	 Conversions:	 a	 guide	 for	
Decision-makers,	United	Nations,	1990	(hereinafter	the	Guide	to	Debt	Equity	Conversions),	p.	36,	
L.	Maktouf,	Some	reflections	on	debt-for-equity	conversions,	Journal	of	International	Law,	1989	and	
W.	Elali,	Debt-equity	swaps	and	the	alleviation	of	 the	LDCs	debt	problem,	 International	 Journal	of	
Commerce	&	Management,	1995,	p.	64.
258 Elali	id.
259 Chile	is	a	successful	example	of	the	good	outcome	of	debt-to-equity	swaps	since	in	the	first	three	
years	of	implementation	of	such	programs	was	able	to	reduce	its	external	debt	by	USD	3.8	billion.	
However,	generally	speaking,	the	benefit	of	this	kind	of	debt	relief	can	be	set-off	by	the burden	of	
repaying	a	portion	of	the	debt	in	local	currency	and	having	to	deal	with	the	capital	repatriation	on	
equity	 investment.	 To	 address	 such	 concern,	 many	 debt-equity	 schemes	 would	 include	
restrictions	on	capital	repatriation	and	profit	remittances.	R.P.	Buckley,	Debt	exchanges	revisited:	
lessons	 from	 Latin	 America	 for	 Eastern	 Europe,	 Northwestern	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 &	
Business,	1998,	pp.	661	and	the	Guide	to	Debt	Equity	Conversions	p.	37-38.
260 W.	Elali,	Debt-equity	swaps	and	the	alleviation of	 the	LDCs	debt	problem,	 International	 Journal	of	
Commerce	&	Management,	1995,	p.	64.
261 The	Guide	to	Debt	Equity	Conversions,	p.	39	and	W.	Elali,	Debt-equity	swaps	and	the	alleviation	of	
the	LDCs	debt	problem,	International	Journal	of	Commerce	&	Management,	1995,	p.	64.	However,	
as	Blackwell	and	Nocera	pointed	out,	in	case	the	project	financed	was	successful,	the	conversion	
would	 actually	 results	 into	 a	 long	 term	 foreign	 exchange	 obligation,	 therefore	 in	 case	 no	
restrictions	are	imposed	to	this	kind	of	investments,	the	overall	effect	on	the	balance	of	payments	
would	 be	 negative,	 since	 payments	 abroad	 deriving	 from	 the	 initial	 equity	 investment	 would	
exceed	the	payment	of	interests	on	the	converted	external	debt.	See	M.	Blackwell	and	S.	Nocera,	
The	impact	of	debt	to	equity	conversion,	Finance	&	Development,	1988,	p.	15-17
262		 The	Guide	to	Debt	Equity	Conversions,	p.	38
263 See	L.	Buchheit,	The	capitalization	of	 sovereign	debt:	an	 introduction,	University	of	 Illinois	Law	
Review,	1988,	pp.	401-414	and	the	Guide	to	Debt	Equity	Conversions	p.	39-43.
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a better option to improve the sustainability of the debt of sovereigns. The 
main disadvantages of such programs are as follows:
 Political concerns: foreign investors taking part to these 
transactions would raise worries in respect of the sovereign 
control over natural resources;264
 Inflationary consequences: since the debtor country in order to 
implement this kind of program has to print cash (or issue short-
term bonds in local currency), to fund the conversions;265
 Substitute for fresh investment (additionality): the conversion of 
the external debt of a country does not represent extra foreign 
exchange and capital for the country. In case the program 
facilitates only investment which would have been implemented 
anyway (therefore are not additional to what had already been 
planned), that negatively impacts on the country’s economy 
since in absence of the debt-equity swaps, the same investments 
would have been carried out at more favourable exchanges rates 
for the country and would have implied an injection of foreign 
currency in the country which instead did not occurred.266
 Round tripping transactions: debt to equity conversions 
represent a way for foreign exchange value of the local currency 
exceeds the value of the local currency by another conversion 
back into foreign currency and then back into local currency by a 
further conversion. In this way, external debt is converted into 
local currency in such a way that the foreign exchange value of 
the local currency exceeds the value of the local currency exceeds 
the value of the converted external debt. This will result in a 
higher local indebtedness for the sovereign debtor. Ways to 
prevent round tripping are: (i) introducing restrictions on the use 
of proceeds of the conversion, so that such proceeds will be 
invested in approved projects; and (ii) prohibitions on 
                                                                                                                                     
264 W.	Elali,	Debt-equity	swaps	and	the	alleviation	of	 the	LDCs	debt	problem,	 International	 Journal	of	
Commerce	&	Management,	1995,	p.	65.
265 R.P.	 Buckley,	 Debt	 exchanges	 revisited:	 lessons	 from	 Latin	 America	 for	 Eastern	 Europe,	
Northwestern	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 &	 Business,	 1998,	 pp.	 662	 and	 E.	 Burton,	Debt	 for	
Development,	 Harvard	 International	 Law	 Journal,	 1990,	 p.	 236-237,	 pointing	 out	 the	 social	
consequences	of	debt-equity	swaps	for	the	country.
266 M.	Blackwell	and	S.	Nocera,	The	impact	of	debt	to	equity	conversion,	Finance	&	Development,	1988,	
p.	17	and	the	Guide	to	Equity	Debt	Conversions.	W.	Elali,	Debt-equity	swaps	and	the	alleviation	of	
the	LDCs	debt	problem,	International	Journal	of	Commerce	&	Management,	1995,	p.	65.
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repatriation of principal or payment of dividends for a number 
of years post conversion.267  
 Disparity for local investors: since debt to equity schemes 
granted to investors preferential exchange rates but local 
investors in most countries were prohibited to partake to such 
schemes. This would result in local resentment towards the 
government policies;268
 Misallocation of resources: resulting from inefficiencies in 
increased investments, as those going into sectors of the 
economy sheltered by tariffs and quotas.269 Investments if not 
correctly controlled, could actually worsen the structural 
imbalances of the country’s economy.270
Buckley, drawing his conclusion on this mechanism, expresses an overall 
negative judgment of it from the perspective of the debtor’s country.271 The 
theoretical advantages in concrete turned out to be not as positive as required 
in order to set off the number of disadvantages listed above. Blackwell and 
Nocera comment on the balance between pros and cons stating that such 
programs can improve the overall debt position of a country but that: “It 
must be acknowledged, however, that the limitations imposed by monetary, 
                                                                                                                                     
267 L.	Buchheit,	Debt	equity	conversions	programmes	from	the	debtor	country’s	perspective,	in	Guide	to	
Debt	Equity	Swaps,	special	report	1104,	ed.	S.M.	Rubin,	1987	and	Elali	id.	In	Chile	round-tripping	
transactions	were	described	with	the	name	of	“bicicletas”.	Buckley,	however,	highlights	how	no	
literature	could	be	found	on	this	aspect	of	the	market,	giving	the	following	reasons	for	the	lack	of	
discussions	on	the	point:	“(i)	most	bicicletas	involved	exploiting	the	inability	of	the	local	central	
banks	 to	control	 the	 loopholes	 in	 their	 complex	debt-equity	 and	currency	control	 regulations	–
the	transactions	would	typically	be	within	the	letter	but	not	the	spirit	of	the	regulations,	and	thus	
were	 likely	 to	 invoke	 the	 displeasure	 of	 the	 central	 bank	 if	 they	 came	 to	 light;	 (ii)	 at	 times	
bicicletas	involved	transactions	of	dubious	legality	in	terms	of	exchange	control	regulations;	(iii)	
and	 the	 trading	desks	earning	handsome	returns	 from	the	bicicletas	knew	that	 the	profitability	
would	be	 squeezed	 from	 these	 transactions	 if	 too	many	 traders	 learned	of,	 and	participated	 in	
them.	See	R.P.	Buckley,	The	transformative	potential	of	a	secondary	market:	emerging	markets	debt	
trading	from	1983	to	1989,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal,	1998,	pp.	1221-1225.	
268 L.	Buchheit	Id.
269 M.	Blackwell	and	S.	Nocera,	The	impact	of	debt	to	equity	conversion,	Finance	&	Development,	1988,	
pp.	15-17.
270 In	order	to	prevent	such	negative	effect	most	countries	would	try	to	force	investors	to	channel	the	
proceeds	of	 the	conversions	 in	priority	sectors	of	 the	economy,	as	 those	that	generated	exports	
and	foreign	exchange,	or	into	depressed	geographical	regions of	the	country.	See	L.	Maktouf,	Some	
reflections	on	debt-for-equity	conversions,	Journal	of	International	Law,	1989,	p.	– and	R.P.	Buckley,	
Debt	exchanges	revisited:	lessons	from	Latin	America	for	Eastern	Europe,	Northwestern	Journal	of	
International	Law	&	Business,	1998,	p.	664.
271 R.P.	Buckley	id	pp.	667-669.
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fiscal and other economic considerations mean that the amount of debt-
equity swaps that can be financed has to remain somewhat limited”.272
From the lenders’ perspective, debt-for-equity swaps have the same 
advantages and disadvantages as per the debt buy-backs transactions.273
d) Debt for nature swaps
The concept of debt for nature was created as variation from the concept of 
debt for equity swaps. As general observation, in fact, the debt burden of 
developing countries and the incapacity of developing countries to protect its 
own natural resources were deeply interconnected. As result of the poor 
status of their public finance, developing countries had no funds to take care 
of the environment and poverty would also push such countries to 
overexploit their own natural resources.274 Debt-for-nature swaps tried to 
address both problems using a single transaction.
The debt for nature conversion process consist in the purchase by a “green” 
investor of a portion of the sovereign debt on the secondary market or by the 
selling bank which is then converted in local currency (or a long term bonds 
denominated in local currency) and donated to the debtor country upon 
agreement that it will contribute such amount into a project for the 
conservation of its own territory or it will be used directly by the 
environmental groups to implement a specific project.275
The first two countries to implement such schemes were Bolivia and Costa 
Rica in the late 1980s, the so-called “first generation” debt-for-nature swaps. 
In Bolivia, the swap was structured as follows: the environmental group 
Conservation International purchased from on of Bolivia commercial creditor 
a portion of Bolivian debt with a face value equal to USD 650,000 for a 
                                                                                                                                     
272 M.	Blackwell	and	S.	Nocera,	The	impact	of	debt	to	equity	conversion,	Finance	&	Development,	1988,	
p.	17.
273 On	creditors	constrains	on	debt	equity	transactions,	see	the	Guide	to	Debt	Equity	conversions,	pp.	
51-61.
274 See	J.E.	Gibson	and	W.J.	Schrenk,	The	enterprise	for	the	Americas	initiative:	a	second	generation	of	
debt-for-nature	 exchanges	 – with	 an	 overview	 of	 other	 recent	 exchange	 initiative,	 George	
Washington	Journal	of	International	Law and	Economy,	1992,	pp.	1-70.	On	the	machanics	of	this	
kind	of	swap	see	also	N.M.	Dillon,	The	feasibility	of	debt-for-nature	swaps,	North	Carolina	Journal	
of	International	Law	and	Commercial	Regulation,	1991,	pp.	127-140.
275 Environmental	group	have	structured	such	transactions	in	various	ways:	(i)	some	would	donate	
the	 purchased	 debt	 to	 affiliate	 member	 which	 operate	 in	 the	 debtor	 country	 and	 then	 such	
affiliates	would	start	a	relationship	with	the	government;	(ii)	some	would	convert	 the	debt	into	
local	currency	and	then	they	would	dedicate	such	amount	to	support	a	specific	project.	Id.	On	the	
transactional	 aspects	 of	 the	 negotiation	 of	 debt-for-nature	 swaps	 see	 M.	 Lachmann,	 Debt-for-
nature	 swaps:	 a	 case	 study	 in	 transactional	 negotiation,	 Journal	 of	 Contemporary	 Legal	 Issues,	
1989,	p	139-171.
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purchase price equal to USD 100,000. Conservation International then 
converted such amount on the basis that in exchange the Bolivia government 
would have set up a 4 million acres Amazon rain forest natural reserve. 276
Costa Rica developed a more sophisticated arrangement, according to which 
the Government undertook to pay to any person willing to donate its 
sovereign debt for conservation project 75% of the face value of its debt, not 
taking into account the price at which the debt was traded on the secondary 
market. However, the government, in order to have a strict control over the 
funds, would not pay the purchasers of the debt, but it would transfer the 
money directly to a special fund (the Natural Resources Conservation Fund), 
dedicated specifically to environmental projects. An upside of this program 
was its capacity to pool funds coming from multiple small environmental 
organizations, which otherwise would have not been able to implement such 
project on their own. The appreciation by the public and the effectiveness of 
this structure was such that Costa Rica was able, as of late 1989 Costa Rica, to 
reduce its debt up to USD 75 million by means of it. 277
Other developing countries follow such approach in the following years, 
such as Brazil, Ecuador, the Philippines, Madagascar and Zambia.278
From the country’s perspective, this process had raised some concerns in 
respect of the claimed lost of sovereignty over the portion of territory that 
was object of the “eco-swaps”.  In some cases local people would accuse the 
environmental group managing the territory pursuant to such debt-for-
nature swaps to interfere with the government right to govern its lands.279
The impact of this kind of swaps on the debt reduction process of the 
countries was relatively small, however using as criteria for the assessment 
the effects on the preservation of the nature that they were able to produce, 
                                                                                                                                     
276 See	 the	 Guide	 to	 Equity	 Debt	 Conversions	 p.15-16.	 See	 also	 M.	 Chamberlin,	 M.	 Gruson	 and	 P.	
Weltchek,	 Sovereign	 debt	 exchanges,	 University	 of	 Illinois	 Law	 Review,	 1988,	 p.	 441-443	 and	
J.E.Gibson	and	W.J.	Schrenk,	The enterprise	for	the	Americas	initiative:	a	second	generation	of	debt-
for-nature	exchanges	– with	an	overview	of	other	recent	exchanges	initiatives,	George	Washington	
Journal	of	International	Law	and	Economics,	1991,	pp.	7-9.
277 Id.	p.	16.	See	also	M.	Chamberlin,	M.	Gruson	and	P.	Weltchek,	Sovereign	debt	exchanges,	University	
of	Illinois	Law	Review,	1988,	p.	445	footnote	115	and	M.	Lachmann,	Debt-for-nature	swaps:	a	case	
study	in	transactional	negotiation,	Journal	of	Contemporary	Legal	Issues,	1989,	p	144-145.
278 For	an	overview	of	the	programs	implemented	in	such	countries	see	J.E.	Gibson	and	W.J.	Schrenk,	
The	enterprise	for	the	Americas	initiative:	a	second	generation	of	debt-for-nature	exchanges	– with	
an	overview	of	other	recent	exchanges	initiatives,	George	Washington	Journal	of	International	Law	
and	 Economics,	 1991,	 pp.	 12-15	 and	 D.	 Asiedu-Akrofi,	 Debt-for-nature	 swaps:	 extending	 the	
frontiers	of	 innovative	 financing	 in	 support	of	 the	Global	Environment,	The	 International	Lawyer,	
1991,	pp.	565-571.
279 See	 R.P.	 Buckley,	 Debt	 exchanges	 revisited:	 lessons	 from	 Latin	 America	 for	 Eastern	 Europe,	
Northwest	Journal	of	International	Law	&	Business,	1998,	p.	241-243.
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the final judgment was definitely positive.280 Some authors defined them as 
“one of the few types of Latin American debt transactions in which all 
participants can rightfully claim benefits”.281 Costa Rica, for instance, 
received a considerable amount of funds dedicated to its nature, which 
would have never been able to channel to such purpose otherwise, since its 
agreement wit the IMF would prevent it from raising its budget for 
maintenance of national parks.282
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a second kind of debt-for-nature swaps were 
introduced: the so-called “second generation” debt-for-nature exchanges.283
The innovative element of such transactions was that the debt to be swapped 
was the external debt that developing countries owed to governments, the 
Paris debt.284 The relevance of this kind of government-to-government swaps 
was that larger amounts of debt could be actually invested in environmental 
oriented projects. Debt exchange programs to convert debt deriving from 
Official Development Assistance were introduced as well.
Second generation debt-for-nature exchanges were implemented in 1989 in 
Costa Rica, in 1991 in Poland and in 1995 in Bulgaria.285
An innovative aspect of such agreements was the insertion of enforcement 
measures which enabled the donor countries to maintain control over the 
projects financed by means of: (i) control over the selection process of 
projects to be financed; (ii) inspectional powers, which entitled the donor 
country to interrupt the financing in case the debtor country was not 
compliant with the terms of the exchange agreement.286
                                                                                                                                     
280 See	 M.	 Lachmann,	 Debt-for-nature	 swaps:	 a	 case	 study	 in	 transactional	 negotiation,	 Journal	 of	
Contemporary	Legal	Issues,	1989,	p	141-142	and	on	the	domestic	awareness	effect	that	swap-for-
nature	have	see	also	D.	Asiedu-Akrofi,	Debt-for-nature	swaps:	extending	the	frontiers	of	innovative	
financing	in	support	of	the	Global	Environment,	The	International	Lawyer,	1991,	pp.	577-578.
281 M.	Chamberlin,	M.	Gruson	and	P.	Weltchek,	Sovereign	debt	exchanges,	University	of	 Illinois	Law	
Review,	1988,	p.	441.
282 C.	 Jochnick	 and	 F.	 A.	 Preston,	 Sovereign	 debt	 at	 the	 crossroads,	 Oxford,	 2006.	 For	 a	 costs	 and	
benefits analysis	see	also	id.	p.	445-446.	On	the	possible	application	of	debt-for-nature	swaps	in	
the	sub-Saharan	Africa	see	P.	M.	Nichols,	Swapping	debt	for	development:	a	theoretical	application	
of	swaps	to	the	creation	of	microenterprise	lending	institutions	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	International	
Law	and	Politics,	1994,	pp.	43-102.
283 C.	Jochnick	and	F.	A.	Preston,	Sovereign	debt	at	the	crossroads,	Oxford,	2006.
284 See	S.	Freeland	and	R.P.	Buckley,	Debt-for-development	exchanges:	using	external	debt	to	mitigate	
environmental	damage	in	developing	countries,	West	Northwest	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	and	
Policy,	2010,	pp.	84-91.	
285 Id.	pp.	85-89.
286 Id.	 p.	 85.	 As	 interesting	 further	 development	 on	 the	 point,	 see	 the	 description	 of	 the	 potential	
synergies	between	debt-for-nature	exchanges	and	Clean	Development	Mechanism	set	forth	by	the	
Kyoto	Protocol	in	Indonesia,	id.	pp.	97-100.
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This mechanism, however, suffers from the lack of a secondary market for 
official bilateral debt, which does not allow the potential private donors to 
benefit from the steep discounts that a market may offer. Investors in fact 
would have to pay the debt at the discount granted to the debtor country in 
accordance with the terms of the Paris Club agreement (which will be 
analysed in the following paragraphs). The investor therefore may find 
cheaper to buy local currency in the secondary market, creating a 
disincentive to the implementation of this kind of transactions by private 
actors.287
e) Debt for development swaps
Debt-for-development swaps were introduced shortly after the 
implementation of the first debt-for-nature exchanges. Their structure is 
exactly the same as the “eco-swaps” but their target is different: debt 
conversion is used in this context to fight hunger and disease and to promote 
more generally the development of the country. A further version of this 
kind of exchanges is represented by the debt-for-education swaps, whereby 
the final aim is not generically development but improving the education 
system of developing countries.288
From a results point of view, the value of debt-for-development exchanges 
had much more success than debt-for-nature swaps. It has been calculated 
that in the period between 1987-1994, the face value of developing countries 
debt cancelled because of “eco-swaps” was equal to USD 750 million, while 
debt-for-development swaps reached the significant result of USD 1 billion of 
debt cancellation.289
The advantage of this kind of transactions in comparison with the debt-for-
nature swaps is that they do not raise criticism in respect of sovereignty 
issues.290
                                                                                                                                     
287 See	 J.	 Kaiser	 and	 Lambert,	Debt	 swaps	 for	 sustainable	 development-a	 practical	 guide	 for	 NGO’s,	
IUCN,	1996	(hereinafter	the	Debt	Swaps for	Sustainable	Development	Guide).
288 See	 R.P.	 Buckley,	 Debt	 exchanges	 revisited,	 lessons	 from	 Latin	 America	 for	 Eastern	 Europe,	
Northwestern	Journal	of	International	Law	&	Business,	1998,	pp.	673-674.
289 Debt	Swaps	for	Sustainable	Development	Guide.
290 On	 the	 transactional	 aspects	 of	 a	 debt-for	 development	 agreement,	 see	 E.	 Burton,	 Debt	 for	
development:	a	new	opportunity	for	non-profits,	commercial	banks	and	developing	states,	Harvard	
International	Law	Journal,	winter	1990,	pp.	233-256.
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Concluding on both nature and development for debt exchanges, a couple of 
observations on the effects on the constituents of these structures, applicable 
to both debt and development kind of transaction, will follow. 
From the perspective of the debtor country, this represent a way to get relief 
from the debt servicing of the portion of debt purchased by the private party. 
It will also achieve the improvement of the overall living conditions of the 
population, channelling funds directly to specific projects set up for such 
purpose. Since the amounts to be converted are not excessively big, they do 
not trigger the risk of inflationary results, as per the debt for equity swaps.
From the perspective of the private party (NGO’s or other entity), this is an 
effective way to strengthen their spending power in respect of their project, 
offering local currency at discounted prices. A moral dilemma was raised by 
the non-profits since they feel that such programs is for the benefit of 
commercial banks too, which to the contrary, in their opinion, should not 
request the repayment of the debt from such poor countries.291
Finally, private creditors of developing countries take the view that being 
repaid in part is anyway better than not being repaid at all. The only issue 
they may encounter is if non-profits request them to sell their loans at prices 
which are more favourable than secondary market prices, on the grounds 
that a higher level of debt relief is necessary.292
Overall, therefore, it can be shared the view that the great potential of such 
transactions is their capacity to address the needs of all the parties involved, 
resulting into what could be judged as a win-win situation for all.
f) Debt relief, the HIPC initiative and odious debt
Debt relief represents obviously the most favourable approach to
unsustainable debts burdens from the debtor countries’ perspective. This 
paragraph will first do a short introduction on debt relief in general and then 
will focus on a specific initiative set up for highly indebted countries and 
finally it will take into account the doctrine of the odious debt.
(i) Debt relief
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The idea of debt relief is based on two general observations: (i) some 
countries are too poor to repay their debts without inflicting 
unbearable sufferance to their population; and (ii) some debts were 
not legitimate. We will focus on the second point in the paragraph 
related to the odious debt doctrine.
Debt relief has an ethical component in those cases in which the 
burden of debt is so heavy that the governments cannot serve the 
basic functions of a state in a civilized society. An ethical approach to 
finance would impose lenders not to profit at the expenses of the 
poorest, requiring debt forgiveness any time servicing the debt 
makes a country unable to provide its population with basic social 
services.
From the lenders’ perspective, creditors are generally against debt 
relief on the basis that it creates a moral hazard, rewarding the 
debtor who has not repaid its debt and that it makes it harder for the 
debtor to have access again to capital markets in the future. Debt 
relief obviously implies great losses for the creditors and in the past 
was able to put at risk the stability of the credit institutions lending 
to developing countries, in cases in which their exposure in respect 
of the country requesting the write off is very high, as for American 
banks at the beginning of the Latin American crisis in the 1980s, as 
already observed. 
However, in extreme circumstances, when all parties involved 
consider the debt of a country as clearly unsustainable, debt relief is 
the only remaining option. Creditors agree upon writing off portion 
of their debt in the hope that by improving the economical 
conditions of the debtors they will eventually be repaid at least 
partially. 
Historically, in order to proceed with cancellation of debt, creditors 
would evaluate whether in absence of such relief the country would 
default on its external debt, in other words if the country was in a 
situation of imminent default.293 In case such test was passed, debt 
relief was usually granted both by multilateral creditors and private 
creditors. Such approach has been mitigated with a view to find 
long-term solutions to the debt sustainability issue of developing 
                                                                                                                                     
293 On	the	principle	of	imminent	default	see	A.	Fieffel,	The	Paris	Club,	1978-1983,	Columbia	Journal	of	
Transnational	Law,	1984,	pp.	83-85.
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countries to be implemented prior to having a country on the verge 
of default.294
In the context of the implementation of the Brady-menu in Latin 
America in the late 1980s, for instance, debt relief, in the form of 
debt-to-debt swaps, played a key role in the process of recovery of 
the economical situation of such countries.  
Three examples of debt relief can be examined: bilateral debt relief 
(i.e. debt relief implemented or facilitated by a single country by 
means of its internal legislation), Paris Club debt relief (which will be 
separately analysed in paragraph 4) and multilateral debt relief.
A bilateral debt relief implies the political will of a country to 
support the reduction of the debt burden of developing countries 
and it is usually translated into reforms of the legislation in order to 
facilitate the write off.
In 1990 the US, for instance, passed the Federal Credit Reform Act 
whose purpose was to change the way in which governmental loans 
and guarantees could be forgiven, in order to facilitate such 
process.295 Prior to such reform in order to write off one dollar of 
debt, the US Congress had to appropriate one dollar. According to 
the new legislation, rather than taking into account the face value of 
the debt for the purpose of the appropriation by the US Congress, 
introduced the concept of “net present value” of the debt. In order to 
establish such value factors such as likelihood of default, interest rate 
and maturity period are taken into account, reducing the amount to 
be appropriated and making less burdensome for US taxpayers. In 
this way, for example, seven dollars debt could be relieved against 
one dollar’s worth of US public funds.296
Moving to multilateral debt relief, a short overview of the most 
relevant initiatives carried out by the World Bank and the IMF will 
follow.297
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for	instance.
295 R.	Sakar,	International	development	law- rule	of	law,	human	rights	and	global	finance,	Oxford	Press,	
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In 1960 the World Bank created the International Development 
Association (IDA), which had the scope of advance loans to the 
poorest countries at concessional terms. However, the funds made 
available to such organization were insufficient to deal with the 
needs of the most indebted countries, therefore in 1987 the Special 
Programme of Assistance (SPA) was set up by the World Bank and 
by the IMF. The SPA was designed as a complement to existing aid 
coordination mechanisms and as a response to the economic crises of 
the debt-distressed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and intended to 
support the countries' structural adjustment programs with the 
International Development Association and the IMF.298
In 1985 the World Bank established the Special Facility for Africa, 
shortly followed by the Debt Reduction Facility in 1989.
The Debt Reduction Facility (DRF) provides grant funding to 
eligible Governments to buy back -- at a deep discount -- the debts 
owed to external, commercial creditors. Since its inception, the DRF 
has played a significant role in extinguishing commercial external 
debt from the books of the public sector of low-income countries. It 
has supported 25 completed buy-back operations in 22 IDA-only 
countries, extinguishing about US$10.3 billion of external commercial 
debt principal and more than US$3.5 billion of associated interest 
arrears and penalties.
In conclusion, the analysis of the debt issue in the poorest countries 
made clear that some kind of debt relief is necessary in order to bring 
the debt of such countries to sustainable levels. 
(ii) HIPC initiative
In 1996 the World Bank and the IMF proposed the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in acknowledgment of the fact that 
traditional measures to deal with the sovereign debt such as 
structural adjustment programs, Paris Club reschedulings and 
                                                                                                                                     
298 For	 an	 evaluation	 of	 the	 SPA	 results	 see	 the	 evaluation	 by	 the	 Independent	 Evaluation	 Group	
available	 on	 the	 World	 Bank	 Group	 website:	
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/B9308361A99A
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bilateral donor forgiveness had been proved to be not effective in 
respect of the poorest countries.299
The aim of the HIPC Initiative is to offer a faster and more 
comprehensive way to address the debt issue and achieve poverty 
reduction. 
In order to be eligible for the HIPC Initiative a country has to: (i) 
have an unsustainable level of indebtedness300 after the application of 
the traditional Paris Club debt relief mechanism; (ii) be eligible for 
the concessional terms of financial assistance granted by the IDA and 
the IMF’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Facility (PRGF); and (iii) have 
a track record of reform and develop a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) which includes civil society participation.301
Under the HIPC Initiative, the IMF and the World Bank boards first 
determine (at the “decision point”) whether a country is eligible for 
debt relief. If an affirmative decision is reached, all creditors 
(multilateral, bilateral and commercial) is requested, on a voluntary 
basis, to commit to provide debt relief once the country has 
satisfactorily carried out certain prescribed policy reforms (the 
“completion point”). Of the 39 countries eligible or potentially 
eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance, 32 are receiving full debt relief 
from the IMF and other creditors after reaching their completion 
points. Four countries have reached their decision points and some 
of them are receiving interim debt relief. Three countries, which have 
been identified as potentially eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance, 
have not yet reached their decision points.302
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March	2012)	 and	 for	 a	 comment	on	 the	 initiative	 see	V.K.	Aggarwal	 and	B.	Granville,	Sovereign	
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302 See	IMF	fact	sheet	above.
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(iii) Odious debt
Alexander Sack, a Russian scholar of international law, presented the 
first formal theorization of the doctrine of the odious debt in 1927.303
An odious debt is the debt incurred by a dictatorial regime for the 
personal benefit of such regime, which is not approved by the 
citizens and whose proceeds are not used for their benefit. Sack 
establishes two elements to be proven to an international tribunal by 
a Government that wants to repudiate the debts incurred by the 
previous regime: “(a) that the needs which the former Government 
claimed in order to contract the debt in question, were odious and 
clearly in contradiction to the interests of the people of the entirety of 
the former State or a part thereof, and (b) that the creditors, at the 
moment of paying out the loan, were aware of its odious purpose. 
Upon establishment of these two points, the creditors must then 
prove that the funds for this loan were not utilized for odious 
purposes-harming the people of the entire State or part of it-but for 
general or specific purposes which do not have the character of being 
odious.” 304
Such theory represents an exception to the general rule of
international law according to which successor governments inherit 
the obligations incurred by previous governments and must honor 
them. According to such theory, some debts should not fall within 
the category of obligations which can be passed on to the successor 
government, due to their odious nature. Sack suggests to apply a 
debt-by-debt approach for the evaluation of the odious nature of the 
obligations, requesting international courts to review each single 
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304 Sack	establishes	two	elements	to	be	proven	by	the	Government	that	wants	to	repudiate	the	debts	
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Upon	establishment	of	these	two	points,	the	creditors	must	then	prove	that	the	funds	for	this	loan	
were	not	utilized	for	odious	purposes-harming	the	people	of	the	entire	State	or	part	of	it-but	for	
general	or	specific	purposes	which	do	not	have	the	character	of	being	odious.”	Id.,	translated	in	R.	
Howse,	 The	 concept	 of	 odious	 debt	 in	 public	 international	 law,	 U.N.	 conference	 on	 Trade	 and	
Development,	discussion	paper	no.	185,	2007.
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loan documentation and how such loan was used in order to 
establish whether such debt can be considered as odious or not.305
The doctrine of the odious debt has been consequently developed as 
a mean to constrain creditors to advance loans to dictators, on that 
basis that odious debt are illegitimate and therefore cannot be 
transferred to the new government. The risk of having the debt 
declared unenforceable was a powerful disincentive for creditors to 
extend loans to regimes.306
The debate on odious debts developed again in the 1980s, in respect 
of the debt crisis of the Latin American countries and in 2003, upon 
the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. 
In the late 1980s, some authors would question the nature of the 
loans advanced to Latin American countries by private creditors in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, which were the result of reckless policies of 
international banks dealing with an excess of liquidity deriving from 
the petrodollars (as already observed in the first part of this 
chapter).307 However, the carelessness of banks in advancing loans is 
not a reason for debt cancellation under the odious debt doctrine.  
Borrowers, anyway, did not try to support this theory and 
unilaterally repudiate their debts because of the fear of scaring 
international lenders and not being able to access to credit in the 
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306 Historically	 such	 theory	had	already	been	 implemented,	prior	 to	Sack’s	 formulation	of	 it,	 at	 the	
end	of	the	1910s	by	U.S.	Supreme	Court	Chie	Justice	William	Howard	Taft,	in	his	decision	on	the	
unenforceability	of	a	loan	advanced	by	the	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	to	the	Tinoco	regime,	which	was	
governing	 Costa	 Rica	 at	 the	 time.	 The	 new	 government	 of	 Costa	 Rica,	 elected	 once	 the	 Tinoco	
regime	was	over,	refused	to	repay such	loan,	which	had	been	used	for	personal	expenses	by	the	
Tinoco	family.	Chief	Justice	Taft	ruled	that	Costa	Rica	was	legitimately	entitled	to	refuse	to	repay	
such	 loans	 on	 the	 basis	 that.	 “The	whole	 transaction	was	 full	 of	 irregularities…The	 case	 of	 the	
Royal	Bank	depends	not	on	the	mere	form	of	the	transaction	but	upon	the	good	faith	of	the	bank	
in	 the	 payment	 of	 money	 for	 the	 real	 use	 of	 the	 Costa	 Rican	 Government	 under	 the	 Tinoco	
Regime.	 It	 must	 make	 out	 its	 case	 of	 actual	 furnishing	 of	 money	 to	 the	 government	 for	 its	
legitimate	use.	It	has	not	done	so.	The	bank	knew	that	this	money	was	to	be	used	by	the	retiring	
president…for	 his	 personal	 support	 after	 he	 had	 taken	 refuge	 in	 a	 foreign	 country…”.	 See	 C.M.	
Gentile,	The	market	 for	odious	debt,	Law	and	Contemporary	problems,	 fall	2010,	p.	155-156.	On	
this	point	see	also	P.	Bolton	and	D.	Skeel,	Odious	debts	or	odious	regimes?, Law	and	Contemporary	
Problems,	Autumn	2007,	pp.		83-107.
307 See	 J.	 V.	 Feinerman,	Odious	 debt,	 old	 and	 new:	 the	 legal	 intellectual	 history	 of	 an	 idea,	 Law	 and	
Contemporary	Problems,	autumn	2007,	pp.	202-209.
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future.308 Furthermore, even if Latin American countries had tried to 
argue the odiousness of the loans, it would have been difficult to tell 
which were bad loans and which were good loans used to build 
hospitals and bridges. Once the Brady Plan was implemented in the 
single countries, moreover, the whole amount of loans would be 
consolidated into one single loan and converted into bonds,309
making impossible to distinguish from that moment on the good or 
bad nature of debts.310
Moving to the Iraq situation, by 2003 the overall debt burden of the 
country, taking into account all claims related to the Hussein Regime, 
was equal to USD 120 billion.311 Because of the size of debt and the 
brutality of the regime many authors, politicians and members of the 
civil society argued for the cancellation of odious debts.  Political 
concerns were involved as well, since it was feared that more 
financial distress would have jeopardize the just born democracy. 
The doctrine of odious debt would have provided a legal way to 
cancel a portion of the debt and condemning the regime at the same 
time. However, eventually Iraq was granted debt relief (80% of Paris 
Club debt was written off) but on the basis of the distressed 
economic situation of the country avoiding explicitly references to 
the odious debt doctrine.312 Such generous write-off, however, raised 
concerns in respect of the sustainability of such policy for the IMF 
and the World Bank, which are the main creditors of the poorest 
countries. Granting such high level of debt relief on a regular basis, 
in fact, would be in prejudice of the capacity of such institutions to 
carry out their own functions, since they do not have enough funds 
to put up with such losses.313
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International	Financial	System,	policy	and	regulation,	Kluwer	Law	International,	2008,	83-93.
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In conclusion, although the doctrine of odious debts cannot be 
considered to be part of customary international law, the concept of 
odious debt acquired growing importance and some authors have 
suggested ways to translate such concept into something more 
institutionally structured in order to create a “more usable odious 
debt doctrine”.314
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3) THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS
The role of the IMF as lender of the last resort has already been analyzed in the previous 
chapter together with the concept of conditionality connected to the loans advanced by 
the IMF. This paragraph will focus on the role played by the IMF in the context of the 
restructuring process and the proposal advanced by the IMF in relation to the creation of 
an international insolvency regime.
a) IMF and sovereign workouts
The IMF plays a central role in the context of restructuring of sovereign debt: starting 
from the Latin American crisis and was maintained in most of the following 
restructurings, exception made for some cases whereby the countries decided not to 
involve the IMF since they did not want to implement any structural adjustment, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.
The IMF is usually involved in sovereign workouts for the following reasons:
 As lender of the last resort: as already analysed in the previous chapter, a 
country which has difficulties in servicing its debt may request the IMF to 
provide it with the necessary amount of new money in order to avoid a 
payment default and the exclusion from international capital markets. 
However the IMF approach in respect of lending to countries in economical 
distress changed after the first phase of the Latin American crisis, as already 
commented in the first paragraph. Initially the IMF was the only lender to 
advance new finance in order to allow the service of the country’s debt. 
However the IMF then requested private creditors to share the burden of 
advancing new finance to the borrower (the involuntary lending), since 
having the IMF as only entity to advance funds was not sustainable from the 
borrower’s perspective. Since the IMF loans do not suffer haircuts and have 
priority in respect of all other debts of the country (that is due to the fact that 
the IMF is the only lender to fund in arrears- this point will be further 
analysed in the following chapter), such policy resulted in having the 
commercial debt being serviced by money which would create a debt burden 
not object of debt relief, and which could have been repaid only at the 
population’s expenses, creating a lucrative but unethical vicious circle;315
                                                                                                                                     
315 Palley	commented	on	this	at	a	Conference	on	the	Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring	Mechanism	held	
at	IMF	Headquarters,	on	22	January	2003:	“Under	the	existing	system,	costs	of	default	are	large	
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 As catalyst of financial assistance: the IMF provides a country in financial 
distress with a limited amount of funds in respect of the financial needs of 
that country. However, the fact that the IMF judged such country as eligible 
in order to receive its loans, since the implementation of the adjustment plan 
has been correctly carried out, catalyses financial assistance from other 
sources. The intervention of the IMF allows the country also to regain access 
to financial markets, which is crucial in order to work out a path out if the 
crisis;316  
 As coordinator: the IMF assists negotiations with the Paris Club and the 
London Club, facilitating the process by coordinating it and playing the role 
of the “honest broker”;317
 As advisor: since the IMF will advance money only if the State follows its 
technical prescriptions, implementing a plan which will secure the short-
medium term sustainability of the debt (a structural adjustment), which was 
analysed in the previous chapter as well, in relation to the policy of 
conditionality of the IMF. The IMF is equipped with a large highly trained 
technical staff, that monitors, in general, trends in the global economy, and 
specifically, the countries which are implementing its programs, feeding this 
information into discussion with other governments; 318
 As gatekeeper: since the IMF will be involved in monitoring the 
implementation of the plan, the other parties involved in the restructuring 
                                                                                                                                     
for	 countries,	 and	 they	 are	 also	 potentially	 large	 for	 the	 global	 economy	 owing	 to	 contagion	
effects.	To	avoid	 these	costs,	 countries	have	an	 incentive	 to	 “gamble	 for	 redemption,”	 taking	on	
additional	high	interest	rate	loans	in	the	hope	of	escaping	default.	Side-by-side,	the	IMF	also	has	
an	incentive to	extend	additional	loans,	so	that	solvency	crises	get	treated	as	if	they	were	liquidity	
crises.	 The	 net	 result	 of	 this	 policy	 treatment	 is	 that	 private	 sector	 lenders	 get	 bailed-out	 and	
moral	hazard	is	created	in	international	credit	markets”.	T.	I.	Palley,	Sovereign	debt	restructuring,	
what	 is	 the	 problem?,	 available	 at	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/seminars/2003/sdrm/pdf/palley.pdf.	 On	 the	 role	 of	 the	
IMF	as	lender	of	last	resort	see	also	G.	Corsetti,	B.	Guimaraes	and	N.	Roubini,	International	lending	
of	 last	resort	and	moral	hazard:	a	model	of	 IMF’s	catalytic	 finance,	National	Bureau	of	Economic	
Research,	working	paper	no.	10125,	available	on	http://www.nber.org/papers/w10125.	On	the	
role	of	the	IMF	in	the	Latin	American	crisis	see	S.	Hagan,	Sovereign	debtors,	private	creditors	and	
the	IMF,	Law	and	Business	Review	of	the	Americas,	pp.	50-53.	On	bridge	financing	in	the	context	
of	 a	 sovereign	 debt	 restructuring	 see	 also	 K.	 Hudes,	 Coordination	 of	 Paris	 and	 London	 Club	
reschedulings,	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics,	1984-1985,	p.	565-
567.
316 S.	 Hagan,	 Sovereign	 debtors,	 private	 creditors	 and the	 IMF,	 Law	 and	 Business	 Review	 of	 the	
Americas,	p.	51.
317 Hudes	defines	the	role	of	the	IMF	in	the	context	of	the	Paris	and	London	Club	reschedulings	as	an	
honest	broker	that	would	mediate	and	balance	the	opposite	demands	of	the	parties	involved:	on	
one hand	 the	 request	 of	 the	 creditors	 of	 intrusive	 and	 harsh	 adjustment	 measures	 to	 be	
implemented	by	the	debtor	country	and	on	the	other	hand	the	request	of	the	debtor	country	for	
new	 finance.	 See	 K.	 Hudes,	 Coordination	 of	 Paris	 and	 London	 Club	 reschedulings,	 New	 York	
University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics,	1984-1985,	p.	563.
318 See	 D.	 Lombardi	 and	 N.	 Woods,	 The	 politics	 of	 influence,	 an	 analysis	 of	 IMF	 surveillance,	 in	
International	Economic	Law,	A.H.	Qreshi	and	X.	Gao	editors,	Routledge	Edition,	2011,	pp.	167-175.
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will trust the role of supervisor played by the IMF319 and will rely on the 
information passed on by the IMF on the economical status of the State;320
The critics to the IMF have already analysed in the previous chapter and are 
applicable in this context as well. The statutory approach proposed by the IMF in 
order to create an international bankruptcy regime will be now set out.
b)    The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
One of the main issues of the restructuring process of sovereign debt is the lack of a 
consistent and orderly framework for crisis prevention and resolution.321
Implementing such a framework would ultimately reduce the future cost of 
sovereign borrowing, which have been proven to be too long and too expensive,
because creditors would receive a higher recovery under such a system and this 
would result into a decrease of the cost of sovereign lending and would minimizing 
                                                                                                                                     
319 In	 the	 1980s,	 the	 surveillance	 activity	 of	 the	 IMF	 was	 instrumental	 in	 promoting	 the	 debt	
restructuring	 agreements	 with	 the	 other	 creditors	 (both	 commercial	 and	 bilateral):	 the	 IMF	
would	monitor	 the	performance	of	 the	debtor	and	set	 clear	benchmarks	against	which	 the	 IMF	
and	 the	 other	 creditors	 could	 evaluate	 the	 performances	 of	 the	 debtor.	 	 D.	 Lombardi	 and	 N.	
Woods,	The	politics	 of	 influence,	 an	 analysis	 of	 IMF	 surveillance,	 in	 International	Economic	Law,	
A.H.	Qreshi	and	X.	Gao	editors,	Routledge	Edition,	2011,	pp.	164-186.
320 The	 relevance	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 IMF	 as	 gatekeeper	 brought	 borrowers	 and	 creditors	 of	 low-
income	countries	to	develop	a	new	instrument,	in	collaboration	with	the	IMF:	the	Policy	Support	
Instrument	(PSI). The	PSI	was	designed	for	countries	which	do	not	have	a	financial	arrangement	
with	the	IMF	(either	because	they	are	not	 in	 financial	distress	or	because	they	preferred	not	 to	
rely	on	 the	 IMF)	but	which	 still	 need	assistance	 from	donors.	 Such	program	requires	 the	 entry	
into	an	unfunded	arrangement	based	on	a	quantitative	macroeconomic	framework.	Under	the	PSI,	
member	countries	agree	to	implement	a	set	of	policies	designed	to	maintain	macroeconomic	and	
financial	 stability,	 and	 accelerate	 growth,	 with	 sustainable	 domestic	 and	 external	 debt.	 These	
commitments,	 including	 specific	 conditions,	 are	 described	 in	 the	 country’s	 letter	 of	 intent	 - a	
document	that	spells	out	a	country’s	commitments	under	the	PSI.	The	IMF	checks	on	the	progress	
made	by	the	country	in	 the	implementation	of	such	framework	and	in	case	the	expectations	set	
out	 in	 the	 arrangement	 are	met,	 the	 country	 receives	 the	 IMF’s	 approval.	Nigeria	was	 the	 first	
country	to	implement	such	program	and	the	restructuring	of	 its	Paris	club	debt	was	conditional	
upon	receipt	of	the	IMF’s	approval.	D.	Lombardi	and	N.	Woods,	The	politics	of	influence,	an	analysis	
of	 IMF	 surveillance,	 in	 International	 Economic	 Law,	 A.H.	 Qreshi	 and	 X.	 Gao	 editors,	 Routledge	
Edition,	 2011,	 pp.	 164-186.	 See	 also	 the	 IMF	 fact	 sheet,	 available	 on	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm (last	checked	on	27	March	2012).
321 Palley	 sums	 up	 the	 main	 issues	 related	 to	 sovereign	 debt	 restructuring	 as	 follows:	 “First,	
restructuring	 negotiations	 under	 both	 the	 Paris	 and	 London	 club	 arrangements	 are	 long	 and	
uncertain,	 giving	 rise	 to	 economic	 dislocation	 during	 the	 negotiating	 period.	 Second,	 there	 is	
inadequate	 protection	 for	 new	 lending	 during	 the	 negotiation	 period,	 and	 this discourages	 the	
flow	 of	 needed	 new	 financing.	 Third,	 there	 is	 an	 absence	 of	 uniformity	 of	 treatment	 across	
creditor	classes.	Fourth,	there	is	the	collective	action	problem	associated	with	getting	creditors	to	
agree.	 This	 collective	 action	 problem	 obtains	 within	 a	 specific	 creditor	 class	 (the	 hold-out	 or	
vulture	fund	problem)	and	across	creditor	classes	(the	aggregation	problem).	Finally,	all	of	these	
problems	 are	worsening	 owing	 to	 the	 shift	 away	 from	bank	 loan	 financing	 to	more	 diversified	
sources	of	funding”,	see	T.	I.	Palley,	Sovereign	debt	restructuring,	what	is	the	problem?,	available	at	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/seminars/2003/sdrm/pdf/palley.pdf.
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social costs for the population which ultimately suffers the most from the lack of 
effectiveness of the current restructuring process.322
In order to address such issue, two main proposals were formulated by the academic 
world and by the institutions involved in this field: (i) a statutory approach promoted 
by the IMF, so-called Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM);323 and (ii) a 
contractual, market-based approach, based on the insertion of specific clauses in the 
agreements governing sovereign bonds and loans. The second approach will be 
analysed in the following chapter while a summary of the IMF proposal will follow.
In 2001, the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Kruger, presented the 
proposal for a treaty based international bankruptcy regime, setting up an entity 
close to an international bankruptcy court.324
Even if other proposal for a reform had been advanced at earlier stages, the IMF 
initiative would distinguish from them for the level of support received by the official 
sector. Such support, according to Hagan’s opinion, was due to three main reasons: 
(i) frustration for the lack of implementation of contractual, market-based solutions, 
which the public sector had encouraged since 1996; (ii) the tragedy unfolding in 
Argentina, which would have lead to a restructuring and which made clear the need 
to establish a restructuring framework aiming at encouraging the sovereign debtor 
and the creditors to start negotiating at an early stage of the crisis so that collateral 
damages could have been limited; (iii) concerns in respect of the role of the IMF, 
which in absence of a structured framework for the restructuring able to give 
confidence to the debtor in respect of the outcome of the process, countries in 
financial distress would continue to ask the IMF to provide them with new finance in
order not to default and in order to avoid the pain of going through a 
restructuring.325
The original proposal formulate by the IMF was criticised because of the relevance 
given to the role of the IMF in overviewing the restructuring process, resulting into a 
lack of independence, therefore the original proposal was remodelled, and a revised 
                                                                                                                                     
322 See	S.	L. Schwarcz, Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring:	A	Bankruptcy	Reorganization	Approach, Cornell	
Law	Review,	2000,	pp.	956-1032;	and	A.	M.	Dickerson,	A	Politically	Viable	Approach	to	Sovereign	
Debt	Restructuring,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	pp.	998	– 1041.
323 On	SDRM	see	A.O.	Krueger	and	S.	Hagan,	Sovereign	workouts:	an	IMF	perspective,	Chicago	Journal	
of	 International	 Law,	 summer	 2005,	 pp.	 203-218	 and	 J.	 Sedlak,	 Sovereign	 debt	 restructuring:	
statutory	reform	or	contractual	solution?,	University	of	Pennsylvania Law	Review,	2003-2004,	pp.	
1491-1497.
324 Anne	 Krueger’s	 speech	 is	 available	 at	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.HTM.
325 See	S.	Hagan,	Designing	a	 legal	 framework	 to	 restructure	 sovereign	debt,	 Georgetown	 Journal	 of	
International	Law,	2005,	pp.	302-303.
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version, structured as Proposed Features, was presented in 2003.326 Key elements of 
the Proposed Features are:
 Dispute Resolution Forum (DRF): an independent body should be set up in 
order to carry out the following main activities (i) administrative functions 
during the restructuring process, (ii) resolve upon the disputes arising out of 
the restructuring process, having exclusive jurisdiction in such respect; and 
(iii) Issuance of orders of suspension of enforcement proceedings, in cases 
such proceeding could undermine the restructuring process;327
 Principles guiding the restructuring mechanism: such principles are, inter 
alia: (i) the scope of SDRM, which should just be used to restructure 
unsustainable debt328 only and should not result into an encouragement for 
increasing the number of defaults or likelihood of future restructurings; (ii) it 
should catalyse a quick restructuring process; (iii) limited interference with 
contractual relationships; (iv) promoting transparency in the restructuring 
process; (v) the mechanism should not interfere with the sovereignty of 
debtors; (vi) the role of the IMF should be limited;329
 Eligible claims: identifying the scope of the claims to be included in the 
restructuring. The proposal to include official bilateral claims too had been 
object of lengthy discussions;330
 Activation: the sovereign debtor only can activate the proceeding;331
 Information: the debtor shall provide all information about its indebtedness 
and the indebtedness of other included entities, including debt which will be 
restructured and debt which will not be affected by the restructuring to the 
Dispute Resolution Forum (DRF);332
 Limits on creditor enforcement: creditor claims are aggregated across 
instruments, hotchpot rule333 would apply and upon request of the sovereign 
                                                                                                                                     
326 The	 text	 of	 the	 Proposed	 Features	 is	 available	 online	 at	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf.	
327 See	art.	14	the	sets	of	principles	included	as attachment	to	the	paper	presented	by	the	IMF	on	13	
February	2003,	available	at		http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf.	
328 On	the	concept	of	unsustainable	debt	see	A.	O.	Krueger	and	S.	Hagan,	Sovereign	Workouts:	an	IMF	
perspective,	Chicago	Journal	of	International	Law,	summer	2005,	pp.	205-207.
329 Id.	Art.	2.
330 Id.	Art.	3.
331 Id.	Art.	4.
332 Id.	Art.	5.
333 The	 hotchpot	 rule	 is	 a	 legal	 rule	 in	 international	 insolvency	 law	 which	 says	 that	 any	 funds	
collected	by	an	individual	creditor	enforcement	action	in	another	jurisdiction	shall	be	netted	out	
of	the	share	due	that	creditor	in	the	jurisdiction	where	the	bankruptcy	case	is	being	heard.	It	 is	
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and approval of the holders of 75% of the verified claims,334 a stay of all 
enforcement proceedings would be applied;335
 Creditors committees: according to the IMF proposal, creditors committees 
should be set up in order to facilitate the restructuring process. The costs of 
such committees should be borne by the debtor country;336
 Priority financing: upon consent of holders of 75% of the registered claims, 
new finance, ranking ahead of any other indebtedness of the debtor, would 
be advanced to the debtor;337
 Approval of the restructuring agreement: the restructuring agreement should 
be approved by 75% of the outstanding principal of each class of verified 
claims (as defined above) and would be binding on dissenting minority.338
In order to implement the SDRM, an amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF was necessary; therefore the consent of IMF members holding 85% of the total 
voting power was essential for the good outcome of the proposal. 339 In particular, the 
approval by the United States was key, since the United States holds 17,14% of the 
voting power. However the United States ultimately did not support the initiative, 
which was then dismissed.340
The origin of the framework proposed by the IMF can be traced down to US 
Bankruptcy Code, in particular Chapter 11 and Chapter 9, the latter dealing with the 
                                                                                                                                     
therefore	a	disincentive	to	individual	creditor	enforcement	actions,	since	any	amount	recovered	
at	the	end	of	the	judicial	proceeding	will	be	affected	by	the	application	of	the	hotchpot	rule.
334 The	verified	claims	are	the	claims	registered	with	the	Dispute	Resolution	Forum	and	verified	on	
objective	basis	by	it,	as	set	forth	in	art.	6	of	the	Proposed	Features.	Id.
335 Id.	Art.	7.	However	no	automatic	cessation	of	payments	upon	activation	has	been	included	in	the	
Proposed	 Features.	 The	 IMF	 suggests	 that	 a	 moratorium	 on	 payments	 would	 represent	 an	
incentive	 for	 creditors	 to	 rush	 for	 the	 exit.	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 the	 risks	 that	 the	 cessation	 of	
payments	 due	 to	 the	 distressed	 conditions	 of	 the	 borrower,	 such	 as	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 access	 to	
capital	markets,	has	not	been	addressed.	Id.	p.	5.
336 Id.	Art.	8.
337 Id.	Art.	10.
338 Id.	Art.	9.
339 Articles	of	Agreement	of	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	as	amended,	art.	XXVIII(a),	available	at	
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf.	
340 On	12	April	2003,	at	the	Meeting	of	the	International	Monetary	and	Financial	Committee	(IMFC),	
Secretary	 John	 W.	 Snow,	 Treasury	 of	 the	 United	 States,	 stated:	 “The	 IMF's	 exploration	 of	 a	
sovereign	 debt	 restructuring	 mechanism	 has	 raised	 important	 issues. But	 clearly,	 given	 the	
reactions	 of	markets	 and	 emerging	market	 countries,	we	 should	move	 forward	with	 collective	
action	 clauses.	 These	 clauses,	 and	 not	 a	 centralized	mechanism,	 are	 the	 vehicle	 to	 resolve	 the	
issues	 connected	 with	 sovereign	 debt	 restructuring.	 There	 can	 at	 times	 be	 "collective	 action"	
problems	that	prevent	a	prompt,	orderly	resolution	of	a	sovereign	debt	crisis. The	source	of	these	
problems	 lies	 in	 the	 relationships	 and	 agreements	 of	 debtors	 and	 their	 creditors. It	 is	 these	
parties,	 not	 an	 international	 organization,	 that	 must	 assume	 responsibility	 for	 the	 solution.	
Therefore,	it	is	neither	necessary	nor	feasible	to	continue	working	on	SDRM”.	 Full	text	available	
at	http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/usa.htm.	
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bankruptcy of municipality, which share with sovereign debtors the main 
characteristic of not being able to convert the restructuring process into a liquidation 
process.341
The IMF approach has been acknowledged for its role in developing the discussion 
on the subject, but several authors have highlighted the limitations of such proposal. 
Bolton and Skeel set forth three main aspects of the SDRM to be improved: (i) it does 
not pay enough attention to ex ante effects of the SDRM, in particular the need of the 
debtor country to service the debt so that its access to capital markets is facilitated; (ii) 
the bridge financing proposal is not effective, since it is too cumbersome and it does 
not deal with the concerns in respect of the role of the IMF in such context; and (iii) 
the fact that the SDRM is created within the IMF raises independence and conflict of 
interest concerns.342
A comparative analysis of pros and cons of the statutory approach versus the 
contractual approach will be carried out in the next chapter.
                                                                                                                                     
341 For	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 SDRM	 in	 light	 of	 the	 US	 Bankruptcy	 code	 see	 H.	 Schier,	 Towards	 a	
reorganisation	system	for	sovereign	debt,	an	international	perspective, Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	
2007,	pp.	37-46.
342 See	P.	Bolton	and	D.	A.	Skeel,	Redesigning	the	international	lender	of	last	resort,	Chicago	Journal	of	
International	Law,	summer	2005,	p.	177-201.	For	a	critique	of	the	IMF	statutory	approach	see	T.	I.	
Palley,	 Sovereign	 debt	 restructuring,	 what	 is	 the	 problem?,	 available	 at	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/seminars/2003/sdrm/pdf/palley.pdf.
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4) THE ROLE OF CREDITORS CLUBS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS
a) The Paris Club
The Paris Club of Sovereign Creditors is an informal forum composed of the largest 
sovereign creditors343which was created with the aim of coordinating sovereign 
creditors’ contribution to the resolution of external payment problems of sovereign 
debtors. It gathered for the first time in 1956 to deal with Argentina’s financial crisis 
by the French Treasury, which remained the place where Paris Club meetings are 
held.
The Paris Club plays a coordinating role in the sovereign debt restructuring process, 
representing a homogeneous group of sovereign creditors. From a practical point of 
view, the process starts once the debtor country addresses the Paris Club seeking for 
a rescheduling or reorganization of its bilateral debt and it usually ends upon 
issuance of the so-called Agreed Minutes, which represent the final agreed text 
between creditors and the debtor.344 Agreed Minutes however, are just a framework 
agreement agreed by the parties on the basis of unanimous consent (no cramdown 
procedure is contemplated): in order to give binding effect to the content of such 
                                                                                                                                     
343 The	Paris	Club	is	composed	by	19	permanent	members	(US,	Canada,	France,	UK,	Germany,	Italy,	
Japan,	 Russia,	 Spain,	 Switzerland,	 Belgium,	 the	Netherlands,	 Ireland,	 Norway,	 Sweden,	 Finland,	
Denmark,	Austria,	Australia)	and	13	associated	countries	 (Portugal,	 Israel,	New	Zealand,	Brazil,	
Turkey,	 Korea,	 Argentina,	 South	 Africa,	 Abu	 Dhabi,	 Koweit;	 Morocco;	 Trinidad	 &	 Tobago)	 and	
observers.	Permanent	members	fix	the	principles	to	be	applied	in	negotiations	by	the	Paris	Club.	
Associated	members	are	creditors	countries	which	may	participate	to	negotiations	with a	debtor	
country	and	sign	the	final	agreement,	subject	to	the	permanent	members	and	the	debtor	country	
allowing	them	to	do	so,	and	which	agree	upon	implementing	the	Paris	Club	principles.	Observers	
are	divided	in	three	categories:	(i)	representative	of	international	institutions	(IMF,	World	Bank,	
OECD,	 UNCTAD,	 European	 Commission,	 African	 Bank	 of	 Development,	 Asian	 Bank	 of	
Development,	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	and	Inter-American	Bank	of	
Development);	(ii)	representatives	of	permanent	members	which	do	not	have	any	claim	against	a	
specific	 debtor,	 but	 which	 are	 willing	 to	 partake	 to	 the	 Paris	 Club	 meeting;	 and	 (iii)	
representatives	 of	 countries	 which	 have	 claims	 against	 the	 specific	 country	 but	 which	 are	 not	
neither	 permanent	 member	 nor	 associated	 members,	 which	 may	 assist	 upon	 consent	 of	
permanent	members	and	of	the	debtor.
344 The	 definition	 of	 Agreed	 Minutes	 taken	 from	 the	 official	 Paris	 Club	 web	 site	 is	 was	 follows:	
“Participating	 creditor	 countries	 	 and	 the	 debtor	 country	 sign	 Agreed	Minutes	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	
negotiation	session.	This	document	states	the	commonly	agreed	debt	treatment	in	writing.	This	is	
not	a	legally	binding	document	but	a	recommendation	by	the	heads	of	delegations	of	Participating	
creditor	countries	and	of	 the	debtor	country	to	 their	governments	to	sign	a	bilateral	agreement	
implementing	 the	 debt	 treatment”.	 Available	 at	
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/services/glossaire/definitions/proces-verbal-agree.	 See	
also	E.	 Cosio-Pascal,	The	 emerging	of	 a	multilateral	 forum	 for	 debt	 restructuring:	 the	Paris	 Club,	
United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	November	2008,	Discussion	Paper	no.	192,	
pp.	12-13.	On	the	Paris	Club	process	see	A.	Rieffel,	The	Paris	Club	1987-1983,	Columbia	Journal	of	
Transnational	 Law,	 1984,	 pp.	 90-98,	 K.	 Hudes,	 Coordination	 of	 Paris	 and	 London	 Club	
reschedulings,	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics,	1984-1985,	pp.	555-
556	 and	 the	 Paris	 Club	 Annual	 Report,	 2010,	 p.	 46,	 available	 at	
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/communication/rapport-annuel-d/2010-rapport-
annuel/downloadFile/file/Rapport_annuel-Annual_Report_2010.pdf.	
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framework, single bilateral agreement have to be executed between the debtor and 
the single creditor.345
The functioning of the Paris Club is based on a set of fixed principles:346
 Case by case: the decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis in order to tailor 
its action to each debtor country’s individual situation.347
 Consensus: decisions cannot be taken without a consensus among the 
creditor countries involved in the restructuring process.
 Conditionality: debt restructurings negotiations are limited to the debtor 
countries that meet the following three requirements: (i) the burden of debt is 
such that debt relief is necessary as viable option. In this respect debtor 
countries have to provide detailed descriptions of their economic and 
financial situation in order to evaluate the compelling necessity of the debtor 
country to benefit of debt relief policies; (ii) have or are in the process of 
implementing reforms to restore their economic and financial situation; and 
(iii) they have a track record of implementing reforms under an IMF 
program.348 
 Solidarity: in the sense the all members of the Paris Club agree, albeit 
informally, to act as a group in their negotiations with a debtor country and 
take into account the impact that their own claim may have on other Paris 
Club creditors.
 Comparability of treatment: by signing an agreement with its Paris Club 
creditors the debtor country agrees upon seeking to receive from its non-
Paris Club creditors terms of treatment of its debt that are comparable to 
those agreed with the Paris Club.
The principle of comparability of treatment is particularly relevant in the context of 
the restructuring process. Pursuant to such principle, in fact, the borrower 
undertakes to seek to obtain from non-multilateral creditors, in particular other 
official bilateral creditor countries that are not members of the Paris Club and private 
creditors a treatment on comparable terms to those granted by Paris Club members. 
                                                                                                                                     
345 Id.	pp.	106-107.
346 See	the	Paris	Club	website	at	http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/principes/cinq-
grands-principes.	
347 Such	principle	was	consolidated	by	the	Evian	Approach,	which	is	described	below.
348 This	 means in	 practice	 that	 the	 country	 must	 have	 a	 current	 program	 supported	 by	 an	
appropriate	arrangement	with	the	IMF.	The	level	of	the	debt	treatment	is	based	on	the	financing	
gap	identified	in	the	IMF	program.	
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The terms of the arrangements with other creditors have to be “comparable” and not 
identical to the terms of the Paris Club’s agreement, in order to take into account the 
diverse nature of creditors and to give some flexibility to the negotiation process.
Paris Club creditors will evaluate the comparability of treatment requirement on the 
basis of: (i) the maturity of the debt; (ii) applicable interest; (iii) the face value of the 
debt. The implementation of this principle has been facilitated by the work of the 
London Club (see next paragraph), which makes easier to coordinate the progresses 
in negotiations with the bilateral creditors and private creditors of a specific debtor 
country.
The conditionality principle is translated in practice into a close cooperation with the 
IMF and it is based on two main grounds: (i) the Paris Club accepts to negotiate with 
a debtor only if such debtor has already agreed with the IMF a program to restore its 
economic status, so that Paris Club creditors get more comfortable in negotiating 
with the debtor, knowing that the implementation of an economic program will 
reduce the likelihood of future defaults; (ii) the Paris Club creditors rely on the IMF 
supervision during the implementation of the program and on the information 
delivered to them by the IMF. The role of observes which representatives of the IMF 
have during the negotiations with the debtor, facilitates such coordination.
Further relevant concepts elaborated and applied in the context of negotiations with 
the Paris Club are: (i) the definition of eligible credits (i.e. the process of establishing 
which credits will not be taken into account in the Paris Club restructuring);349 (ii) the 
cut-off date (i.e. the date starting from which new money advanced to the debtor 
country will benefit of priority towards other debts of the country, based on the 
principle that advancing loans to a distressed debtor is risky but important, also from 
the other creditors’ perspective, in order to avoid the default of the country); and (iii) 
the consolidation period (i.e.  the period of time in which eligible credits will be 
affected by the restructuring).350
                                                                                                                                     
349 Usually	short-term	debt	is	excluded,	due	to	their	rollover	nature,	which	would	create	difficulties	
in	 the	 context	 of	 restructuring,	 together	 with	 loans	 advanced	 to	 private	 entities	 within	 the	
country	which	are	not	guaranteed	by	the	government	and	further	ad	hoc	categories	negotiated	on	
a	case-by-case	basis.	See	A.	Rieffel,	The	Paris	Club	1987-1983,	Columbia	Journal	of	Transnational	
Law,	1984,	pp.	99-100.
350 Bilateral	creditors	do	not	reschedule	the	aggregate	amount	of	indebtedness	that	the	debtor	owes	
them	for	two	reasons,	connected	to	the	nature	of	bilateral	loans:	(i)	the	term	of	public	loans	can	
be	much	longer	than	private	ones,	as	mush	as	50	years,	therefore	deferring	payments	due	in	40	
years	 time	 do	 not	 make	 sense;	 (ii)	 since	 their	 actions	 are	 judged	 by	 the	 official	 creditors’	
taxpayers,	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 official	 creditors	 prefer	 to	 offer	 debt	 relief	 for	 a	 limited	
amount	 of	 time,	 from	 one	 to	 three	 years.	 See	 A.	 Rieffel,	 The	 Paris	 Club	 1987-1983,	 Columbia	
Journal	of	Transnational	Law,	1984,	pp.	101-102.
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The Paris Club offers two main kind of debt treatments: (i) rescheduling mixed with a 
debt relief component; and (ii) prepayments. Within the first kind of treatment are 
included the following financial structures/approaches:351
 Standard terms: debt treatments are determined on a case-by-case approach 
but the practice created some standard terms that are used a starting point 
for the negotiations. Such terms derive from the practice matured in years of 
negotiations and they have been updated and amended in order to reflect the 
borrowers’ needs. They differentiate among themselves because of the 
different level of concessionality granted to the debtor pursuant to such 
terms. There are currently four standard terms, namely: (i) the Classic Terms 
(which represent the standard treatment); (ii) the Houston terms (for highly 
indebted lower-middle-income countries); (iii) the Naples terms (for highly 
indebted low-income countries); and (iv) the Cologne terms (for countries 
eligible for the HIPC initiative);352
 Evian approach: this is a new comprehensive approach promoted by the 
Paris Club and offered to no HIPC countries and middle-low-income 
countries with debt sustainability issues. It is a framework for actions to be 
implemented aiming at assuring long-term debt sustainability;353
 HIPC initiative: in order to support the HIPC initiative Paris Club creditors 
agreed upon granting debt relief to eligible countries;354
 Cases of crisis: specific treatments are granted to countries which suffered 
from natural catastrophes, internal political conflicts and economical 
difficulties due to food and petroleum prices;
 Debt swap: countries may benefit from debt-for-equity swaps, debt-for-
nature swaps and debt-for-development swaps. Pros and cons of such 
financial structures have been already analyzed in the previous paragraphs.
The second kind of approach includes either prepayment at par value or debt buy-
backs on the secondary market, which have already been analysed as well.
                                                                                                                                     
351 See	 the	 Paris	 club	 official	 website:	 http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/types-
traitement/reechelonnement/termes-de-traitements.	
352 On	the	evolution	of	the	terms	of	the	Paris	Club	rescheduling	see	T.	M.	Callaghy,	Innovation	in	the	
sovereign	debt	regime:	 from	the	Paris	Club	to	enhanced	HIPC	and	beyond,	OED	Working	Paper,	9	
July	2002,	pp.	15-18.
353 See	 E.	 Cosio-Pascal,	The	 emerging	 of	 a	multilateral	 forum	 for	 debt	 restructuring:	 the	 Paris	 Club,	
United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	November	2008,	Discussion	Paper	no.	192,	
pp.	21-26
354 Id.	pp.	18-21.
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The Paris Club played a fundamental role in the Latin American crisis of the late 
1980s355 and in the successive sovereign debt crisis throughout the 1990.356 The 
implementation of the HIPC initiative in the late 1990s was another important 
moment in terms of relevance of the Paris Club in the sovereign debt panorama.357
Query is what the future will be for the Paris Club in the modern time, whereby 
bonds represent the vast majority of sovereign debt, and therefore capital markets 
and not bilateral lenders are the key actors of the play.358 Such question will be 
addressed in the next chapter.359
b) The London Club 
The London Club is an informal forum which gathers private creditors in the process 
of restructuring the debt owed to them by sovereign countries.360The work of the 
London Club and of the Paris Club usually is coordinated, in order to offer a joint 
solution to the sovereign debt crisis. This coordinated approach facilitates also 
achieving a comparable treatment satisfactory for both Paris Club creditors and 
London Club creditors, making easier for the borrower to reach a comprehensive 
agreement.
Since the group of creditors to be represented is far more widespread than in respect 
of Paris Club creditors, usually commercial creditors are represented by a committee 
composed by 10-15 banks which will negotiate with the debtor on behalf of the group 
of creditors.
                                                                                                                                     
355 Hudes	reports	that	between	1978	and	1983	twenty-three	countries	rescheduled	USD	22	billion	of	
debt.	 See	 K.	 Hudes,	 Coordination	 of	 Paris	 and	 London	 Club	 reschedulings,	 New	 York	 University	
Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics,	1984-1985,	pp.	557.
356 T.	M.	Callaghy,	Innovation	in	the	sovereign	debt	regime:	from	the	Paris	Club	to enhanced	HIPC	and	
beyond,	OED	Working	Paper,	9	July	2002,	pp.	13-15.
357 On	the	history	of	the	Paris	Club	see	E.	Cosio-Pascal,	The	emerging	of	a	multilateral	forum	for	debt	
restructuring:	 the	 Paris	 Club,	 United	Nations	 Conference	 on	Trade	and	Development	November	
2008,	Discussion	Paper	no.	192,	pp.	2-26.
358 On	the	Paris	Club	and	 its	role	 in	 the	 international	economic	governance,	see	T.	M.	Callaghy,	The	
Paris	 Club	 and	 international	 economic	 governance:	 double	 crisis	 and	 debt,	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt,	
origins,	 crises	 and	 restructuring,	 V.	 K.	 Aggarwal	 and	 B.	 Granville	 eds.,	 Royal	 Institute	 of	
International	Affairs,	2003,	pp.	201-227.
359 In	2010	9	agreements	have	been	signed	in	the	Paris	Club	framework,	 in	the	context	of	the	HIPC	
initiative	(8)	and	pursuant	to	the	Evian	approach	(1)	and	similar	figures	have	been	registered	in	
the	previous	years,	giving	evidence	of	 the	different	scenario	whereby	the	IMF	 is	now	operating.	
See	 the	 Paris	 Club	 Annual	 Report,	 2010,	 p.	 6,	 available	 at	
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/communication/rapport-annuel-d/2010-rapport-
annuel/downloadFile/file/Rapport_annuel-Annual_Report_2010.pdf.	
360 See	 S.	 Radelet,	 Orderly	 Workouts	 for	 cross-border	 private	 debt,	 International	 Monetary	 and	
Financial	 Issues	 for	 the	 1990s,	 Vol.	 XI,	 1999,	 available	 at	
http://r0.unctad.org/p166/modules2001/mod4/Radelet.pdf and	 B.	 Eichngreen	 and	 R.	 Portes,	
Crisis?	What	crisis?	Orderly	workouts	 for	sovereign	debtors,	Center	 for	Economic	Policy	Research	
London,	1995.
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A similarity with the Paris Club is the role played by the IMF, both as information 
supplier and because the implementation of an economic plan agreed with the IMF is 
a condition to the beginning of the negotiations with the London Club.
Differently from the Paris Club creditors: (i) commercial banks are often requested to 
provide bridge finance to the debtors (as already observed in the context of the Latin 
American crisis); and (ii) the final agreement has to be approved by banks holding 
around 90-95% of the outstanding debt, in order to avoid impasses due to the 
unanimous consent rule.361
Negotiation with the London Club is generally much more time consuming than 
negotiations with the Paris Club, due to the number of creditors (sometimes over 
four hundred) involved. At the beginning the process would terminate with the 
drafting of a final agreement to be signed by all parties. Such practice was later 
replaced by an approach based on the Paris Club model: a framework agreement 
would be agreed by the parties and then creditors would enter in separate 
agreements with the sovereign debtor.362
The London club will be further analysed in next chapter, in the context of its 
potential role in a reform of the sovereign restructuring process based on a 
contractual approach.363
                                                                                                                                     
361 However,	small	minority	can	still	interfere	with	an	orderly	restructuring	process	and	it	is	because	
of	this	that	sometimes	negotiations	with	the	London	Club	can	take	a	very	long	time.
362 K.	Hudes,	Coordination	 of	 Paris	 and	 London	 Club	 reschedulings,	 New	York	University	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	and	Politics,	1984-1985,	pp.	560-561.
363 See	also	D.	McGovern,	Different	market	windows	on	sovereign	debt:	private-sector	credit	from	the	
1980s	 to	 the	present,	 in	 Sovereign	Debt,	 origins,	 crises	 and	 restructuring,	V.	K.	Aggarwal	 and	B.	
Granville	eds.,	Royal	Institute of	International	Affairs,	2003,	pp.	82-84.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTUING PROCESS IN THE 
BONDHOLDERS ERA
1. NEW PLAYERS AND NEW MARKET
a) The old game
As anticipated in the previous chapter, the debt restructuring dynamics went 
through two main phases. The debt restructuring procedures in the 1980’ies, as 
described in the previous chapter, were characterised, in terms of identity of the 
country’s private creditors, by a majority of commercial banks, lending in pools to the 
borrower in order to meet the vast economical needs of developing countries.364
Loan agreements, at the time (as now) were drafted so that all lenders were treated 
equally amongst themselves: banks would group together in order to advance money 
to a specific borrower under the same terms, set out in the agreement. Although the 
obligation to advance funds was an independent obligation undertaken by each bank 
(i.e. each bank was responsible for the advance of its portion of commitments only 
and would not be held responsible in the event of default by an other member of the 
syndicate) the loan agreement would then create a single and centralised 
management of the loan itself. Provisions in order to deal with day-by-day 
management of the loan, decision making and undertakings and representations by 
the borrower to all the lenders were introduced in order to discipline unitarily the 
relationship between the borrower and the banks of the pool. One of the banks of the 
syndicate is normally designated as agent of the pool and carries out administrative 
functions and facilitates the operations throughout the life of the loan, dealing with 
communications, collecting and transferring funds etc.
Loan agreements generally include a share losses provision according to which 
recoveries from the borrowers are shared pro rata across the lenders, which 
                                                                                                                                     
364 On	syndicated	lending	and	intercreditor	relationships	see	L.	Buchheit	and	R.	Reisner,	The	Effect	of	
the	Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring	Process	on	Inter-creditor	relationships,	University	of	Illinois	Law	
Review,	1988,	pp.	495-517.
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weakened the position of hold out creditors in such context.365 Furthermore, 
individual enforcement actions were usually prohibited
In case of financial distress of the borrower, the banks would group together creating 
an “advisory” or “steering” committee, which would represent the group of banks 
throughout the restructuring and represented the spokesperson to which the debtor 
could address its proposals and with whom the negotiations would be carried out, 
avoiding the almost impossible exercise of getting in touch with every single 
lender.366
Steering committees are formally appointed by the borrower and negotiate de facto 
the business ad legal terms of the debt restructuring arrangements on behalf of the 
other lenders. Members of such committees are generally the largest commercial 
banks which have an exposure in respect of such borrower, which have a moral 
strength to convince the other members of the syndicate to agree upon the deal 
reached with the borrower. 367
Furthermore, main international banks are institutional players, which care about 
their international image, are bound by internal social rules of conduct and they care 
about their commercial relationship with the borrower. And given the size of the 
debts, the stability of the banking systems of the creditors’ countries were at stake as 
well, reason why governments did not hesitate to get involved in the negotiations as 
such as they felt it was necessary in order to take care of the stability of their financial 
system.368
In order to further reduce the risk of single lenders taking enforcement actions, the 
borrower at the outset of the crisis would communicate to the international banking 
community that the intention is to treat al creditors equally, highlighting therefore 
that there would be no benefit in commencing individual actions. Such 
communication would usually also attach confirmations from the main commercial 
banks that they agree upon the moratorium of any enforcement action to the extent 
the banking community as a whole takes the same approach. The moral and 
                                                                                                                                     
365 On	 sharing	 clauses	 in	 syndicated	 loan	 agreements	 in	 such	 period	 and	on	 the	 structure	 of	 such	
agreements	generally,	see	P.	R.	Wood,	Essay:	Sovereign	Syndicated	Bank	Credits	in	the	1970’s,	Law	
&	Contemporary	Problems,	2010,	pp.	7-28.
366 On	 this	 first	phase	of	debt	 restructurings,	 see	also	R.M.	Auerback,	Sovereign	Debt	– Default	and	
Restructuring	of	Debts	Owed	to	Private	Creditors,	Journal	of	International	Banking	and	Regulation,	
2003,	pp.	440-452.
367 L.	 C.	 Buchheit	 and	 R.	 Reisner,	 The	 Effect	 of	 the	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructuring	 Process	 on	 Inter-
creditor	relationships,	University	of	Illinois	Law	Review,	1988,	pp.	505-506.
368 L.	C.	Buchheit,	A	Change	of	Hat,	International	Financial	Law	Review,	1990,	p.	12.
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reputational strength of the main players of the banking system became, again, 
relevant.369
b) The new players
In the 1990’s, as well as today, the main source of funds for developing countries 
switched from loans from commercial banks to bonds. Commercial banks were not 
willing to expose themselves as much as before, after the haircuts suffered 
throughout the 1980’s and contextually, the appetite for investors for bonds issued by 
emerging markets developed, due to the fact that they would generally bear higher 
interest rates than US corporate bonds. Such appetite was also fuelled by the idea that 
bonds were “safer” than loans. Investors noted that in the 1980’s debt crises, bonds 
were usually left untouched and not rescheduled, differently from what had 
appended to the loans from commercial banks. Investors got this false sense of 
security without appreciating that at the time, publicly issued bonds were few and 
the most likely reason why they had not been included in the debt restructuring 
agreements was that their value was so little that it was not worthy going through the 
process of negotiating a rescheduling. 370
Main differences between bondholders and commercial banks as creditors can be 
summed up as follows:371
 Identity of the creditors: in the 1980’s, borrowers would always know 
which were the lenders of the record advancing loans or taking a 
participation in the loans already advanced to them under the terms of 
the loan agreements. The borrower would mainly deal with the agent 
appointed by the syndicate but the names of the banks of the syndicate 
were known, and in the event of a financial crisis the borrower was in a 
position to communicate to the banks directly. Bonds are usually very
liquid and are transferred heavily throughout their lives and are held by 
a multitude of investors, which makes the relationship between the 
issuer of the bonds and its bondholder a relationship based on 
                                                                                                                                     
369 L.	 C.	 Buchheit	 and	 R.	 Reisner,	 The	 Effect	 of	 the	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructuring	 Process	 on	 Inter-
creditor	relationships,	University	of	Illinois	Law	Review,	1988,	p.	504.
370		 L.	 C.	 Buchheit,	 Cross-Border	 Lending:	 What’s	 Different	 This	 Time?,	 Northwest	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	&	Business,	1995,	pp.		44-56.
371 On	the	differences	between	banks	and	bondholders	as	creditors	of	sovereign	borrowers	see	also	
R.M.	 Auerback,	 Sovereign	 Debt	 – Default	 and	 Restructuring	 of	 Debts	 Owed	 to	 Private	 Creditors,	
Journal	of	International	Banking	and	Regulation,	2003,	pp.	440-452.
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anonymity, which makes it very difficult for the issuer to start a proper 
dialogue with the creditors in a moment of crisis;372
 Nature of the creditors: bondholders are less approachable than 
commercial banks given that they do not receive any peer or moral 
pressure nor pressure from governments and they do not suffer from the 
geopolitical consequences of their actions. Certain purchasers of bonds, 
the so called vulture funds, as better explained in the following 
paragraph, actually actively research bonds which are about to be 
restructured in order to make profits at the expenses of the borrower;
 Size of the debts: bondholders would generally lend much smaller 
amounts, differently from the quantum of debt advanced by commercial 
banks, and consequently have better chances for recovery, given that the 
sovereign borrowers would likely have assets to attach outside their 
national territory whose value would have covered the creditor’s 
claims;373
 Free riders: individual bondholders have a right to seek repayment 
through individual legal actions brought in the US or English courts. 
Even if bondholders committees are created, and although such entities 
would have a strong aura of political legitimacy to the eyes of both the 
borrowers and the bondholders, they would have no moral strength or 
peer pressure to impose a rescheduling on all the bondholders, keeping 
the option for litigation open for single investors. Such individual power 
was granted by the terms of the indenture agreement under which the 
bonds were issued: originally, in fact, amendments to the economic terms 
of the bonds required unanimous consent from the bondholders, 
empowering single creditors to hold out the entire restructuring process 
(free riders are also called “hold-out” creditors).374
                                                                                                                                     
372 As	C.	G	Paulus	notes,	 “As	a	 rule	of	 thumb,	 the	anonymity	which	 is	 inevitable	companion	of	 this	
modern	 development	 in	 credit	 markets	 bears	 the	 threat	 of	 inhumanity.	 This	 interrelation	 is	
evidenced	 by	 long-lasting	 historical	 experience.”	 In	 Global	 Insolvency	 Law	 and	 the	 Role	 of	
Multinational	Institutions,	Brooklyn	Journal	of	International	Law,	2006-2007,	p.	763.
373 S.	 Goldman,	 Mavericks	 in	 the	 Market:	 the	 Emerging	 Problem	 of	 Hold-outs	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt	
Restructuring,	UCLA	Journal	of International	Law	&	Foreign	Affairs,	2000,	pp.	169-171.
374 R.	MacMillan,	The	Next	Sovereign	Debt	Crisis,	Stanford	Journal	of	International	Law,	1995,	pp.	346-
349.	 MacMillan	 in	 his	 article	 urged	 the	 relevant	 stakeholder	 to	 find	 a	 system	 to	 unify	 private	
creditors	in	the	event	of	a	sovereign	financial	crisis	in	the	bondholders	era,	highlighting	the	issues	
that	 such	new	source	of	 funding	would	have	brought	 to	 the	 table:	 “We	urgently	need	a	 system	
which	will	unify	commercial	creditors	when	a	sovereign	debtor	needs	debt	relief.	In	the	1980’s,	a	
number	of	people	made	suggestions	for	an	international	bankruptcy	system	of	sovereign	debtors.	
Due	to	the	relationship	of	the	banks	and	the	IMF,	the	homogeneity	of	the	banking	community,	and	
the	syndicated	contractual	nature	of	the	debt,	the	parties	involved	in	the	debt	crisis	of	the	1980s	
scraped	by	without	ever	needing	such	a	system.	In	a	bond	crisis,	however,	those	factors	will	not	
be	 present,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 some	 such	 system	 will	 be	 more	 compelling.	 That	 system	 must	
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c) Vulture funds
The reason why individual bondholders have great incentives to free-ride during the 
bond restructuring process is that they can buy bond obligations on the secondary 
market375 at a fraction of the full cost of the debt and then sue the sovereign in order 
to enforce the entire debt. Emerging-market sovereign bonds are usually bought at a 
substantial discount on the secondary market (this is due to the fact that bonds are 
priced at steep discounts to reflect the bonds’ credit risk, a defaulted bond can be 
priced as low as 20% of the original face value or less).  A default gives the 
secondary-market investor in bonds issued by countries in financial difficulties the 
opportunity to use litigation as a means to achieving repayment: after a default, in 
fact, the investors gain the right to accelerate the debt and to act against the 
sovereign’s assets in the United States (or other international courts) through 
litigation.376 These investors of bond debt on the secondary market are more likely to 
pursue their claims by attaching the sovereign’s limited assets located outside their 
territory following a default and, as already mentioned, they are also generally not 
subject to the political pressures that commercial banks face to participate in a 
restructuring and they may thus have great incentives to pursue litigation.
The most important cases fought in court will be analysed in the following 
paragraph.377
A specific category of hold out creditors are the so called “vulture funds”, which are 
hedge funds and mutual funds specialised in investing in distressed assets. Such 
kind of funds are not primary lenders, as they generally purchase sovereign debt on 
the secondary market with the specific aim to make a profit out of the difference 
                                                                                                                                     
provide	 for	 a	 collective	 bondholder	 decision-making	 process	 and	 for	 representational	 unity.	 It	
must	 prevent	 bondholders,	 either	 individually	 or	 in	 groups,	 from	 bringing	 suits	 that	 would	
disrupt	the	development	of	a	solution	to	a	debt	crisis.”
375 The	secondary	market	was	created	during	the	Brady	Plan	era,	as	better	explained	in	the	previous	
chapter.
376 See	 J.	 Nolan,	 Emerging	 Market	 Debt	 &	 Vulture	 Hedge	 Funds:	 Free-Ridership,	 Legal	 &	 Market	
Remedies,	 Derivatives	 Study	 Center,	 Special	 Policy	 Report	 3,	 2001	 available	 at	
http://www.financialpolicy.org/DSCNolan.htm.	
377 As	 it	will	be	better	analysed	 in	the	 following	paragraphs,	 the	 free-riding	by	 individual	creditors	
undermines	 the	 debt	 restructuring	 process	 and	 it	 is	 economically	 inefficient	 because	 it	 can	
potentially	 delay,	 preclude	 or	 increase	 the	 costs	 of	 a	 debt	 restructuring	 between	 a	 sovereign	
debtor	and	 its	private	creditors.	 	For	even	 if	a	debt	restructuring	 is	reached	 in	the	midst	of	this	
free-riding,	 the	participants	 in	 the	restructuring	 (both	 creditors	and	debtor	alike)	are	 forced	 to	
bear	the	cost	of	those	recalcitrant	creditors	who	do	not	participate	and	the	social	consequences	
for	the	people	of	the	issuer	country	have	also	to	be	borne	in	mind.
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between the discounted value paid on the secondary market and the face value of 
the instrument purchased which they attempt to recover through litigation. 
The difference between vulture funds and general hold-out creditors is as follows: 
holdout creditors are the creditors that in the context of a debt restructuring 
whereby the sovereign country offers to its creditors to exchange old debt with new 
debt (debt exchanges will be analysed in more detail in the following paragraphs) 
decide not to accept such offer and to hold on to their old debt. As the exchange offer 
is made on a voluntary basis and given that the new debt as generally a lower face 
value, certain investor may decide to reject the exchange and sit and wait to be 
repaid.  Vulture funds, on the other hand, purchase the debt only when the financial 
difficulties of the debtor country make the secondary market pricing such debt at a 
very high discount and they then bring the debtor to court in order to try to collect 
the entire face value of the debt. 378 This lucrative business is possible mainly because 
of one legal technical reason: there is no sovereign countries bankruptcy regime, 
which protects defaulting countries from private debtors suing them, and there are 
no tribunal which can impose a “haircut” on the claims of the creditors. 379
“Vulture funds” is the pejorative name for such kind of investors, due to the moral 
reproach that their behaviour has attracted, given that their business model is based 
on getting a profit out of the poorest countries in the world. Some courts, in answer 
to such developed business model, have tried to argue that when sovereign debt is 
traded at such large discount, trading such debt is immoral.380
An example of the activity carried out by vulture funds is the Donegal International 
case. In the 1990’ies Zambia owned $30 million to Romania, however due to the 
widespread poverty, Zambia was not able to service its debt any longer and started a 
process of restructuring of its indebtedness. Before an official agreement was 
reached, the fund Donegal International381 purchased the $30 million debt at a 
discount from Romania, for an overall amount of $4 million, and started a litigation 
procedure in London to recover the full face value of the debt, plus accrued interests, 
                                                                                                                                     
378 See	J.	Fish,	C.	Gentile,	Vulture	or	vanguards?	The	Role	of	Litigation	in	Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring,	
Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	p.	1043.
379 J.	 I.	 Blackman,	 R.	Mukhi,	The	 Evolution	 of	Modern	 Sovereign	 Litigation:	 Vultures,	 Alter	 Egos,	 and	
Other	Legal	Fauna,	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems,	2010,	p.	47-61.
380 See	L.J.	Hooper	in	Barbados	Trust	Co	v	Bank	of	Zambia,	2007.
381 Donegal	International,	as	generally	vulture	funds	do,	set	up	an	SPV	(i.e.	an	empty	shell	company	
created	only	with	one	specific	purpose,	 in this	case	 to	hold	 the	Zambian	debt),	 so	 that	 the	debt	
becomes	a	portable	asset	given	that	rather	then	selling	the	debt	it	is	possible	to	sell	the	SPV	itself	
and	 transfer	 a	 direct	 claim	 vis-à-vis	 the	 debtor,	 going	 around	 the	 issues	 related	 to	 contractual	
limits	to	assignability	of	the	debt.	On	the	issues	related	to	assignability,	see	S.	Brodie,	Assignment:	
problems	and	pitfalls,	Journal	of	International	Banking	and	Financial	Law,	2013.
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which, at the time, was equal to $55 million.382 To put such figure into perspective, 
Zambia had received $42 million in debt relief the year before. Donegal International 
was demanding more than that.
Vulture funds are a threat to the orderly management of a debt restructuring for the 
following reasons:
 Delay in the debt restructuring process: the vulture funds’ claims delay 
the process of restructuring and result into an increase in the costs of the 
restructuring and they overall worsen the burden carried by the citizens 
of economies facing challenging situations;383
 Interaction with other creditors: debt restructurings happen mainly due 
to the indulgence shown by the majority of the creditors which accepts to 
suffer certain reductions of the value of the debt held and the fact that 
vulture funds gain while all the other creditors are losing creates a strong 
resentment and may both dissuade creditors to participate in future debt 
restructuring and encourage other creditors to follow the same path (i.e. 
litigation).384
Some authors have also tried to focus on the positive aspects connected to the 
activity of vulture funds, namely: (i) they represent a check in terms of 
reasonableness and genuine debt defaults versus opportunistic defaults due to 
unwillingness to pay rather than inability to pay, because the sovereign debtors 
know that they will be exposed to the vulture funds threat once their inability to pay 
debts is declared;385 (ii) several cases of corruption in developing countries were 
                                                                                                                                     
382 See	Donegal	 International	 Limited	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Zambia and	 Anr,	 15	 February	 2007,	 case	 no.	
2005-190,	available	at:	news.bbc.co.uk/nol/.../16_02_07_zambiajudge.pdf	.	The	judge	introduces	the	
case	as	follows:	“The	proceedings	arouse	strong	feelings.	Zambia	is	a	poor	country	and	sees	itself	
as	being	vulnerable	 to	“vulture	 funds”.	They	say	that	 this	claim	for	more	 than	$55	million	 is	an	
improper	 attempt	 by	 Donegal	 to	 exploit	 their	 vulnerability,	 Donegal	 having	 originally	 become	
their	 creditors	 by	 buy	 debt	 from	 the	 Government	 of	 Romania	 in	 1999	 for	 some	 $3.2	 million.	
Donegal	respond	that	their	proper	profit	 is	to	make	a	profit,	that	it	 is	 legitimate	to	pursue	their	
claim	 through	 these	proceedings	against	Zambia	and	 that	 they	are	 justified	 in	doing	so,	Zambia	
having	 rejected	 their	 reasonable	 proposal	 for	 settling	 the	 indebtedness	 and	 having	 sought	 to	
evade	their	responsibilities.	I	am	concerned,	of	course,	with	the	legal	questions	that	are	raised	by	
the	applications	before	me	and	not	with	questions	of	morality	or	inhumanity.”
383 S.E.	 Goldman,	 Mavericks	 in	 the	 market:	 the	 Emerging	 Problem	 of	 Hold-outs	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt	
Restructuring,	UCLA	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Foreign	Affairs,	2000,	pp.	159-197.	
384 See	J.	Fish,	C.	Gentile,	Vulture	or	vanguards?	The	Role	of	Litigation	in	Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring,	
Emory	Law	Journal, 2004,	p.	1043.
385 N.	Roubini,	Do	we	need	a	new	bankruptcy	regime?, Brookings	Papers	on	Economic	Activity,	2002.
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exposed;386 (iii) the liquidity in the secondary market, given that they increase the 
demand of defaulted loans and offer an exit to investors.387
It seems however, that the negative consequences of the business carried out by the 
vulture funds are not matched by the positive ones, hence why several campaigns 
against the vulture funds were started and in the United Kingdom, legislation was 
passed (the 2010 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act)388 so that the ability of 
vulture funds to litigate in the United Kingdom has been considerably restricted, 
limiting the amount which can be recovered through litigation to the amount 
initially paid for the debt, plus interest or charges.389 Ian Pearson, MP, which 
supported the introduction of the Bill, stated: “we need to change the law to prevent 
creditors from taking this path. Commercial finance can help – not hinder-
development in low-income countries. The Private Member’s Bill seeks to prevent 
creditors from recovering an amount in excess of the debt relief expected. The 
Government, which consulted on legislation last year, will support the Bill when it is 
debated on 26 February. Parliament has a chance to make sure that million of the 
world’s poorest people gain maximum benefit from the debt relief that we 
provide.390
In 2008 the Belgian Parliament introduces a bill to deal with the issue of vulture 
funds litigation as well (the Act of 6 April 2008). The main concern was that creditors 
seized loans, granted by the Belgian government for humanitarian and development 
                                                                                                                                     
386 E.	 Broomfield,	 Subduing	 the	 Vultures:	 assessing	 government	 caps	 on	 recovery	 in	 sovereign	 debt	
litigation,	Columbus	Business	Law	Review,	2010,	p.	437.
387 See	J.	Fish,	C.	Gentile,	Vulture	or	vanguards?	The	Role	of	Litigation	in	Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring,	
Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	p.	1043.
388 The	 2010	 Debt	 Relief	 (Developing	 Countries)	 Act	 is	 available	 at:	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/22/contents.
389 In	2007	in	France	a	bill	was	introduced	in	Parliament	in	order	to	fight	against	the	vulture	funds:	
the	proposal	consisted	in	granting	the	judge	the	discretionary	power	to	order	or	refuse	to	order	
payment	of	a	debt	in	the	event	the	debtor	was	a	foreign	sovereign.	The	judge	could	have	justified	
its	refusal	to	order	the	payment	on	the	basis	that	the	foreign	sovereign	had	been	helped	by	public	
sources,	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 other	 creditors	 and	 the	 financial	 situation	 of	 the	 debtor.	 The	 bill	
would	go	even	further,	stating	that	no	debt	could	have	been	enforced	if	such	debt	was	purchased	
by	a	party	with	the	intention	to	speculate	on	possible	litigation	rather	than	due	to	the	low	price	of	
the	debt	on	the	secondary	market.	However	the	bill	was	never	passed	by	the	Parliament.	In	2009	
a	proposal	to	introduce	a	legislation	to	limit	the	activities	of	vulture	funds	was	also	presented	to	
the	United	States	Congress	(the	so	called	Stop	Vulture	Funds-Bill”).	This	bill	was	never	introduced	
either,	but	it	aimed	at	making	unlawful	for	all	US	citizen	and	corporations	established	in	the	US	to	
take	 part	 into	 “sovereign	 debt	 profiteering”.	 (which	 was	 defined	 as	 the	 attempt	 to	 recover	
payment	of	a	sovereign	debt	for	an	amount	which	exceeds	the	purchase	price	pad	for	such	debt.	
US	courts	were	also	prevented	from	issuing	any	judgment	which	would	result	into	sovereign	debt	
profiteering.	P.	Wautelet,	Vulture	Funds,	creditors	and	sovereign	debtors:	how	to	find	a	balance?	in	
Insolvabilité	 des	 États	 et	 dettes	 souveraines, M.	 Audit,	 	 LGDJ,	 2011,	 available	 at:	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1994425.
390 See	D.	Sookun,	Stop	Vulture	Funds	Lawsuits:	A	Handbook,	Commonwealth	Secretariat,	2010,	p.p.	
89-90.
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purposes, so that the humanitarian goals assigned to such loans were never fulfilled. 
The provision included in the Act is as follows: “the funds and assets which are 
earmarked for international cooperation as well as the funds and assets earmarked 
for public development aid, other than those of the international cooperation, cannot 
be attached nor assigned”.391 A similar provision deals also with loans made by 
Belgium to foreign countries and organizations. However, it is arguably required a 
more widespread action in order to discipline vulture funds litigation and in 
particular the international community should take a united approach. Until now, 
the only initiatives undertaken are non binding resolutions, such as the resolution 
adopted by the Paris Club in 2007 whereby the Club expresses its concern in respect 
of the vulture funds issue, which takes resources away from poverty reduction and 
investments in developing countries.392
The main litigation cases started by vulture funds will be analysed in the following 
paragraphs together with the main legal arguments raised by developing countries 
to resist the claims raised by such funds.
d) The market 
The integration of the international financial markets is the main innovation which 
has deeply affected the world of cross border lending to emerging economies, as 
anticipated in the first chapter. 
Money can now flow in and out of a country at an incredible speed, with far reaching 
consequences for developing country, as it happened during the Asian crisis. 
When markets perceive that a government is likely not to e able to repay its debts, 
borrowing costs generally rise rapidly and as a consequence, it will be more difficult 
for the government to find cheap resources to refinance its debts, increasing the 
likelihood of default. Indicators of the deteriorated financial condition of a 
government are: (i) the price at which sovereign bonds are sold in the secondary 
                                                                                                                                     
391 J.	 Fish,	 C.	 Gentile,	Vulture	 or	 vanguards?	 The	 Role	 of	 Litigation	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructuring,	
Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	p.	1043.
392 Paris	Club	creditors	have	 furthermore	confirmed	 that	 they	are	committed	 to	avoid	selling	 their	
claims	on	countries	which	qualify	for	the	HIPC	initiative	to	other	creditors	who	do	not	intend	to	
provide	debt	relief	under	the	HIPC	 initiative.	See	http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/themes-
strategiques/2009-8217-action-du-club.
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market; (ii) the spread of sovereign credit default swaps393, and (iii) the rating given 
to the government by rating agencies. 
The role of sovereign credit default swaps has recently been under scrutiny of the 
International Monetary Fund upon the round of restructurings that hit the European 
Union in recent years. In particular, the potential abuse of such credit protection 
instruments has been discussed and the IMF has launched a study on the subject: 
“With the growing influence of SCDS, questions have arisen about whether 
speculative use of SCDS contracts could be destabilizing. Such concerns have led 
European authorities to ban uncovered, or “naked,” purchases of SCDS protection 
referencing European Economic Area sovereign debt obligations, that is, banning 
purchases in which there is no off setting position in the underlying debt. The 
prohibition is based on the view that, in extreme market conditions, such short 
selling could push sovereign bond prices into a downward spiral, which would lead 
to disorderly markets and systemic risks, and hence sharply raise the issuance costs 
of the underlying sovereigns”.394
Furthermore, crisis can easily widespread from one emerging country to the others, 
as it happened during the Mexican crisis in the early 1990’s, which caused the so-
called Tequila Effect, which affected the rest of the Latin American financial 
community.395
Nowadays, the interest rates, the exchange rates, prices of commodities, trades, 
political factors are analysed almost on an hourly basis and affect the investors’ 
decisions. The mood of the investors can change very quickly on the basis of 
information received and cause a massive outflow of money from a country in a very 
short timeframe, upon receipt of worrying news.396 Hence why the need for 
transparency and a constant flow of official information from international 
organisation and from the governments themselves and more careful regulation are 
key in order to avoid mass panic attacks, as set out in the first chapter.
                                                                                                                                     
393 Sovereign	credit	default	swaps	are	agreements	that aim	at	protecting	investors	against	losses	on	
sovereign	debt	arising	from	so-called	credit	events	such	as	the	default	of	the	government	or	debt	
restructuring.	 The	 seller	of	 credit	default	 swaps	undertakes	 to	 the	buyer	 to	provide	protection	
against	losses	in	connection	with	so	called	credit	events	in	exchange	for	a	fee	paid	by	the	buyer.	
Credits	events	generally	include	failure	to	pay	interest	or	principal	on,	and	restructuring	of,	one	
or	more	obligations	issued	by	the	sovereign.	
394 International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 Global	 Financial	 Stability	 Report	 2013,	 p.	 57,	 available	 at:	
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2013/.../c2.pdf	.
395 Tequila	Hangover:	The	Mexican	Pesos	Crisis	and	Its	Aftermath,	IMF	publication,	2012,	available	at	
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2012/pdf/c10.pdf	.
396 L.	 C.	 Buchheit,	 Cross-Border	 Lending:	 What’s	 Different	 This	 Time?,	 Northwest	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	&	Business,	1995,	pp.		54-56.
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The Emerging Markets Traders Association (EMTA), an association created after the 
Brady Bonds era, once the secondary market for sovereign bonds started to develop 
(see previous chapter in such respect), plays an important role in the market of 
sovereign debt of developing countries. The EMTA defines its mission as: 
“promoting the orderly development of fair, efficient and transparent trading 
markets for Emerging Markets instruments and to helping integrate the Emerging 
Markets into the global capital markets. Above all, EMTA provides a forum that 
enables EM market participants to identify issues of importance to the trading and 
investment community and, when necessary, to review alternatives and develop 
consensus approaches to addressing industry problems and opportunities.”397
EMTA's Members include leading investment banks, commercial banks, merchant 
banks, investment management firms and other organizations with a strong interest 
in the emerging markets.
e) New rules?
Debates around the need for new regulations are a common feature of sovereign debt 
restructuring. In the past chapters and paragraphs the main areas whereby it has 
been felt that new rules should be applicable have been outlined and can be summed 
up as follows:
 SDRM (Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism): i.e. the discussions 
around the need for a specific forum to deal with insolvency procedure for 
sovereign states, so that corporate insolvency procedures could be 
replicated in the context of sovereign states (such as the US chapter 11, for 
instance) to grant the sovereign state and its creditors the same protections, 
inter alia, in terms, respectively, of moratorium for enforcement and the 
court supervision in the process of repaying or rescheduling the creditors. 
As described in chapter 3 (Sovereign Debt Restructuring), the IMF suggested 
the creation of an international entity, which would have broadly covered 
the role played by national courts in corporate restructuring. Opposed to 
this approach are the authors and practitioners which believe that there is 
no need for an international entity to be established because history teaches 
that debt restructuring have existed since a long time and there is now a 
common know how and common understanding of how sovereign crisis 
                                                                                                                                     
397 See	EMTA	website	at:	http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=32.
129
develop and are resolved which does not require any “external” 
intervention. Such authors and practitioners believe that the introduction of 
collective action clauses and other similar contractual mechanics are the 
way forward to deal with sovereign debt restructuring. Collective action 
clauses will be analysed in more detail in the following paragraphs;
 Odious debt: as described in chapter 3 (Sovereign Debt Restructuring), there 
is an on-going debate in relation to what can be defined as “odious debt” 
and the legal consequences of classifying a debt as odious. The doctrine of 
odious debt was at the centre of discussions quite recently due to the use of 
such definition in the context of the Greek financial crisis, whereby many 
commentators queried the use of such term in relation to the debt incurred 
by a legitimate government, democratically elected.398The issues around the 
burden of proof, determining when a debt becomes odious and who is 
entitled to have the final say on whether a debt is odious or not have 
already been analysed in the previous chapter. An interesting approach is 
suggested by certain authors that look at the governing law of the debt as 
instrument to resolve the disputes around the qualification of the debt, 
noting how national private law can be an answer to the issue, rather than 
looking at international public principles such as international customary 
law, which would be difficult to be applied (given the arguably such 
principle is part of general and consistent practice of states and followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligations);399
 Transparency: as mentioned in the first chapter (and as further noted in the 
previous paragraphs), the need for more transparency in the financial 
markets and for the unregulated players of the market has been recently 
discussed, particular due to the impact that financial transactions have on 
the stability of weak economies across the world;
                                                                                                                                     
398 Alexis	Tsipras,	leader	of	radical	left-wing	Greek	party	SYRIZA,	during	one	of	his	press	conferences,	
declared	that	an	international	committee	should	have	reviewed	the	Greek	debt	in	order	to	assess	
whether	such	debt	could	be	classified	as	odious.	See	Does	Greece	has	“odious”	debt?,	by	A.	Hern,	
published	 on	 NewStatesman	 on	 9 May	 2012,	 available	 at:	
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/interest-rates/2012/05/does-greece-have-odious-debt.
399 See	L.	C.	Buchheit	and	M.	G.	Gulati	and	R.B.	Thompson,	The	Dilemma	of	Odious	Debts,	Duke	Law	
Journal,	 2006.	 Available	 at	 SSRN:	 http://ssrn.com/abstract=932916.	 Also	 interesting	 the	
suggested	 approach	 in	 respect	 of	 “piercing	 the	 corporate	 veil”,	 to	 be	 replicated	 in	 relation	 to	
governments	 incurring	odious	debts,	 so	 that	 the	debt	 itself	 can	be	 re-qualified	 as	 a	 loan	 to	 the	
members	of	the	government	directly	rather	than	a	loan	to	the	state.
130
 Litigation: i.e. the treatment of the so-called vulture funds, as mentioned in 
the previous paragraph. The aspects related to the litigation carried out by 
vulture funds and the theories presented by governments in order to protect 
themselves from vulture funds will be further analyzed below.
Separately, as final paragraph, the initiatives implemented by the European Union 
will be set out, being one of the most recent example of answers to a financial crisis 
and also due to the peculiarity of the European Union as international organization 
and the relationship amongst its member states.
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2. SOVEREIGN DEBT LITIGATION 
The aim of this chapter is to explore some of the most relevant sovereign debt 
litigation and to trace which are the main arguments brought in court by vulture 
funds enforcing their claims in respect of sovereign debt and the main defenses used 
by states. 
Historically, bonds were excluded from the restructuring process and the 
government would continue to service such debt, notwithstanding the rescheduling 
and haircuts applied to other form of indebtedness. The reasons for such approach 
were multiple: (i) mainly because the quantum of the debt was de minimis (as 
mentioned previously, in the 1970ies and 1980ies the vast majority of debt was 
structured as syndicated loans); (ii) to avoid markets to negatively judge the credit 
worthiness of the country, making access to the market for such country particularly 
hard (especially in terms of interest to be paid) and to protect individual investors; 
(iii) due to the fragmentation of the creditors (opposed to the banks’ committees) 
which would have made the restructuring process more complex.400
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, following the debt crisis in the 
1980ies, countries switched from bank loans to bonds so that the debt crisis that 
followed involved mainly restructuring of bond issuances. 
The origin of any restructuring (and related litigation) is the default of the borrower. 
The default can consists of failure of meeting a payment which falls due or a breach 
of the other terms of the contract which regulates the bonds.401 The governing law of 
the bonds will dictate the general contractual rules applicable to the default and the 
remedies available to the creditors. As mentioned in chapter two, the law applicable 
to sovereign bonds is generally English law or New York law, both “neutral” law 
and commonly used in international transactions. The risk of having a sovereign 
bond governed by the national law of the issuer is that the issuer itself would then 
                                                                                                                                     
400 See	M.	Megliani,	Debitori	sovrani	e	obbligazionisti	esteri,	Giuffré	editore,	2009,	pp.	61	ss.
401 Standard	events	of	default	in	a	bond	issuance	are:	(i)	non	payment	(i.e.	non	payment	of	principal	
or	interest	for	a	consecutive	period	of	30	days);	(ii)	breach	of	other	obligations	under	the	contract	
regulating	 the	 issuance	 (upon	 expiry	 of	 the	 relevant	 grace	 period);	 (iii)	 cross	 default;	 (iv)	
moratorium;	 (v)	contestation	of	 the	validity	of	 the	debt	 securities;	 (vi)	 failure	of	authorisations	
required	 to	 perform	 the	 obligations	 by	 the	 issuer;	 (vii)	 monetary	 judgement	 (i.e.	 a	 monetary	
judgment	exceeding	a	pre-agreed	amount	in	the	prospectus,	not	adequately	satisfied	or	contested	
in	 good	 faith);	 (viii)	 illegality	 (i.e.	 the	 adoption	 by	 the	 issuer	 of	 any	 applicable	 law,	 rule	 or	
regulation	 which	 would	 make	 it	 unlawful	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 obligations	 agreed);	 (ix)	 IMF	
membership	cessation.	See	R.	Olivares-Caminal,	J.	Douglas,	R. Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	S.	Paterson,	D.	
Singh,	H.	Stonefrost,	Debt	Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	389.
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be able to unilaterally amend the terms of the contract, by passing a law or decree, 
which could, for instance, mandatorily declare the deferral of certain payments.
A default would trigger two main consequences for a government: (i) it would be 
source of international responsibility and would expose the government to litigation; 
(ii) it would result into a loss of reputation, which would affect the government 
credibility in the markets.402
Another relevant feature of international bonds is the jurisdiction clause. All 
contracts regulating international bonds include, together with an applicable law 
clause, a jurisdiction clause, regulating the forum which the parties acknowledge to 
be the relevant forum for an dispute arising in connection with the issuance of the 
bonds. Generally the forum selected reflects the applicable law of the bonds, being 
either the courts of New York or the courts of England and Wales. By submitting the 
jurisdiction of the disputes to a certain court, the relevant government implicitly 
waives to its sovereign immunity403 and accepts that its contractual counterpart may 
bring a claim against it before the relevant court.404
a) The main issues related to litigation aspects of sovereign debt 
Prior to discussing certain litigation and the main arguments supported by the 
creditors (plaintiffs) and by the governments (defendants), it is helpful to picture the 
choices that a bondholder faces once the government (issuer of the bonds) is in 
financial difficulties.405
                                                                                                                                     
402 On	 this	 point	 there	 are	 opposed	 theories:	 (i)	 one	 supporting	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 default	 would	
negatively	impact	on	the	capacity	of	the	country	to	raise	additional	indebtedness	on	the	market,	
due	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 reputation;	 (ii)	 one	 arguing	 that	 the	 market	 “forgets”	 quite	 easily	 and	 the	
appetite	of	investors	changes	quickly	so	that	it	is	not	predictable	the	success	or	lack	of	success	of	
future	 bond	 issuances	 by	 a	 defaulted	 country.	 See	 M.	 Tomz,	 Reputation	 and	 International	
Cooperation:	 Sovereign	 Debt	 across	 Three	 Centuries,	 Princeton	 University	 Press,	 2007	 and	 B.	
Eichengreen,	 Historical	 Research	 on	 International	 Lending	 and	 Debt,	 The	 Journal	 of	 Economic	
Perspectives,	1991,	pp.	149-169.	
403 H.	Schier,	Towards	a	Reorganisation	System	for	Sovereign	Debt,	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	2007,	
pp.	6-7.
404 Until	 the	1950ies,	 the	 general	principle	of	 sovereign	equality	of	 states	was	predominant	under	
English	 and	American	 law,	 so	 that	 no	 state	 should	 have	 had	 jurisdiction	 in	 relation	 to	 another	
state.	From	this	starting	point,	the	doctrine	of	absolute	immunity	of	sovereign	states	was	slowly	
eroded	to	the	present	distinction	between	acta	iure	imperio (i.e.	sovereign	acts	per	se)	and	acta	
iure	 gestionis (i.e.	 commercial	 activities	which	 the	 government	 carries	 out	 but	which	 are	 dealt	
with	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 activities	 of	 corporations	 or	 natural	 persons).	 See	 M.	 N.	 Shaw,	
International	Law,	Cambridge,	2003,	p.	628.
405 On	 sovereign	 debt	 litigation	 by	 vulture	 funds	 generally	 see	 C.C.	 Wheeler	 and	 A.	 Attarant,	
Declawing	 the	 Vulture	 Funds:	 Rehabilitation	 of	 a	 Comity	 Defence	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Litigation,	
Stanford	Journal	of	International	Law,	2003,	pp.	253-284,	P.	Wautelet,	Vulture	funds,	creditors	and	
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As preliminary step, a creditor whose sovereign debtor is going through financial 
difficulties has to decide whether it will partake in the restructuring process and 
accept the offer made by the creditor (which, as already mentioned in the previous 
chapter) usually consists of a rescheduling of the debt and remodeling of the 
economics of the bond (in terms of interest), implemented through the exchange of 
the existing bonds with newly issued bonds, which can be exchanged at par or below 
par (which implies an haircut on the amount of principal to be repaid) or whether it 
will start a legal proceeding against the government demanding repayment of the 
amounts due.406
If the creditor decides to litigate, as briefly mentioned above, the first issue to deal 
with is state immunity or sovereign immunity, as referred to under English law and 
New York law respectively.407 A bondholder has to prove that the relevant court has 
personal jurisdiction over the sovereign and that the sovereign has waived to its 
immunity or, alternatively, there is an exception applicable so that the sovereign is 
not protected by the immunity. Usually, the instrument governing the bonds 
includes a submission to jurisdiction clause, together with the appointment of a 
process agent and an express waiver to immunity from suit, therefore this 
preliminary step is quite straightforward and the creditor are generally able to obtain 
a court judgment for the payment of money.
Once the money judgment is obtained, the creditor has to decide whether executing 
property within the territory of the debtor (by means of recognition of foreign court 
decision) or whether executing property abroad.
The risk connected to the first option is that the sovereign state would probably 
refuse to recognize the judgment due to public policy restrains or, to the extent the 
judgment is recognized, that the government rather than allowing the creditor to 
execute property, would repay in specie, offering debt instruments with very 
                                                                                                                                     
sovereign	 debtors:	 how	 to	 find	 a	 balance?,	 available	 at:	
http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/87549/1/Vulture%20funds%20and%20sovereign%20de
btors%20Wautelet.pdf.
406 As	mentioned	 in	the	previous	chapters,	 there	 is	no	 insolvency	procedure	for	states	(opposed	to	
procedures	such	as	chapter	11	for	corporates)	which	can	insure	protection	for	the	governments	
from	 enforcement	 actions	 during	 a	 restructuring	 process.	 Therefore	 governments	 are	 exposed	
throughout	the	process	 to	 the	 legal	actions	carried	out	by	hold	out	creditors,	which	are	against	
the	 restructuring	 process.	 Furthermore,	 during	 the	 Allied Bank	 II	 case,	 the	 Federal	 Court	 of	
Appeal	 of	 the	 Second	 Circuit	 stated	 that	 pending	 the	 restructuring	 process,	 the	 payment	
obligations	of	the	sovereign	debtor	remain	valid	and	binding	and	that	the	creditors	which	decide	
not	 to	 support	 the	 restructuring	 are	 entitled	 to	 start	 a	 legal	 proceeding	 against	 the	 sovereign	
debtor,	otherwise	the	rights	of	the	creditors	would	be	unjustly	limited,	given	that	in	practice	there	
would	be	no	option	between	being	part	of	the	restructuring	process	or	enforcing	its	rights,	due	to	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 creditor	 would	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 commence	 a	 legal	 action	 prior	 to	 the	
restructuring	 having	 completed.	 M.	 Megliani,	 Debitori	 sovrani	 e	 obblgazionisti	 esteri,	 Giuffrè	
editore,	2009,	pp.	132-133.	
407 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R. Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	390-391.
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unattractive economical terms. In addition, the execution process itself would be 
quite uncertain and ultimately in the hands of the sovereign debtor itself.408
The second option is more reliable in terms of process and outcome, both easily 
predictable; however, the downside is that it could be very difficult to find assets of 
the sovereign state abroad to attach.409 Furthermore, assets designated for sovereign 
or official functions enjoy immunity, such as diplomatic missions, central bank 
reserves, payments to and from international financial institutions (for instance the 
IMF).
A further point to be considered, is the structure chosen for the issuance of the bonds, 
which can either be based on a fiscal agent agreement or on a trust structure. In the 
first case, a fiscal agent is appointed to deal with monetary matters in the context of 
the issuance, such as redeeming bonds at maturity and payment of the coupons. The 
second structure requires the appointment of a trustee which will act as fiduciary and 
overview all matters connected to the issuance to ensure that the issuer complies with 
all the terms of the instrument governing the issuance.
There is one main difference, of relevance in the context of a restructuring: a fiscal 
agent acts as representative of the issuer, while the trustee is a fiduciary representing 
the bondholders.410
In an enforcement scenario, this makes a great difference, given that payments made 
to the trustee are not attachable as soon as they are received by the trustee, which 
holds the money on trust for the bondholders (consequently as soon as the moneys 
reach the trustee’s bank account, the ownership of such amount is transferred to the 
trustee). On the other hand, payments made to the fiscal agent and held on the bank 
account of the fiscal agent can be attached given that such funds belong to the 
sovereign until they are transferred from the bank account of the fiscal agent to the 
account of the bondholders. To the extent the bank account of the fiscal agent is held 
outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign debtor, such funds represent an attractive 
                                                                                                                                     
408 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University Press,	2011,	p.	392-393.
409 Argentina,	 for	 instance,	 even	prior	 to	 its	default,	was	doing	 everything	 it	 could	 to	 avoid	having	
assets	abroad:	Central	Bank	reserves	deposited	in	New	York	were	withdrawn,	funds	of	the	Banco	
Nacion (the	 national	 bank)	 that	 were	 in	 their	 New	 York	 branch	 were	 repatriated,	 salaries	 of	
government	employees	abroad	were	paid	 into	deposit	accounts	 in	Argentina	or	 the	money	was	
sent	 via	 the	 so-called	diplomatic	pouch	 (which	enjoys	 immunity),	 the	presidential	 airplane	and	
frigate	 avoided	 certain	 airports	 and	 ports	 in	 countries	 where	 bondholders	 had	 asked	 for	
garnishments.	 See	 A.	 Rebossio,	 El	 gobierno	 se	 protege	 de	 los	 embargos,	 La	 Nacion,	 5	 February	
2004.
410 Historically,	 the	 fiscal	 agent	 structure	 has	 been	 prevailing	 in	 international	 bond	 issuances,	
however	 in	 recent	 years,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 opposite	 trend,	 where	 the	 trust	 structure	 is	 the	
preferred	option.	Argentina,	Belize,	Dominica,	Ecuador,	Grenada	and	Uruguay	have	all	opted	for	a	
trust	 structure	 in	 their	 recent	 issuances.	 See	 L.	 C.	 Buchheit,	 Supermajority	 control	 wins	 out,	
International	Financial	Law	Review,	April	2007.
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option for creditors, while accounts held in the territory of the sovereign debtor can 
always be protected by means of passing emergency laws or decrees.411
b) The champerty defence
The Law of Champerty is a common law doctrine which aims at preventing the 
instrumental use of justice, to avoid people starting legal proceedings for private 
ends.412
The Law of Champerty is a common defence of sovereign debtors, which argue that 
vulture funds purchase sovereign debt with the mere intention to sue the sovereign 
debtor for repayment, against the common law principle of champerty. 
In CIBC Bank versus Banco Central do Brasil413, the New York court admitted that 
the simultaneous acquisition of the debt and the commencement of the legal 
proceeding to obtain repayment had a champertuous aim, however that fact that 
other legitimate purposes could also be attributed to the purchase of the debt, would 
prevent the judge from applying the Law of Champerty to such case. 
In Elliot Associates versus the Republic of Peru414, the federal court of appeal 
overruled the judgment issued by the district court of New York in favour of the 
Republic of Peru. The district court of New York argued that Elliot purchased the 
Peruvian debt with the purpose of commencing a legal proceeding to recover the full 
amount of the bonds, and such intention was further confirmed by the fact that Elliot 
did not partake together with the other creditors in the negotiations during the 
restructuring process, but decided to follow a separate course of action, suing the 
Brazilian government to obtain the repayment in full of the debt. 
The judgement was however overruled by the federal court of appeal, in line with 
previous jurisprudence, stating that the primary intention of Eliot in purchasing the 
debt was the recovery of the amounts due, and the commencement of a legal action 
                                                                                                                                     
411 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	S.	Paterson,	D.	Singh,	H.	Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	395-396.
412 The	underlying	ratio,	which	justifies	the	moral	reproach	connected	to	the	private	use	of	justice,	is	
due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 “the	 psychological	 background	 is	 the	medieval	 and	 Christian	 one	 in	which	
litigation	 is	 at	 best	 a	 necessary	 evil,	 and	 litigiousness	 is	 a	 vice”.	 M.	 Radin,	 Maintenance	 by	
Champerty,	in	California	Law	Review,	1935-36,	pp.	48	ss.
413 CIBC	Bank	and	Trust	Company	LTD	v.	Banco	Central	do	Brasil,	886	F.	Supp.	1105	(S.D.N.Y.	1995).	
CIBC	Bank	was	an	 investment	 fund	specialised	 in	 the	purchase	of	debt	of	developing	countries,	
which	rejected	the	restructuring	plan	put	forward	by	the	Brazilian	government	and	commenced	a	
legal	 action	 against	 Banco	 Central	 do	 Brasil	 before	 the	 New	 York	 Court.	 M.	 Megliani,	Debitori	
sovrani	e	obbligazionisti	esteri,	Giuffré	editore,	2009,	pp.	136- 137.
414 Elliot	Associates	L.P.	v.	Republic	of	Peru,	12	F.	Supp.	2d	328,	332	(S.D.N.Y.	1998).
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was a secondary aim, subordinated to the lack of voluntary payment by the 
sovereign debtor. 415
The Argentinian government in 2003 further invoked the champerty defence, 
however the New Your courts rejected such argument adopting the position held by 
the US courts in the previous judgments mentioned above.416
Another case worth mentioning is the Pravin Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del 
Peru,417whereby Pravin refused to participate in Peru’s restructuring process and 
sued Peru to obtain repayment of the full amount of the debt.
Peru argued that Pravin had bought the debt at a substantial discount and that a 
recovery in full of the amounts due would have resulted into an unjust enrichment at 
the expenses of the Peruvian population. The New York court involved in such case 
had to balance two opposite principles: (i) the success of the public debt restructuring 
of Peru; and (ii) the respect of contract law principles (and protection of the 
investors), which required the repayment of the debt. Finally, the court held that 
Pravin was not obliged to partake into the restructuring given that a restructuring 
process is based on a voluntary basis and consequently to the extent a creditor was 
not willing to support the restructuring its right to demand repayment (also through 
a court proceeding) should remain unfettered.418The decision was also affected by the 
role that New York plays in international financial transaction and the fear that a 
judgment against the rights of the investor could have negatively impacted on the 
role of New York as centre of the financial markets.419
c) The pari passu mystery
                                                                                                                                     
415 M.	Megliani,	Debitori	 sovrani	e	obbligazionisti	esteri,	Giuffré	editore,	2009,	pp.	138-139	and	S.	E.	
Goldman,	 Mavericks	 in	 the	 market:	 the	 emerging	 problem	 of	 hold-outs	 in	 sovereign	 debt	
restructuring,	UCLA	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Foreign	Affairs,	2000,	pp.	192-196.
416 M.	Megliani,	Debitori	sovrani	e	obbligazionisti	esteri,	Giuffré	editore,	2009,	pp.	139-140.
417 Pravin	 Banker	 Associates	 v.	 Banco	 Popular	 del	 Peru,	 109	 F	 3d	 850,	 2nd	 Circuit,	 1997,	 in	 R.	
Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	 Douglas,	 R.	 Guynn,	 A.	 Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	 D.	 Singh,	 H.	 Stonefrost,	 Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	396.
418 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	396-397.
419 On	Champerty	Defense	see	also	 J.	 I.	Blackman	and	R.	Mukhi,	The	Evolution	of	modern	Sovereign	
Debt	 Litigation:	 Vultures,	 alter	 egos	 and	 other	 legal	 fauna,	 in	 Law	 and	Contemporary	 problems,	
2010,	pp.	52-55.
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A famous case in the sovereign debt litigation involves the interpretation of a 
boilerplate clause included in any instrument governing sovereign bonds, the so-
called pari passu clause.420
The case (already mentioned above, although in relation to a separate aspect) is Elliot 
and Associates v. Republic of Peru and Banco de la Nacion de Peru. Elliot purchased 
Peruvian debt at a high discount and sued the Peruvian government to recover the 
full amount of the debt before the courts of New York, refusing to accept an exchange 
offer under which the existing bonds would have been exchanged with bonds issued 
under the Brady Plan (see chapter three). The court ruled in their favour and Elliot 
sought to enforce the monetary judgment, however there were not Peruvian assets 
outside the Peruvian territory to be attached.
Elliot tried to attach payments made by the Peruvian government under the newly 
issued Brady bonds through the fiscal agent (Chase Manhattan) and after an 
unsuccessful attempt they were able to obtained a restraining order from the Belgian 
court of appeal421 prohibiting the fiscal agent and the clearing house (Euroclear) to 
pay interest due on the Brady bonds.
The court of appeal stated: “it…appears from the basic agreement that governs the 
repayment of the foreign debt of Peru that the various creditors benefit from a pari 
passu clause that in effect provides that the debt must be repaid pro rata among all 
creditors”.422
Given that the judgment of the court of appeal prevented the Peruvian Government 
to make payments thorough the fiscal agent and through the clearing house located 
in Brussels (Euroclear), the only option to avoid the default under the newly issued 
Brady bonds was to make payments through the other clearing house, Clearstream, 
located in Luxembourg. However, this would have required all bondholders to open 
an account with Clearstream and it was a matter of time before Elliot obtained a 
restraining order from the courts in Luxembourg, making any payment impossible.
The Government of Peru eventually decide to settle with Elliot in order to avoid a 
default under the Brady bonds, which would have re-opened the restructuring 
process just concluded. The settlement agreement required payment by the Peruvian 
                                                                                                                                     
420 A	famous	practitioner	defined	the	pari	passu clause	as:	“short,	obscure,	and	sports	a	bit	of	Latin;	
all	characteristics	 that	 lawyers	 find	endearing”,	L.	Buchheit,	How	to	negotiate	Eurocurrency	 loan	
agreements,	International	Financial	Law	Review,	2000,	pp.	82-83.
421 Elliot	Associates,	LP;	General	Docket	No	2000/QR/92	(Court	of	Appeals	of	Brussels,	8th	Chamber,	
26	 September	 2000,	 in	 R.	 Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	 Douglas,	 R.	 Guynn,	 A.	 Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	 D.	
Singh,	H.	Stonefrost,	Debt	Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	398.
422 Elliot	Associates,	LP;	General	Docket	No	2000/QR/92	(Court	of	Appeals	of	Brussels,	8th	Chamber,	
26	 September	 2000,	 in	 R.	 Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	 Douglas,	 R.	 Guynn,	 A.	 Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	 D.	
Singh,	H.	Stonefrost,	Debt	Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	398.
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Government of $58,45 million, which meant a gain worth 400 per cent of the 
defaulted bonds for Elliot.423
The judgment of the Belgian court was based on the affidavit prepared by professor 
Andreas Lowenfeld, which opined that the meaning of the pari passu clause424 in any 
debt instrument was that the debtor has to treat all creditors equally, so that when the 
debtor makes a payment, the payment must be pro rata across all the creditors, 
stating: “I have no difficulties in understanding what the pari passu clause means: it 
means what it says – a given debt will rank equally with other debt of the borrower, 
whether that borrower is an individual, a company, a sovereign state. A borrower 
from Tom, Dick and Harry can’t say “I will pay Tom and Dick in full, and if there is 
anything left over I’ll pay Harry.” If there is not enough money to go around, the 
borrower faced with a pari passu provision must pay all three of them on the same 
basis…”.425
Many authors and practitioners argued against the “rateable” interpretation of the 
pari passu clause, in contrast with the usual interpretation of such clause, according to 
which the pari passu covenant imposes and obligation on the borrower not to 
subordinate426 the claims of the creditors under the relevant debt instrument, dealing 
therefore with raking of the creditors rather than with pro rata payments.427
                                                                                                                                     
423 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	399.
424 A	standard	formulation	of	the	pari	passu clause	in	modern	cross	border	credit	instruments	is:	“the	
Notes	 rank,	 and	 will	 rank,	 pari	 passu in	 right	 of	 payment	 with	 all	 other	 present	 and	 future	
unsecured	and	unsubordinated	External	Indebtedness	of	the	Issuer”.	L.	C.	Buchheit	and	J.	S.	Pam,	
The	Pari	Passu	Clause	in	Sovereign	Debt	Instruments,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	p.	871.
425 L.	 C.	 Buchheit	 and	 J.	 S.	 Pam,	 The	 Pari	 Passu	 Clause	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Instruments,	 Emory	 Law	
Journal,	2004,	p.	878.
426 Generally,	 the	 claims	 of	 all	 unsecured	 creditors	 against	 a	 borrower	 are	 on	 a	 parity,	 .	 .	 .	 The	
creditors,	however,	may	contractually	alter	this	relationship	through	a	subordination	agreement.	
Debt	subordination	involves	the	agreement	of	one	creditor	(the	junior	creditor)	to	allow	payment	
of	 indebtedness	 due	 to	 another	 creditor	 (the	 senior	 creditor)	 prior	 to	 the	 payment	 of	
indebtedness'	 owed	 to	 it.	 	 A	 subordination	 agreement	 is	 a	 type	 of	 intercreditor	 agreement	
between	 or	 among	 the	 affected	 creditors,	 that	 describes	 the	 nature	 and	 the	 mechanics	 of	 an	
agreed	legal	subordination.	D.	J.	Schnebel,	Intercreditor	and	Subordination	Agreements-A	Practical	
Guide,	Banking Law	Journal,	January	2001,	pp.	48-62.
427 “Over	 the	 years,	 a	 few	 commentators	 (including	 one	 of	 the	 authors)	 have	 offered	 possible	
explanations	 for	 the	appearance	of	pari	passu	covenants	 in	sovereign	credit	 instruments.	These	
explanations	 have	 ranged	 from	 a	 suggestion	 that	 drafters	 may	 have	 wanted	 to	 prevent	 an	
informal	"earmarking"	of	a	sovereign's	assets	or	revenues	to	service	a	particular	debt,	to	the	more	
cynical	explanation	that	 this	 type	of	clause	had	a	 tendency	to	migrate-through	 the	 ignorance	or	
inattention	of	contract	drafters-from	cross-border	corporate	debt	instruments	to	sovereign	debt	
instruments.	The	common	theme	among	these	commentators	was	a	degree	of	agnosticism	about	
the	precise	denotation	of	the	pari	passu	clause	in	a	sovereign	context”. L.	C.	Buchheit	and	J.	S.	Pam,	
The	Pari	Passu	Clause	in	Sovereign	Debt	Instruments,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	pp.	875	and	G.	M.	
Gulati	and	K.	N.	Klee,	Sovereign	Piracy,	the	Business	Lawyer,	2001,	pp.	635-655.
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The effects of the judgment issued by the court in Brussels had far reaching 
consequences and other vulture funds obtained judgment in their favour using the 
same argument.428
It has been discussed amongst academics and banking practitioners whether the 
drafting of the pari passu clause should have been changed in order to clarify that a 
rateable interpretation should have been excluded, however, in practice the wording 
did not change. 
The fact that the clause remained the same after the judgment of the court of Brussels 
posed the question whether the continued use of the same clause meant the 
acceptance of the pro rata interpretation or whether the refusal of the interpretation 
suggested by the court was deemed so far from the actual meaning of the clause that 
lawyers and experts of the sovereign debt market did not considered necessary to 
amend the clause.
The pari passu clause migrated from corporate bonds into sovereign bonds, however 
the meaning and implications in the sovereign context are different. In both cases the 
aim of the clause is to prevent the borrower from incurring obligations to other 
creditors that rank legally senior to the debt instrument containing the clause. In the 
corporate scenario, however, the implications are different, given that creditors 
enjoying a senior treatment under the terms of the relevant debt instrument receive a 
preferred treatment during insolvency procedure in the USA (i.e. chapter 11). 
However, given that there are no insolvency procedures for sovereign states, it has 
been argued that the rationale for such clause is to prevent “earmarking” of the assets 
to certain creditors.429
In practice, as noted by certain authors, the relevance of pari passu clauses has been 
reduced by the widespread use of collective action clauses in debt instruments, which 
                                                                                                                                     
428 U.	 Varottil,	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Documentation:	 unraveling	 the	 pari	 passu	 mystery,	 DePaul	
Business&Commercial	 Law	 Journal,	 2008,	 p.	 124,	 L.	 C.	 Buchheit	 and	 J.	 S.	 Pam,	 The	 Pari	 Passu	
Clause	 in	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Instruments,	 Emory	 Law	 Journal,	 2004,	 pp.	 880-884	 and	 R.	 Olivares-
Caminal,	J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	S.	Paterson,	D.	Singh,	H.	Stonefrost,	Debt	Restructuring,	
Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	pp.	401-402.
429 The	Financial	Markets	Law	Committee	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	stated:	“The	only	purpose	of	 the	
clause	was	believed	to	be	to	prevent	sovereigns	from	“earmarking”	revenues	of	the	government	
or	 allocating	 foreign	 curency	 reserves	 to	 a	 single	 creditor	 or,	 more	 generally,	 to	 prevent	 the	
sovereign	 from	adopting	 legal	measures	which	have	the	effect	of	preferring	one	set	of	creditors	
against	the	others”.	Financial	Markets	Law	Committee,	Issue	79	–Pari	Passu	clauses:	analysis	of	the	
role,	use	and	meaning	of	pari	passu	clauses	in	sovereign	debt	obligations	as	a	matter	of	English	law,	
2005,	 available	 at:	 ftalphaville.ft.com/files/2012/11/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf	,	 L. C.	 Buchheit	 and	 J.	 S.	
Pam,	The	Pari	Passu	Clause	in	Sovereign	Debt	Instruments,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	pp.	872-873	
and	 U.	 Varottil,	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Documentation:	 unraveling	 the	 pari	 passu	 mystery,	 DePaul	
Business&Commercial	Law	Journal,	2008,	p.	119-120.
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reduced the bargaining power of hold out creditors and which could be in part the 
reason why the terms of the pari passu clause did not change.430
As further point of interest, a broad interpretation of the pari passu clause in 
accordance with the principle set out by the court of Brussels would prevent 
countries restructuring their private debt from making payments to multilateral 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, payments which, as general and 
uncontested understanding, have always had a de facto priority431 which has never 
been challenged (and violation of the pari passu clause due to such de facto priority 
has never been contemplated).432
d) Recent developments
The pari passu clause was back in the spotlight following a recent ruling of the Federal 
District Court of New York (which was upheld by the Court of Appeal) which
condemned the Argentinian Government to the payment in full of certain hold out 
creditors, arguing on the basis of the pari passu clauses included in the debt 
instruments.
The judge of the lower court ruled in favour of a group of vulture funds (including 
Elliot Management) which rejected the Argentinian restructuring proposal and sued 
the Argentinian government for repayment in full of the bonds, for an amount equal, 
approximately, to $1,3 billion. The judgment included two relevant features. First, it 
has been imposed on Argentina an obligation to pay the vulture funds on their 
defaulted bonds whenever it next made payments on the restructured bonds. And an 
innovative approach is also suggested to potentially enforce this decision if 
Argentina chose to ignore it, focusing on the financial firms that pass the payments 
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Business&Commercial	Law	Journal,	2008,	p.	139-140.
431 The	priority	granted	to	the	IMF	 is	due	to	many	reasons,	 the	main	one	being	that	 the	IMF	 is	 the	
only	 institution	 acting	 as	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 and	 willing	 to	 advance	 money	 in	 distressed	
situations	whereby	 other	 creditors	would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 lend.	 The	 role	 of	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	
benefits	 also	 other	 private	 creditors	 (due	 to	 the	 improved	 liquidity	 situation	 of	 the borrower),	
hence	why	it	has	never	been	contested.	R.	Olivares-Caminal,	J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	S.	
Paterson,	D.	Singh,	H.	Stonefrost,	Debt	Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	pp.	404-405.
432 On	the	pari	passu clause	and	the	Elliot	vs.	Argentina	case	see	also:	C.D.	Schmerler,	Restructuring	
Sovereign	 Debt,	 in	 the	 Law	 of	 International	 Insolvencies	 and	 Debt	 Restructuring,	 editors	 J.R.	
Silkenta,	C.D.	Schmerler,	Oceana	Publications,	2006,	pp.452-456,	W.	W.	Bratton,	Pari	Passu	and	a	
Distressed	Sovereign’s	Rational	Choices,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2004,	pp.	823- 868,	M.	Monteagudo,	
Peru’s	experience	in	sovereign	debt	management	and	litigation:	some	lessons	for	the	legal	approach	
to	 sovereign	 indebtedness,	 Law	and	Contemporary	Problems,	2010,	pp.	201-2015,	P.	Wood,	Pari	
Passu	Clauses	– what	do	they	mean?,	Journal	of	International	Banking	and	Financial	Law,	2003,	pp.	
371-376	 and	 on	 equal	 treatment	 of	 creditors	 and	 pari	 passu clause	 see	 C.	 T.	 Ebenroth	 and	 R.	
Woggon,	The	development	of	the	equal	treatment	principle	in	the	international	debt	crisis,	Michigan	
Journal	of	International	Law,	1991,	pp.	690-742
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on the restructured bonds from the Argentine government to their holders. The final 
effect of the judgment is that if these firms handle the payments, they could 
effectively find themselves in contempt of the court’s ruling.433By threatening trustees 
and fiscal agents to breach the law by making payments to bonds in violation of the 
court’s decision, the New York court found a powerful mean to enforce its decisions, 
which had never been explored in previous litigations involving the pari passu clause.
Argentina appealed, however the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower 
court ruling unanimously. The judgment is supportive of the lower court decision 
however in a vague and ambiguous way, welcoming the intervention of the Supreme 
Court on the point and statin, in relation to the most delicate point raised in the 
decision of the lower court (i.e. the potential liability for payment agents): “The 
amended injunctions simply provide notice to payment system participants that they 
could become liable through Rule 65 if they assist Argentina in violating the district 
court’s orders. Since the amended injunctions do not directly enjoin payment system 
participants, it is irrelevant whether the district court has personal jurisdiction over 
them. And of course, there will be no adjudication of liability against a [non-party] 
without affording it a full opportunity at a hearing, after adequate notice, to present 
evidence. In such a hearing, before any finding of liability or sanction against a non-
party, questions of personal jurisdiction may be properly raised. But, at this point, 
they are premature. Similarly, payment system participants have not been deprived 
of due process because, if and when they are summoned to answer for assisting in a 
violation of the district court’s injunctions, they will be entitled to notice and the right 
to be heard.”434
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal tries to deny the relevance and the far reaching 
consequences in the world of sovereign debt, of this ruling, by stating: “This case is 
an exceptional one with little apparent bearing on transactions that can be expected 
in the future. Our decision here does not control the interpretation of all pari passu
clauses or the obligations of other sovereign debtors under pari passu clauses in other 
debt instruments. As we explicitly stated in our last opinion, we have not held that a 
sovereign debtor breaches its pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and not 
another, or even every time it enacts a law disparately affecting a creditor’s rights.”435
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and	 The	 Economist,	 An	 illusory haven,	 20	 April	 2013,	 available	 on	 line	 at:	
http://www.economist.com/NEWS/FINANCE-AND-ECONOMICS/21576391-WHAT-LESSONS-
SHOULD-INVESTORS-LEARN-ARGENTINE-AND-GREEK-RESTRUCTURINGS.
434 F.	 Salmon,	 Eliott	 vs.	 Argentina:	 it’s	 not	 over	 yet,	 published	 on	 line	 on	 Reuters,	 available	 at:	
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/08/23/elliott-vs-argentina-its-not-over-yet/.
435 F.	 Salmon,	 Eliott	 vs.	 Argentina:	 it’s	 not	 over	 yet,	 published	 on	 line	 on	 Reuters,	 available	 at:	
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/08/23/elliott-vs-argentina-its-not-over-yet/.
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The Supreme Court is now due to decide whether it will take the case and express its 
opinion or whether it will deny a further review of this case. It is noted that generally 
the Supreme Court does not rule over cases whereby the lower courts have been in 
agreement, and as of today the court has not yet accepted to take the case. Query if in 
the future the Supreme Court will accept to express a final judgement, given the 
relevance and the potential implications of this ruling. 
It is also worth mentioning the recent development in relation to the applicability of 
class actions in the sovereign debt context: after couple of attempts of classes of 
bondholders in the late 1980ies and 1990ies, the US courts accepted jurisdiction over a 
class action of bondholders against the Argentinian government, on the basis of an 
“opt-in” mechanics (i.e. bondholders had to actively select to be part of the lawsuit). 
The positive aspect of class actions is that they are quite effective in terms of 
organising bondholders and engage the sovereign in a meaningful dialogue with 
creditors.436
                                                                                                                                     
436 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	pp.	453-454.
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3. COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES (CACs) AND EXIT CONSENT
In this chapter transactional aspects of sovereign debt restructuring will be explored.
The contractual aspects of sovereign debt restructuring in the bondholders era will 
be analysed, in particular the mechanics of exchange offers and the development of 
the so-called collective action clauses in English law and New York law bonds will 
be presented. Contractual technics have been supported by the authors and 
practitioners who did not support the proposal put forward by the IMF about a 
statutory mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring (SDRM, see chapter 
3)437, as a more flexible alternative, already used in practice.
a) Exchange offers
Exchange offers are an effective technique used to reprofile the debt of a country, 
which has become unsustainable. To the extent the exchange offer is performed prior 
to the default of the borrower, they avoid going through a proper debt restructuring 
and it is an effective tool to reduce the economic pressure of debt servicing when a 
country is facing financial issues.
In practice, exchange offers consist in the offer by the issuer to exchange the existing 
bonds with newly issued bonds with different economics in terms of final maturity 
and interest payable. To the extent the exchange offer is put in place prior to a 
default, and to the extent the burden of the debt is not unsustainable, the old bonds 
are exchanged at par with the new bonds (i.e. the principal amount is the same, so 
that there is no economic loss for the investors). As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, exchange offers below par have been a frequent feature of debt restructuring 
in the 1980ies and 1990ies (i.e. exchange of old bonds for new bonds with a face value 
                                                                                                                                     
437 In	 short,	 the	 SDRM	 was	 not	 considered	 a	 viable	 option	 due	 to	 the	 burdensome	 process	 of	
amending	the	Articles	of	Agreement	of	the	IMF	and	the	fact	 that	the	SDRM	upon	amendment	of	
the	articles	would	have	been	binding	on	all	members	of	the	IMF,	and	in	respect	of	any	sovereign	
debt	 (opposed	 to	Collective	Action	Clauses	which	can	be	 tailored	on	a	debt	 instrument	by	debt	
instrument	basis).	Furthermore,	many	sovereign	issuers	and	investment	banks	were	opposed	to	
it	 because	 they	 believed	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 such	 mechanism	 would	 have	 driven	 many	
investors	 away and	 it	 would	 have	 also	 made	 the	 cost	 of	 issuance	 for	 the	 sovereign	 debtors	
increase.	As	general	idea,	there	was	a	general	dislike	of	the	idea	of	granting	an	excessive	influence	
to	 the	 IMF	 in	 the	 context	 of	 debt	 restructuring	 in	 particular	 in	 relation	 to	 decisions	 affecting	
private	creditors	(in	fact	the	SDRM	would	not	have	applied	to	debt	owned	to	governments	or	to	
multilateral	 financial	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank).	 See	 B.	 Metzger	 and	 M.	 J.	 Hagan,	
Collective	Action	Clauses	in	International	Sovereign	Bonds,	Journal	of	Banking	and	Finance	Law	and	
Practice,	 2003,	 p.223	 and	 R.	 Gray,	 Collective	 action	 clauses:	 theory	 and	 practice,	 Georgetown	
Journal	of	International	Law,	2004,	p.	694-697.
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below the face value of the old bonds, which represent an haircut in the amount of 
principal to be repaid).438  
Given the widespread nature of investors in bonds, it is often the case that not all the 
existing bondholders enter into the exchange offer, either due to lack of knowledge 
that the exchange offer is in place or due to the willingness to reject the offer (i.e. the 
holdout creditors). Therefore, upon completion of the exchange offer, the 
government, issuer of the old and new bonds has to deal with two sets of creditors, 
the holder of the new debt and holders of the old debt, with the complexities that 
may arise in respect of the old creditors which transfer their debt to investment funds 
specialised in distressed debt, which purchase the debt at a discount and then 
commence litigation proceedings in order to recover the full amount of the debt (as 
set out in the previous paragraph).439
b) Collective Action Clauses
Collective action clauses are contractual provisions included in the debt instrument 
regulating bonds which prescribe a certain majority of bondholders in order to 
amend certain terms of the debt instrument itself or to take certain decisions. 
The inclusion of majority provisions is a relatively recent feature in sovereign bonds: 
historically each bond was a “standalone” piece of debt and the consent of each 
bondholder was required in order to make any amendments. The right of the 
individual to recover the amount due was considered “untouchable” and the concept 
that a majority of bondholders could bound a minority of creditors was not 
contemplated.440
The downside of such approach is that a single bondholder acquires a position of 
strength given that any restructuring proposal will require the consent of every single 
bondholder and holdout creditors represented a material risk to the success of the 
restructuring.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the first majority provisions were 
included in English law corporate bonds: it became in fact clear that unanimous 
decisions were against the interest of the bondholders themselves, as in practice they 
                                                                                                                                     
438 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	pp.	415-416.
439 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	pp.	415-416.
440 L.	C.	Buchheit	and	G.	M.	Gulati,	Sovereign	bonds	and	the	collective	will,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2002,	p.	
51	ss.
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testified corporation being liquidated due to the lack of consent of all bondholders, 
when a simple deferment or reduction of the creditors’ claims would have allowed 
the relevant corporation to continue to operate.441
The position was different in the United States, whereby some technical issues442
prevented majority provisions to be widespread and until very recently the standard 
approach for New York law bonds was to allow amendments to the terms of the 
bonds with the consent of 51% of the bondholders, however, to the extent any 
amendment to the payments dates or amounts to be repaid was required, the 
unanimous decision of the bondholders was necessary.
Quite recently, after the sovereign debt restructuring in the late 1990ies (such as 
Pakistan, Ukraine and Ecuador), the official sector began to encourage a broader use 
of collective action clauses to favour more orderly restructurings and avoid the issues 
created by holdout creditors in previous restructurings. As mitigant for the rights of 
the minority bondholders, the majority in taking any decisions had to act in the best 
interest of all the bondholders, creating a sort of fiduciary duty of the majority vis-à-
vis the minority.443
The event that marked the switch to CACs was the Mexico bonds issuance444 that 
included CACs and which was positively welcomed by the market: after such 
issuance, the number of New York law bonds including CACs raised rapidly and 
                                                                                                                                     
441 The	paternity	of	majority	action	clause	has	been	claimed	by	Francis	Beaufort	Palmer,	an	English	
barrister	which	 in	1881	published	his	 “Company	Precedents”	 (a	book	of	English	 law	 corporate	
precedents),	 whereby	 the	 first	 form	 of	 majority	 clause	 was	 included,	 with	 the	 following	
explanation:	 “	 it	 is	 by	 no	 means	 uncommon	 now	 to	 insert	 [majority	 action]	 provisions…in	 a	
debenture	 trust	 deed,	 enabling the	 majority	 to	 bind	 the	 minority	 in	 respect	 of	 various	
matters…Now	it	sometimes	happens	that	a	company	which	has	raised	a	large	sum	on	debentures	
falls	 into	 temporary	 difficulties,	 and,	 though	 a	 large	majority	 of	 its	 debenture	 holders	may	 be	
willing	to	give	time	or	make	some	reasonable	arrangement,	a	minority	decline	to	concur,	and,	in	
the	 result,	 the	 company	 is	 forced	 into	 liquidation.	 The	 Insertion	 of	 [majority	 action]	
provisions…meets	 this	 inconvenience,	 and	 may	 save	 the	 majority	 from	 the	 tyranny	 of	 the	
minority”.	F.	B.	Palmer,	Company	Precedents,	1881,	p.	122.
442 Under	the	Uniform	Negotiable	Instruments	Law	(1896),	a	provision	which	allows	the	amendment	
to	 payment	 terms	 post	 issuance	 may	 have	 affected	 the	 status	 of	 negotiable	 instrument	 of	 the	
bond.	 The	 Uniform	 Negotiable	 Instruments	 Law,	 n	 fact,	 required	 a	 negotiable	 instrument	 to	
contain	“an	unconditional	promise…to	pay	a	sum	certain	money…[and]	be	payable	on	demand,	or	
at	a	fixed	or	determinable	future	time”.	 	L.	C.	Buchheit	and	G.	M.	Gulati,	Sovereign	bonds	and	the	
collective	 will,	 Emory	 Law	 Journal,	 2002,	 p.	 57.	 Furthermore,	 sovereign	 bonds	 followed	 the	
corporate	bonds	model,	and	under	the	Trust	Indenture	Act	of	1939,	amendments	to	the	amounts	
due	under	a	publicly	issued	corporate	bond	cannot	be	implemented	without	the	consent	of	all	the	
bondholders	(provided	that	deferral	to	up	to	three	years	can	be	effected	with	75%	majority).	The	
Trust	Indenture	Act	is	not	applicable	to	sovereign	bonds,	however	the	drafting	of	sovereign	bonds	
did	 not	 change	 to	 reflect	 this	 technical	 point.	 See	 R.	 Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	 Douglas,	 R.	 Guynn,	 A.	
Kornbeig,	S.	Paterson,	D.	Singh,	H.	Stonefrost,	Debt	Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	
435.
443 L.	C.	Buchheit	and	G.	M.	Gulati,	Sovereign	bonds	and	the	collective	will,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2002,	p.	
66.
444 The	 excerpt	 of	 the	 CACs	 include	 in	 the	 Mexican	 bonds	 can	 be	 found	 in	 A.	 Gelpern,	 M.	 Gulati,	
Innovation	after	the	revolution:	foreign	sovereign	bond	contracts	since	2003,	Capital	Markets	Law	
Journal,	2009,	pp.	88-89.
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recent issuance now have invariably majority provisions. The reason why issuer were 
reluctant to include such provisions was the fear that the market would have 
demanded a higher spread for bonds diverging from the traditional New York law 
approach (which did not include CACs), given that the individual rights were limited 
in favour of the majority.445
Some authors also highlighted certain disadvantages linked to the use of CACs, 
namely, the fact that not including these clauses could have sent a strong message to 
the market (i.e. that there was no possibility to restructure), that governments were 
expecting to receive an official sector bailout therefore there was little need to have a 
mechanics that would allow debtors to resolve the distressed situation without a 
bailout, provisions that facilitate restructuring may have brought to more “casual” 
restructurings and, finally, that CACs may have raised the cost of borrowing (as 
counterbalance for the flexibility granted to the debtor), which however was proven 
wrong.446
The public sector was also supporting the introduction of CACs in New York law 
bonds: in particular the Group of Ten (a committee of the IMF)447 elaborated a 
proposal for a set of model clauses to be used in sovereign bonds.448
The two main typologies of CACs are: (i) the majority restructuring provisions; and 
(ii) the majority enforcement provisions.449
 Majority restructuring provisions: these are provisions which empower a 
supermajority to bind all bondholders to certain amendments to the terms of 
the bonds, including the final maturity, the amount of interest to be paid and 
other related changes.450 When negotiation the original terms of the bonds, 
                                                                                                                                     
445 R.	Gray,	Collective	action	 clauses:	 theory	and	practice,	 Georgetown	 Journal	 of	 International	Law,	
2004,	p.	698.
446 L.	C.	Buchheit	and	G.	M.	Gulati,	Sovereign	bonds	and	the	collective	will,	Emory	Law	Journal,	2002,	
pp.	51	ss.
447 For	 more	 information	 see	 the	 IMF	 factsheet	 on	 the	 IMF	 committees	 available	 at:	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G10.
448 The	report	prepared	by	the	Group	of	Ten	on	CACs	is	available	at:	www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf	.
449 See	a	summary	of	the	main	provisions	in	recent	bonds	issues	in	J.	Dey,	Collective	Action	Clauses,	
Sovereign	Bondholders	cornered?,	Law	and	Business	Review	of	the	Americas,	2009,	pp.	505-507.
450 A	sample	clause	to	deal	with	majority	restructuring	provisions	is	the	following:	
“Reserve	Matters.	Any	modification,	amendment,	supplement	or	waiver	of	the	Trust	Indenture	or	
the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	Bonds	that	would:	
(i)	change	the	date	for	payment	of	principal	of,	or	any	installment	of	interest	on,	the	Bonds;	
(ii)	 reduce	 the	 principal	 amount	 or	 redemption	 price	 or	 premium,	 if	 any,	 payable	 under	 the	
Bonds;	
(iii)	reduce	the	portion	of	the	principal	amount	which	is	payable	in	the	event	of	an	acceleration	of	
the	maturity	of	the	Bonds;	
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there is always a tension between the issuer and the creditors in relation to 
the threshold to be included as supermajority: the issuer would rather have a 
lower figure, in order to facilitate the process of reaching the required 
majority and having a certain degree of predictability and flexibility, whilst 
the creditors would prefer to have a higher number so that they are not 
outvoted by dissenting bondholders, seeking therefore an adequate 
protection.451In New York law bonds, the percentage is generally between 
75% and 85% (calculated as the percentage of outstanding principal amount 
of bonds at the relevant time), including sometimes the right for 10% of the 
outstanding principal amount at the time to block any amendments to the 
key economics terms of the bond. In English law bonds, the percentage is 
broadly the same but calculated differently: the percentage refers to the 
amount of cast votes at a duly convened meeting (whereby a certain 
percentage of the principal amount of outstanding bonds shall be 
gathered).452
                                                                                                                                     
(iv)	reduce	the	interest	rate	on	the	Bonds;	
(v)	change	the	currency	or	place	of	payment	of	any	amount	payable	under	the	Bonds;	
(vi)	change	the	obligation	of	the	Issuer	to	pay	Additional	Amounts	in	accordance	with	the	Trust	
Indenture,	
(vii)	change	the	definition	of	Outstanding	or	reduce	the	quorum	requirements	or	the	percentage	
of	votes	required	for	the	taking	of	any	action	pursuant	to	this	Section	___;	
(viii)	authorize	the	Trustee,	on	behalf	of	all	Holders,	to	exchange	or	substitute	the	Bonds	for,	or	
convert	the	Bonds	into,	other	obligations	or	securities	of	the	Issuer	or	any	other	person;	
(ix)	instruct	the	Trustee,	on	behalf	of	all	Holders,	to	settle	or	compromise	any	proceeding	or	claim	
asserted	by	the	Trustee	pursuant	to	Section	___;	
(x)	give	to	any	person	or	group	of	persons,	other	than	the	Trustee,	the	exclusive	right	to	enforce	
any	provision	of	the	Trust	Indenture or	the	Bonds	on	behalf	of	all	Holders;	or	
(xi)	 appoint	 any	 person	 or	 group	 of	 persons	 to	 represent	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Holders	 in	 any	
discussions	with	the	Issuer	or	any	other	creditors	of	the	Issuer	in	connection	with	any	proposed	
restructuring	of	the	Bonds	or	other	indebtedness	of	the	Issuer,
may	be	made	with	the	consent	of	the	Holders	of	more	than	75%	(or	in	the	case	of	paragraph	(x)	
or	(xi),	66-2/3%)	in	aggregate	principal	amount	of	the	Bonds	at	the	time	outstanding	pursuant	to	
a	 written	 action	 of	 the	 Holders;	 provided	 that	 modifications,	 amendments,	 supplements	 or	
waivers	pursuant	to	paragraph	(xi)	of	this	subsection	may	also	be	made	with	the	consent	of	the	
Holders	 of	 more	 than	 66-2/3%	 in	 aggregate	 principal	 amount	 of	 the	 Bonds	 at	 the	 time	
Outstanding	entitled	to	vote	at	a	meeting	of	Holders	convened	and	conducted	in	accordance	with	
Section	___;	provided	further	that	modifications,	amendments,	supplements	or	waivers	pursuant	
to	 paragraphs	 (i)	 through	 (vii)	 of	 this	 subsection	 also	 shall	 require	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 Issuer.”	
Model	clause	prepared	by	the	Group	of	Ten,	available	at:	www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf	.
451 See	H.S.	Scott,	A	bankruptcy	procedure	for	sovereign	debtors?,	The	International	Lawyer,	2003,	p.	
118	 and	 B.	Metzger	 and	M.	 J.	 Hagan,	Collective Action	 Clauses	 in	 International	 Sovereign	 Bonds,	
Journal	of	Banking	and	Finance	Law	and	Practice,	2003,	p.225.
452 B.	Metzger	and	M.	J.	Hagan,	Collective	Action	Clauses	in	International	Sovereign	Bonds,	 Journal	of	
Banking	 and	 Finance	 Law	 and	Practice,	 2003,	 p.225	 and	 see	R.	 Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	 Douglas,	 R.	
Guynn,	 A.	 Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	 D.	 Singh,	 H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	 Restructuring,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	2011,	p.	438-439	for	some	recent	examples	of	thresholds	included	in	CACs	of	recent	bond	
issuances.
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 Majority enforcement provisions: these provisions deal with the capacity of 
the single bondholder to enforce its claims under the bonds following a 
default.453 It is generally required a certain majority in order to be able to 
accelerate the debt (i.e. to declare the debt due and payable) and, following 
acceleration, to enforce the debtor’s claims. Usually, in English law and New 
York law bonds the required majority is 25% or more of the outstanding 
bonds. To the extent the required majority has not been reached, the 
bondholders will only be entitled to the payment of interest and principal 
when falling due however they will not be entitled to demand repayment of 
the entire debt outstanding.454 In New York law bonds it also common to 
                                                                                                                                     
453 A	sample	enforcement	clause	is	as	follows:
“(a)	Control	by	Holders	
The	Holders	of	a	majority	 in	principal	amount	of	 the	Outstanding	Bonds	shall	have	 the	right	 to	
direct	the	time,	method	and	place	of	conducting	any	proceeding	for	any	remedy	available	to	the	
Trustee	or	exercising	any	trust	or	power	conferred	on	the	Trustee; provided	that	
(i)	such	direction	shall	not	be	in	conflict	with	any	rule	of	law	or	this	Indenture;	
(ii)	the	Trustee	shall	not	determine	that	the	action	so	directed	would	be	unjustly	prejudicial	to	the	
Holders	not	taking	part	in	such	direction,	and	
(iii)	the	Trustee	may	take	any	other	action	deemed	proper	by	the	Trustee	that	is	not	inconsistent	
with	such	direction.	
(b)	Limitation	on	Suits	
No	 Holder	 of	 any	 Bond	 or	 coupon	 shall	 have	 any	 right	 to	 institute	 any	 proceeding,	 judicial	 or	
otherwise,	with	 respect	 to	 the	Bonds	or	 this	 Indenture,	or	 for	 the	appointment	of	a	 receiver	or	
trustee,	or	for	any	other	remedy	hereunder,	unless:
(i)	such	Holder	has	previously	given	written	notice	to	the	Trustee	of	a	continuing	Event	of	Default;	
(ii)	the	Holders	of	not	less	than	25%	in	aggregate	principal	amount	of	the	Bonds	Outstanding	at	
that	 time	 shall	 have	made	written	 request	 to	 the	Trustee	 to	 institute	proceedings	 in	 respect	of	
such	Event	of	Default	in	its	own	name	as	Trustee	hereunder;	
(iii)	 such	Holder	or	Holders	shall	have	offered	 to	 the	Trustee	reasonable	 indemnity	against	 the	
costs,	expenses	and	liabilities	to	be	incurred	in	compliance	with	such	request;		
(iv)	 the	Trustee	 for	90	days	after	 its	receipt	of	such	notice,	request	and	offer	of	 indemnity	shall	
have	failed	to	institute	such	a	proceeding;	and	
(v)	no	direction	inconsistent	with	such	written	request	has	been	given	to	the	Trustee	during	such	
90	day	period	by	the	Holders	of	a	majority	in	principal	amount	of	the	Bonds	Outstanding	at	that	
time;	
it	being	understood	and	intended	that	no	one	or	more	Holders	of	Bonds	or	coupons	shall	have	any	
right	in	any	manner	whatever	by	virtue	of,	or	by	availing	of,	any	provisions	of	this	Indenture	to	
affect,	disturb	or	prejudice	the	rights	of	any	other	Holders	of	Bonds	or	coupons,	or	 to	obtain	or	
seek	 to	obtain	priority	or	preference	over	any	other	Holders	or	 to	enforce	any	right	under	this	
Indenture,	except	in	the	manner	herein	provided	and	for	the	equal	and	rateable	benefit	of	all	the	
Holders	 of	 Bonds	 and	 coupons.” Model	 clause	 prepared	 by	 the	 Group	 of	 Ten,	 available	 at:	
www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf	.
454 A	sample	acceleration	clause	is	as	follows:
“Acceleration.	 If	 an	Event	of	Default	 occurs	 and	 is	 continuing,	 then,	 and	 in	 every	 such	 case,	 the	
Trustee	 may,	 or	 shall	 upon	 the	 instruction	 of	 the	 Holders	 of	 not	 less	 than	 25%	 in	 aggregate	
principal	amount	of	the	Bonds	Outstanding	at	that	time,	declare	the	principal	of,	and	any	interest	
accrued	on,	all	the	Bonds	to	be	due	and	payable	immediately	by	a	notice	in	writing	to	the	Issuer,	
and	 upon	 any	 such	 declaration	 such	 principal	 and	 interest	 shall	 become	 immediately	 due	 and	
payable.” Model	clause	prepared	by	the	Group	of	Ten,	available	at:	www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf	.
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include a de-acceleration provision according to which upon cure or waiver 
the outstanding defaults by the borrower a certain majority (usually between 
50% and 75%) is entitled to de-accelerate the debt,455 so that it is not due and 
payable and the pre-established repayment dates apply.456Majority 
enforcement provisions may also deal with the right of the bondholders to 
initiate a legal proceeding, which is generally restricted so that only a 
qualifying majority of bondholders are entitled to proceed. English law 
bonds are issued under trust deeds, and under a trust deed the trustee is the 
only entity entitled to start a legal proceeding in respect of the claims arising 
from the bonds (upon instructions of a certain majority of bondholders, 
usually 20-25%), therefore prohibiting single bondholder to commence 
individual actions. A trust deed, furthermore, requires the proceeds of any 
litigation to the applied pro rata across all bondholders, making less 
attractive the litigation option for holdout creditors. On the other hand, New 
York law bonds may also adopt the fiscal agent structure, whereby there is 
no trustee acting on behalf of the bondholders, and hence the relevance of 
clauses dealing with majorities for initiating legal proceedings.457
A common feature for both types of clauses is that the bonds held by the 
borrower (upon debt buy backs) are disenfranchised for the purposes of 
calculating the relevant majorities, so that the relevant debtor cannot 
influence the voting process.458
Further examples of CACs, not yet very developed, are the representation clauses 
and the aggregation clauses. 
                                                                                                                                     
455 A	sample	de-acceleration	clause	is	as	follows:
“Rescission	 of	 Acceleration.	 If	 any	 and	 all	 existing	 Events	 of	Default	 hereunder,	 other	 than	 the	
non-payment	of	 the	principal	of	 the	Bonds	which	shall	have	become	due	solely	by	acceleration,	
shall	have	been	cured,	waived	or	otherwise	remedied	as	provided	herein,	then,	and	in	every	such	
case,	 the	 Holders	 of	 66-2/3%	 in	 aggregate	 principal	 amount	 of	 the	 Bonds	 Outstanding	 at	 that	
time,	by	written	notice	to	the	Issuer	and	to	the	Trustee	as	set	forth	in	the	Trust	Indenture,	may,	on	
behalf	 of	 all	 the	 Holders,	 rescind	 and	 annul	 any	 prior	 declaration	 of	 the	 acceleration	 of	 the	
principal	of	and	interest	accrued	on	the	Bonds	and	its	consequences,	but	no	such	rescission	and	
annulment	shall	extend	to	or	affect	any	subsequent	default,	or	shall	impair	any	right	consequent	
thereon.	Actions	by	Holders	pursuant	 to	 this	 Section	 ___	may	be	 taken	by	written	 action	of	 the	
Holders.“	Model	clause	prepared	by	the	Group	of	Ten,	available	at:	www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf	.
456 B.	Metzger	and	M.	J.	Hagan,	Collective	Action	Clauses	in	International	Sovereign	Bonds,	 Journal	of	
Banking	and	Finance	Law	and	Practice,	2003,	p.225-226.
457 B.	Metzger	and	M.	J.	Hagan,	Collective	Action	Clauses	in	International	Sovereign	Bonds,	 Journal	of	
Banking	and	Finance	Law	and	Practice,	2003,	p.226.
458 For	recent	examples	of	CACs	introduced	in	sovereign	bonds	see	R.	Olivares-Caminal,	J.	Douglas,	R.	
Guynn,	 A.	 Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	 D.	 Singh,	 H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	 Restructuring,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	2011,	p.	442- 448	and	M.	Gugiatti	and	A.	Richards,	The	use	of collective	action	clauses	in	New	
York	law	bonds	of	sovereign	borrowers,	Georgetown	Journal	of	International	Law,	2004,	pp.	815-
835.
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Representation clauses deal with the procedure for negotiations between the debtor 
and the classes of creditors. These clauses can be more or less detailed and provide a 
framework for negotiation, from the process to be followed to convene the borrower 
and creditors for negotiations, the method for representing the creditors and the 
necessary details and information to be provided by the borrower in the context of a 
restructuring. It could deal also, for instance, with the appointment of a bondholders’ 
representative that would then be entitled to represent and voice the collective 
interests of the bondholders.459
Aggregation clauses amplifies the effect of majority restructuring clauses and 
majority enforcement provisions by providing such clause to apply not only to the 
specific debt instrument in which they have been included, but also to all further 
bond issuances, so that the creditors’ claims in separate bond issuances are 
aggregated. They generally require a double majority: an overall majority in respect 
of al the series involved and a majority in respect of each single issue of bonds.460
These clauses allow the debtor to engage in a comprehensive restructuring with all 
bonds issuances covered by such aggregation clause and avoid hold outs issues in 
respect of creditors controlling a single bond issue amongst many and trying to block 
the entire restructuring process.461
A very recent and interesting development is the requirement for all bonds with 
maturity more than one year issued in the European market (both national and 
international securities) to include CACs starting from 1 January 2013, as a measure 
against the occurrence of situations as the Greek restructuring (see next chapter) to 
happen again in the Eurozone and facilitate orderly and voluntary restructurings and 
reduce the issue of holdout creditors. The CACs to be included in the Eurobonds will 
also have an aggregation clause so that the majority provisions will apply across 
multiple issuances of bonds, making it more difficult for vulture funds to acquire a 
blocking position and stop the restructuring process.462
                                                                                                                                     
459 B.	Metzger	and	M.	 J.	Hagan,	Collective	Action	Clauses	 in	 International	Sovereign	Bonds,	 Journal	of	
Banking	and	Finance	Law	and	Practice,	2003,	p.226.
460 Uruguay	introduced	an	aggregation	clause	in	its	bonds	issued	in	2003,	which	required	a	double	
majority	as	 follows:	(i)	85%	of	 the	aggregate	principal	amount	of	all	affected	series;	and	(ii)	66	
2/3%	 of	 each	 specific	 series. See	 R.	 Olivares-Caminal,	 Is	 there	 a	 need	 for	 an	 International	
Insolvency	 Regime	 in	 the	 Context	 of	 Sovereign	 Debt?	 A	 case	 for	 the	 Use	 of	 Corporate	 Debt	
Restructuring	Techniques,	Journal	of	International	Banking	Law	and	Regulation,	2009,	pp.	21-34.
461 B.	Metzger	and	M.	 J.	Hagan,	Collective	Action	Clauses	 in	 International	Sovereign	Bonds,	 Journal	of	
Banking	and	Finance	Law	and	Practice,	2003,	p.226.
462 C.	 de	 Vrieze,	 New	 sovereign	 CAC	 provision	 a	 step	 forward,	 but	 unlikely	 to	 resolve	 future	 debt	
restructurings,	published	online	on	Debtwire	on	12	December	2012.
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In practice, it must be noted that CACs are a partial solution, due to the fact that the 
vast majority of sovereign debt was issued several years ago (in particular the Brady 
bonds – see chapter three), will mature in many years to come (most of them will 
mature in 2025) and do not include CACs. Therefore the holdout issue may still be 
relevant and is not resolved.463
CACs are surely an effective tool to improve certain aspects of sovereign debt 
restructuring, in particular to avoid lengthy litigation with vulture funds which 
exacerbate the delicate position of a country going through a financial crisis, and they 
help creating an orderly framework to operate, setting out procedures ahead of the 
critical time, making the process quicker and more efficient.
The other useful effect is that the widespread use of these clauses “educates” the 
market and the investors, so that they are familiar with the process and they know 
what to expect if a distressed event occurs, avoiding panic attacks in the market, 
which a
It is worth noting that similar clauses are now generally included in private sector 
financing both in the form of loans and bonds. During the recent financial crisis the 
private sector had to face several restructuring process due to the incapacity of 
several companies to maintain the service of their debts as prior to the financial crisis. 
Most the debt documents did not include majority voting provisions so that 
unanimous decisions were often required, making the process a lengthy one and 
offering chances to holdout creditors to create issues in the negotiations.
Following such experiences, many practitioners included in the documentation 
clauses to deal with restructuring situations whereby a supermajority (generally 
between 75% and 85%) is entitled to change the economic terms of the loan 
agreement or bond instrument.
It has been argued that CACs do not deal with certain key issues of sovereign debt 
restructuring, in particular there is still the need to grant a “stay” to enforcement 
actions during the negotiations in order to avoid disruptive legal proceeding during 
the delicate phase of the restructuring and there is still no mechanics to provide 
rescue financing to the borrower in a distressed situation.464
It is certainly true that no statutory provisions as per national insolvency procedures 
are currently in place and CACs cannot offer such protections. It is however correct 
to say that CACs can be worded so that they empower the majority to enter into a 
                                                                                                                                     
463 S.	Hoger,	Towards	a	Reorganisation	System	for	Sovereign	Debt:	an	 International	Law	perspective,	
Brill	 Academic	 Publishers,	 2007,	 pp.	 33-35	 and	 on	 CACs	 generally,	 A.	 Gelpern,	 M.	 Gulati,	
Innovation	after the	revolution:	foreign	sovereign	bond	contracts	since	2003,	Capital	Markets	Law	
Journal,	2009,	pp.	85-103	and	J.	Dey,	Collective	Action	Clauses,	 Sovereign	Bondholders	 cornered?,	
Law	and	Business	Review	of	the	Americas,	2009,	pp.	485-530.
464 D.A.	Jr.	Skeel,	Can	Majority	Voting	Provisions	do	it	all?, Emory	Law	Journal,	2003,	pp.	417- 426.
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contractual standstill which bounds all the bondholders and prevents any 
bondholder from commencing a legal proceeding, granting effectively the same level 
of protection to the debtor. In the same way, a CAC can be worded so that the 
majority is entitled to vote in favour of the introduction of an additional layer of debt 
ranking super senior, permitting the borrower to receive additional financing which 
would have priority over the existing debt, and being therefore more attractive for 
potential lenders.
In conclusion, CACs are not the answer to all the outstanding issues in the context of 
sovereign debt restructuring, however, they are a flexible instrument which has 
improved the debt restructuring process, creating an orderly framework for it, and 
which can further improve it, with innovative wordings which can be introduced in 
the future.465
c) Exit consents
Exit consents are a technique used in the context of sovereign debt restructuring in 
the event that the debt documentation to be restructured does not include majority 
voting provisions, requiring unanimous consent for amendments to its economic 
terms.466
According to such technique, the holders of the bonds in default, which have 
accepted an exchange offer, at the time when they accept the exchange offer are also 
requested to give their consent for certain amendments of the existing bond 
documentation. To the extent the majority required to amend the terms of the 
documentation is not reached, the exchange offer does not go through (i.e. the 
exchange offer is conditional upon the amendment of the terms of the existing 
documentation). The amendments concern those previsions which are not related to 
the economic terms of the bonds (which would require a unanimous consent to be 
amended), such as covenants and events of default.
The final result of the exit consent is that bondholders which do not accept the 
exchange offer are left with the old bonds, amended however in a way which make 
them very unattractive in legal and financial terms (so called covenant stripping, 
                                                                                                                                     
465 On	CACs	see	also	N.	Ishikawa,	Towards	the	Holy	Grail	of	orderly	sovereign	debt	restructuring	Pt	I:	
the	use	 of	 CACs	 in	 sovereign	 debt	 financing,	 Journal	 of	 International Banking	 and	Financial	 Law,	
2007,	pp.	333-338	and	N.	Ishikawa,	Towards	the	Holy	Grail	of	orderly	sovereign	debt	restructuring	
Pt	 II:	 optimum	 architecture	 of	 collective	 action	 clauses,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Banking	 and	
Financial	Law,	2007,	pp.	404-412.
466 Exit	consent	techniques	can	also	be	used	if	majority	voting	provisions	have	been	included	but	the	
relevant	majority	has	not	been	reached,	so	that	payment	terms	cannot	be	amended.
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which leaves the bondholder with very few of the original contractual protections 
included in the debt instrument).467
Ecuador was the first government to use exit consent techniques, in 2000, requiring 
the existing bonds to the amended as follows:
 all payment defaults had to be cured, so that the debt could be de-accelerated 
(i.e. not due and payable);
 deletion of the provisions prohibiting Ecuador to buy back the existing bonds 
while a payment default is continuing;
 deletion of the covenant according to which Ecuador undertook not to seek a 
further restructuring of the bonds;
 deletion of the cross default event of default (so that a default under the 
newly issued bonds would have not triggered an event of default under the 
old bonds);
 deletion of the negative pledge covenant (so that the borrower could grant 
additional security to other creditors);
 deletion of the covenant according to which the old bonds had to be listed on 
the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (turning effectively the old bonds in not 
tradable instruments).468
Uruguay, in 2003, also used exit techniques, but in a slightly different way in respect 
of the Ecuador exit consent. Uruguay, in fact, rather than making the exchange offer 
conditional upon the implementation of the required amendments in the old bonds, 
included a “check the box” exit consent, whereby bondholders could voluntary 
choose to give their consent to the amendments, but the exchange offer was not 
conditional upon the required majority for the amendment being reached.469
As it has been noted by certain commentators, the downside of exit consent is that 
this technique has an element of coercion, which could go beyond the squeezing of 
the holdout creditors and there therefore a certain risk of abusing the minority. This 
                                                                                                                                     
467 R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	Douglas,	R.	Guynn,	A.	Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	D.	 Singh,	H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	
Restructuring,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	p.	442-448.
468 R.	 Olivares-Caminal,	 Is	 there	 a	 need	 for	 an	 International	 Insolvency	 Regime	 in	 the	 Context	 of	
Sovereign	 Debt?	 A	 case	 for	 the	 Use	 of	 Corporate	 Debt	 Restructuring	 Techniques,	 Journal	 of	
International	Banking	Law	and	Regulation,	2009,	pp.	31-32.
469 R.	 Olivares-Caminal,	 Is	 there	 a	 need	 for	 an	 International	 Insolvency	 Regime	 in	 the	 Context	 of	
Sovereign	 Debt?	 A	 case	 for	 the	 Use	 of	 Corporate	 Debt	 Restructuring	 Techniques,	 Journal	 of	
International	 Banking	 Law	and	Regulation,	 2009,	 pp.	 32	 and	R.	Olivares-Caminal,	 J.	 Douglas,	 R.	
Guynn,	 A.	 Kornbeig,	 S.	 Paterson,	 D.	 Singh,	 H.	 Stonefrost,	Debt	 Restructuring,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	2011,	p.	445-446.
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is not the case in the event the exit consent is on a voluntary basis, as per the 
Paraguay example.470
On the other hand, the advantages of exit consents are as follows:
 they require no change to existing laws or standard form of bond 
documentation;
 they can be implemented only at a time when the debtor has found a 
restricting proposal deemed acceptable by the majority of its creditors;
 they ensure that the majority of creditors and the debtor itself are not 
exploited by a dissident minority of creditors, protecting them from 
opportunistic free riders of the market;
 the opportunity of implementing an exit consent will induce the debtor to 
propose an exchange offer good enough to attract a super majority support, 
indirectly strengthening the negotiation position of the bondholders.471
                                                                                                                                     
470 L.	C.	Buchheit	and	G.	M. Gulati,	Exit	consents	in	sovereign	bond	exchanges,	UCLA	Law	Review,	2000,	
pp.	60-84.
471 L.	C.	Buchheit	and	G.	M.	Gulati,	Exit	consents	in	sovereign	bond	exchanges,	UCLA	Law	Review,	2000,	
pp.	82-83.
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4. THE GREEK RESTRUCTURING
In this chapter the Greek case will be analysed. The main peculiarity of this 
restructuring is that it deals with government member of the European Union: 
historically, no European country had defaulted since the World War II472 and this 
restructuring challenged the idea that sovereign defaults are for developing 
countries only and unthinkable for UE countries.
a) Background
The Greek drama commenced in October 2009, when the government revealed the 
deficit figures, making clear that the external indebtedness of the government was 
unsustainable and a restructuring of the debt would have been necessary.
The situation continued to deteriorate and became so critical that Greek sovereign 
bond yields rose up to 900 basis points over German bunds, making practically 
impossible for Greece to have access to the bond markets. The Greek government 
was then forced to turn to the European institutions and the international financial 
organisations for help.
A rescue package was put in place, consisting of Euro 80 billion in EU loans and 
additional Euro 30 billion granted by the IMF, conditional upon implantation of 
certain fiscal measures and structural reforms to restore competitiveness and growth.
Shortly after, the leaders of the European Union agreed to implement additional 
rescue measures, in particular the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF)473 with a lending budget equal to Euro 440 billion and destined to sovereign in 
financial distress and a secondary market purchase program (SMP) by the European 
Central Bank,474 according to which the European Central Bank had a mandate to 
purchase on the secondary market sovereign debt for the purposes of stabilising the 
spread of the relevant bonds.475
                                                                                                                                     
472 Germany	restructured	its	war	debt	in	1953,	but	the	proper	default	dates	back	a	decade	earlier.
473 The	mission	of	the	EFSF	is:	“The	EFSF’s	mandate	is	to	safeguard	financial	stability	in	Europe	by	
providing	 financial	 assistance	 to	 euro	 area	 Member	 States	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 a	 macro-
economic	 adjustment	 programme.	 To	 fulfil	 its	 mission,	 EFSF	 issues	 bonds	 or	 other	 debt	
instruments	on	the	capital	markets.	The	proceeds	of	these	issues	are	then	lent	to	countries	under	
a	programme.	The	EFSF	may	also	intervene	in	the	primary	and	secondary	bond	markets,	act	on	
the	 basis	 of	 a	 precautionary	 programme	 and	 finance	 recapitalisations	 of	 financial	 institutions	
through	 loans	 to	 governments.”	 See	 EFSF	 website	 on:	
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm.	
474 For	 more	 information	 on	 the	 program	 (now	 terminated)	 see	 the	 ECB	 website	 on:	
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/facts/monpol/html/mp_013.en.html.
475 J.	Zettelmeyer,	C.	Trebesch,	M.	Gulati,	The	Greek	Debt	Restructuring:	An	Autopsy,	CESifo	Working	
Paper	Series, number	4333,	2013.
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Notwithstanding the rescue plan, in 2011 it became clear that the improvements
required to manage the Greek debt burdens were not sufficiently advanced (with a 
continuing negative GDP ratio) and that the debt would have soon become 
unsustainable.476
The involvement of the private sector in a second round of restructuring was 
inevitable and additional official financing would also be required. Before analysing 
the technical structure of the second restructuring, it will be helpful to set out the 
structure of the Greek private debt which needed to be reprofiled.
It is also relevant to recall that the Greek restructuring from a social point of view 
borne heavy consequences and endless public manifestations against the austerity 
measures, which added further complexity due to the political instability that such 
opposition created.477
b) Structure of the Greek indebtedness
The vast majority of the Greek private debt was in the form of bonds, held mainly by 
institutional investors (mainly French and German banks, together with hedge funds, 
mutual and pensions funds) and very few retail investors.
Almost all the debt was denominated in Euro and, quite surprisingly for 
international Eurobonds, the governing law of the large majority (approximately 
90%) of the bonds was Greek law. English law was the governing law of the majority 
of the remaining bonds. 478
In terms of CACs, the Greek law governed bonds did not include any majority voting 
provisions, whilst English law governed bonds included majority provisions 
allowing amendments to the payment terms with, respectively, a 66% majority in 
bonds issued prior to 2004 and a 75% majority for bonds issued thereafter.479
The peculiar characteristics of the Greek debt posed certain issues in terms of 
structure of the restructuring to be implemented, including certain advantages and 
certain disadvantages.
The main advantages are:
                                                                                                                                     
476 J.	Zettelmeyer,	C.	Trebesch,	M.	Gulati,	The	Greek	Debt	Restructuring:	An	Autopsy,	CESifo	Working	
Paper	Series,	number	4333,	2013.
477 See,	amongst	many,	H.	Smith,	Anger	in	Athens	as	Greek	austerity	measures	passed,	The	Guardian,	
November	 2012,	 available	 at:	 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/07/greece-
austerity-protests-violence.
478 L.	C.	Buchheit,	G.	M.	Gulati,	How	to	Restructure	the	Greek	Debt,	2010,	p.	1-2,	available	at	Available	
at	SSRN:	http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304	or	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1603304.	
479 L.	C.	Buchheit,	G.	M.	Gulati,	How	to	Restructure	the	Greek	Debt,	2010,	p.	2-3,	available	at	Available	
at	SSRN:	http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304	or	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1603304.
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 almost all the private debt was in the form of bonds, so that there were no 
sophisticated intercreditor issues between bank debt and bonds and 
negotiation generally could be carried out with a single category of creditors;
 financial support from multilateral and bilateral sources was available, so the 
newly issued bonds may have been made more attractive using some form of 
“credit enhancement” using as model the Brady bonds;
 very few bonds were held by retail investors, so that the Greek government 
was not in the uncomfortable situation of dealing with thousands of single 
investors;
 most the bonds were governed by the national law, which gave the 
government the option of passing ad hoc laws to deal with the amendment of 
the terms of the bonds.480
On the other hand, the same features presented some disadvantages, as follows:
 a relevant percentage of the bonds was held by Greek institutional investors, 
which implied that any relevant haircut of the debt would have negatively 
impacted on the Greek domestic financial sector itself;
 another category of holders of Greek debt (in a relevant proportion) were 
European banks, whose stability was also relevant for the general well being 
of the European financial framework (in this respect the Greek crisis 
resembled the Latin American crisis of the 1980ies, whereby the deep 
involvement of the international banks requested additional rescue financing 
for years in order to allow such banks to create appropriate loss reserves  to 
allow them to deal with a right off of the sovereign debt without risking the 
bankruptcy of the commercial banks themselves);
 Euro was the currency of most of the debt, and being a currency shared with 
the other members of the European Union, any measure negatively affecting 
such currency would have been reflected on the Euro zone and any loss of 
confidence in the currency would also be propagated to all other EU 
countries.481
                                                                                                                                     
480 L.	C.	Buchheit,	G.	M.	Gulati,	How	to	Restructure	the	Greek	Debt,	2010,	p.	4-5,	available	at	Available	
at	SSRN:	http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304	or	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1603304.
481 L.	C.	Buchheit,	G.	M.	Gulati,	How	to	Restructure	the	Greek	Debt,	2010,	p.	5-6,	available	at	Available	
at	SSRN:	http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304	or	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1603304.
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Next paragraphs will outline the terms of the deal struck for the Greek 
restructuring and some general observations in terms of consequences for the 
future.
c) The Greek deal(s)
At the end of 2011, negotiation with the private sector commenced, in order to reach 
an agreement on the terms of an exchange offer, which was due to considerably 
reduce the private debt burden hanging on Greece.
The negotiation were conducted on behalf of the private creditors by creditors’s 
committee (which, again, reminds of the bank steering committees in the 1980ies (see 
chapter three)) composed by 12 banks, insurers and asset managers holding in 
aggregate about 30-40% of the outstanding debt.
In February 2012, the Greek Government and the committee announced that a deal 
had been found and in March the following exchange offer was presented to the 
investors, so that for every old bond, each investor would receive:
 15% of the face value exchanged with EFEF notes, issued in two separate 
series, one maturing in March 2013 and bearing a 0.4% coupon and the other 
maturing in March 2014 with coupon of 1%;
 31.5% of the face value exchanged with new English law bonds, with 
maturity of up to 30 years;
 a set of detachable GDP-linked securities, which offered an increase in the 
coupon of the principal amount of the new bonds of up to 1%, on the basis 
that the real growth and nominal GDP exceed certain figures starting from 
2015.
Bondholders, as final outcome, suffered a haircut of more than 50%, however, 97% of 
the creditors supported the exchange offer. Main reason for such a successful 
exchange is that institutional investors held the vast majority of the debt, and such 
kind of investors are sensitive to official sector and public opinion pressure and could 
not ignore the European governments and regulators’ recommendations.
Bonds purchased in 2010 by the European Central Bank, the bonds held by the Greek 
central bank and by the European Investment Bank were excluded by the exchange 
159
offer and exchanged into new bonds with identical economics prior to the launch of 
the exchange offer on the market.482
A peculiarity of the restructuring was the inclusion, by means of law, of “retroactive” 
CACs in the bonds governed by Greek law, so that a majority of bondholders could 
vote in order to accept the amendments to the existing Greek bonds required to 
implement the exchange offer. The Greek Bondholder Act permitted to impose new 
payment terms on the dissenting minority with the consent of two thirds of face 
value votes. The CAC would also include an aggregation clause, so that it would 
apply to all series of bonds, with a participation quorum for each series of bonds of 
50% of the face value of the debt. The aggregation clause was fundamental to achieve 
the restructuring of 100% of the Greek law governed bonds.483
The Greek tragedy however was not yet completed.
In November 2012 a further rescue package was required, involving the official 
sector, which agreed to: (i) extend the maturity of the loans advanced by the EFSF 
(with no face value discount); (ii) the European Central Bank’s commitment to return 
to Greece any profit made in respect of the bonds issued prior to the March 2012 
exchange offer; (iii) the EFSF would have advanced further loans to finance the buy 
back of the newly issued bonds (which were trading at a large discount on the 
secondary market); (iv) a commitment by the Eurogroup to “consider further 
measures and assistance, including inter alia lower co-financing in structural funds 
and/or further interest rate reduction of the Greek Loan Facility (i.e. the loan 
advanced by the EFSF to Greece), if necessary, for achieving a further credible and 
sustainable reduction of Greek debt-to-GDP ratio, when Greece reaches an annual 
primary surplus, as envisaged in the current MoU, conditional on full 
implementation of all conditions contained in the programme”.484
In conclusion, the Greek restructuring was an example of a quick and orderly 
restructuring implemented mainly using contractual techniques (i.e. CACs) and 
introducing innovative expressions of such clauses, in particular in relation to the use 
of aggregation clauses in the Greek law bonds. A technical success in a timing and 
size failure: it is unfortunately clear that the magnitude of the crisis would have 
required a much earlier intervention and a more effective reduction of the debt and 
that the efficient technical approach could not compensate such delay.
                                                                                                                                     
482 J.	Zettelmeyer,	C.	Trebesch,	M.	Gulati,	The	Greek	Debt	Restructuring:	An	Autopsy,	CESifo	Working	
Paper	Series,	number	4333,	2013,	pp.	10-11.
483 J.	Zettelmeyer,	C.	Trebesch,	M.	Gulati,	The	Greek	Debt	Restructuring:	An	Autopsy,	CESifo	Working	
Paper	Series,	number	4333,	2013,	p.	26.
484 Eurogroup	statement	on	Greece,	27	November	2012.
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d) The future
The Greek restructuring had several peculiar elements so that it will be difficult to 
use the “Greek model” for future European restructurings.
Surely one main consequence of the Greek meltdown was the introduction of CACs 
(preferably including an aggregation clause), mandatorily, in each Eurobond 
issuance starting from 1 January 2013 (as mentioned above), which testify the success 
of such contractual instrument in sovereign debt restructurings. 
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that the treaty establishing the European 
Stability Mechanism485 (which replaced the EFSF) is amended so that it states that 
assets and revenues of Eurozone members will be immune from attachments during 
the restructuring process, creating a statutory “stay” which would protect European 
countries from opportunistic litigation commenced by holdout creditors, so that the 
financial support provided by the European institutions is not used to repay existing 
payment obligations of creditors which declined to support the restructuring.486
This kind of amendment would substantially replicate one of the key features of 
national insolvency procedure and become, together with the other ad hoc 
innovation such as the establishment of the ESM itself, the closest international 
representation of a statutory mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring.487
                                                                                                                                     
485 The	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism	 is	 an	 intergovernmental	 institutions	 under	 public	
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CONCLUSIONS
The world of sovereign debt restructuring has been characterised for many decades 
(centuries!) by a high level of unpredictability and disorder.
Throughout the several past restructuring episodes, practitioners, multilateral institutions 
and governments have been continuously looking for improvements in the way 
restructurings develop and for solutions to the main technical issues around debt 
workouts.
The need for an orderly sovereign restructuring mechanism is particularly felt due to the 
social consequences on the population that lengthy and inefficient restructurings have, 
limiting the development possibilities of emerging economies and causing social unrest 
and political instabilities in the defaulted countries.
This thesis starts from the acknowledgment of debt sustainability as a key issue for 
development. The main fora whereby international organizations and key influential 
actors of the financial world meet to debate contemporary issues discussed the way 
forward for developing countries in terms of management of their debt burdens. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, a first step to avoid main financial crisis is helping 
emerging economies with the incurrence and maintenance of their external debts, 
supporting them in terms of technical advice to be provided and transparency of the 
market.
In the 1970ies the disparity between the knowledge of experienced bankers offering 
financial products and members of governments of developing countries was such that 
easy mistakes were made and to some extent the unbalance of know how favoured the 
exploitation of such countries. 
Nowadays, recent cases of debt restructuring prove that notwithstanding the presence of 
highly educated members of the government and being part of a sophisticated 
international organization as the European Union, still government can face economic 
crises due to the unsustainability of an external debt not sufficiently monitored.
In order to describe the background whereby sovereign debt restructurings take place, 
the second chapter sets out the various categories of debt that sovereigns generally incur, 
distinguishing between public and private debt. This distinction is particularly relevant 
give the different treatment, in terms of negotiation, that public and private debt receive 
and the fora whereby such negotiations take place. A relevant feature of sovereign debt 
restructuring, however, is the equal treatment between public and private creditors, 
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which requires both sets of creditors to agree upon the same level of reduction of the 
debt, in order not to advantage one class of creditors at the expenses of the other class, 
which would jeopardise the good outcome of the negotiations. In practice the debtors 
negotiate with public creditors a certain debt reduction or rescheduling and then 
undertake to achieve the same level of debt forgiveness from private creditors.
The focus of the thesis is mainly the rescheduling of private debt and the techniques 
adopted throughout the several cases of sovereign debt restructuring which occurred in 
the past decades and the developments and improvements of such instruments.
Each restructuring has its peculiar characteristics therefore it is difficult to trace a model 
for sovereign debt restructurings, as the factual circumstances vary greatly in each case. 
Although for years the need for a statutory mechanism that replicated national 
insolvency procedures has been advocated, this thesis focused on the developments that 
the market itself introduced in the sovereign debt panorama and the positive effects that 
such innovations produced. As mentioned in the forth chapter, Collective Action Clauses 
are flexible instruments which can deal with the main issues affecting sovereign debt 
restructuring, with the advantage that such instruments are negotiated by the debtor and 
the creditors at the time of the issuance, so that they are not felt as an imposition by both 
parties and can be tailored to each specific case.
The introduction of this kind of clauses in sovereign bonds was supported by the US 
Treasury, which was relevant due to the fact that English law bonds already generally 
included CACs, whilst the New York law bonds still resisted to such trend and the 
blessing by the US government was a strong message to the market players which 
eventually accepted to amend the terms of the documentation.
Their flexibility also allows such instruments to be included in any kind of debt 
instrument, so that in the event the market switched back to bank loans (or to the extent 
certain countries still have a majority of bank loans outstanding) rather than bonds, CACs 
can be included also in such documentation, at their issuance or by way of pre-emptive 
amendment in respect of bonds already issued.
The Greek restructuring proved that exchange offers based on bond instruments 
including CACs can be effective and can be implemented in a very short timeframe. 
However, it is worth noting that the Greek debt had the peculiarity of being held mainly 
by institutional investors rather than retail investors, so that communicating and 
negotiating with them was more practical and less time consuming. In Argentina, where 
the bonds were mainly in the hands of retail investors, retrieving the names of each 
investor, locating each of them and then negotiating the terms of the offer was an 
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incredibly time consuming exercise. Therefore it is true that although technically they 
provide a useful tool for restructuring the debt, the circumstances of each specific case 
will impact on the level of effectiveness that such clauses can provide.
As general point, however, the relevance of the CACs is in respect of holdout creditors: 
the vote of a single creditor, in fact, loses its individual weight and in order to obstacle 
the restructuring it is required a so called “blocking” position, equal to the full amount of 
the bonds minus the amount necessary to vote in favour of the amendments plus one.
Acquiring such percentage of bonds is not impossible for specialised investment funds 
which purchase distressed debt on the secondary market. However, this can be avoided 
by the inclusion of aggregation clauses that require a double majority, in the single series 
of bond and across all the series of bonds to which the aggregation clause applies in order 
to vote in favour of the amendments. Acquiring a majority across all series of bonds can 
be challenging (and beyond the capacity) of such investment funds, providing a proper 
protection to the borrowers in distress.
The most recent update in terms of CACs is the decision by the European Union to 
require the mandatory inclusion of CACs in long term European bond issuances, sending 
a strong message to the market. And the development of CACs can solve further issues, 
such as providing for a standstill from enforcement actions and the provision of rescue 
financing to alleviate liquidity issue for distressed borrowers. The question to be 
answered in the following years is whether and to what extent the market will accept the 
inclusion of more sophisticated clauses and more “invasive” in terms of restructuring 
process, so that the price of the bonds remains untouched and the players in the 
sovereign bond panorama accept such further developments, limiting the power of single 
investors in favour of predictability and orderly terms of future restructurings.
There is something cyclical in the financial downturns in history: the recurrent theme 
being that situations of high liquidity bring a high level of confidence that everything is 
and will be fine, encouraging substantial incurrence of debt which is offered at low prices 
on the market. As the boom at the beginning of the XX century was followed by the 
dramatic economic downturn in the 1920ies, in the same way the economic peak at the 
beginning of the XXI century was followed by a financial crisis which challenged the 
strongest economies in the world.
Hence the query whether beyond improving and developing new frameworks to deal 
with sovereign debt restructurings, there is the need to learn from history.
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